Rogers v. Rigell
| Decision Date | 28 November 1936 |
| Docket Number | 11392. |
| Citation | 188 S.E. 704,183 Ga. 455 |
| Parties | ROGERS v. RIGELL et al. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Rehearing Denied Dec. 12, 1936.
Error from Superior Court, Coffee County; A.J. McDonald, Judge.
Suit by J.J. Rogers against B. Rigell, executor, and others. To review an adverse judgment, plaintiff brings error.
Reversed.
Syllabus by the Court.
1. Generally, after the expiration of the term at which a judgment or decree is rendered, it is out of the power of the court to amend it in any matter of substance or in any matter affecting the merits.
2. The power of courts to correct clerical errors and misprisions and to make the record speak the truth by nunc pro tunc amendments after the term does not enable them to change their judgments in substance or in any material respect, nor where such error has misled and prejudiced the party opposing such amendment.
R.A Moore and Heath & Heath, all of Douglas, for plaintiff in error.
Kelley & Dickerson, of Douglas, for defendants in error.
Rogers filed his equitable petition against certain named defendants, seeking cancellation of deeds, accounting, and other relief. On June 10, 1935, the case came on for trial at a recessed session of the March term, 1935, of the court. At the conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence on June 11 1935, the defendants moved for nonsuit, which was granted on said date, and judgment of nonsuit was rendered. The judge entered this judgment on the bench docket as having been rendered on June 11, 1935. However, the actual judgment written on the plaintiff's petition and signed by the judge, through mistake of the scrivener, was dated June 12 1935. On December 11, 1935, within six months from the date appearing on the original judgment, the plaintiff, relying on June 12, 1935, as the correct date of the judgment, recommended his action against defendants. At the March term, 1936, and after the adjournment of the term at which said judgment was rendered, the defendants filed therein their motion to have this judgment so revised and amended as to show that it was rendered on June 11, 1935, instead of June 12, 1935. The plaintiff, in response, set up that this motion should not be granted, that it appeared that the court was without jurisdiction and power to alter, change, revise, or amend the date of the judgment of nonsuit, as sought by the defendants, in that the term at which same was rendered had expired, and that it was inequitable and unjust for defendants then to insist that the date of said judgment be changed to June 11, the plaintiff having relied on and been guided by the date of the original judgment as it appeared on the original petition in recommencing the case, and that it was laches and negligence on defendants' part to wait until a subsequent term from the rendition of said judgment, nine months thereafter, and after the plaintiff had recommenced his action, before moving to have the date appearing on the original judgment changed and the minutes of the court amended in accordance therewith; and, further, that the defendants were estopped, and the judgment was binding on them. The judge granted the motion and amended said judgment, and the plaintiff excepted.
While it is true that "Every court has power * * * to amend and control its processes and orders, so as to make them conformable to law and justice; and to amend its own records so as to make them conform to the truth" (Code, § 24-104(6), and "As a general rule the court will amend the entries of its orders on the minutes, or the records and other proceedings, nunc pro tunc, * * * when there is something on the face of the proceedings to amend by, from which what actually took place in the prior proceedings can be clearly ascertained and known," and "in all cases where such amendment will clearly be in furtherance of justice" (Code, § 81-1201) it is likewise the rule that "After the expiration of the term at which a judgment or decree was rendered, it is out...
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