Rogers v. Rogers, 93-CA-00771-SCT

• Decision Date: 26 October 1995
• Docket Number: No. 93-CA-00771-SCT,93-CA-00771-SCT
• Parties: William Martin ROGERS v. Frances Gail ROGERS.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Page 1111

662 So.2d 1111

William Martin ROGERS v. Frances Gail ROGERS.

No. 93-CA-00771-SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Oct. 26, 1995.

Christopher A. Tabb, Brandon, for appellant.

Brent E. Southern, Upshaw Williams Biggers Page & Kruger, Jackson, for appellee.

En Banc.

PRATHER, Presiding Justice, for the Court:

I. INTRODUCTION

On June 15, 1993, the Hinds County Chancery Court cited William Martin Rogers (William) for civil contempt, on a motion brought by his ex-wife Frances Gail Rogers (Frances). Aggrieved, William appeals to this Court assigning as error the following:

1) THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE APPELLANT SHOULD PAY CHILD SUPPORT AFTER THE CHILD REACHED THE AGE OF 21.

2) THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE PROPER ALLOWANCE OF CHILD SUPPORT.

3) THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING SUPPORT SHOULD CONTINUE AFTER FOUR YEARS WHEN THE ADULT CHILD WAS NOT MAKING ADEQUATE PROGRESS TOWARD A COLLEGE DECREE.

4) THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE APPELLANT SHOULD PAY MEDICAL EXPENSES AFTER THE CHILD REACHED THE AGE OF 21.

5) THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE APPELLANT SHOULD PAY ONE HALF OF ALL MEDICAL EXPENSES NOT COVERED BY INSURANCE FOR THE ADULT CHILD, WHERE THE ADULT CHILD PROVIDED NO PROOF OF WHAT INSURANCE COVERED, AND NO PROOF THAT THE CHILD PRESENTED

THE APPELLANT WITH THOSE MEDICAL BILLS.

6) THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE APPELLANT SHOULD CONTINUE LIFE INSURANCE WITH THE MINOR CHILD AS BENEFICIARY.

7) THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES WITHOUT PROOF OF APPELLEE'S INABILITY TO PAY.

II. FACTS

William Martin Rogers (William) and Frances Gail Rogers (Frances) filed a Joint Complaint for Divorce with the Chancery Court of Hinds County, First Judicial District, on May 13, 1983. The presiding chancellor awarded a divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences on July 14, 1983. The couple had two children, Kimberly Hope Rogers (Hope), born June 16, 1971, and William Christopher Rogers (Christopher), born February 22, 1974.

On July 1, 1983, both parties agreed to a property settlement pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 93-5-2 (Supp.1993). William agreed to pay $100 per month in support for each minor child until the child had reached 18, married, became self-supporting, or became emancipated. Alternatively, William agreed to pay child support as long the children attended school or college.

William also agreed to provide hospitalization and one-half of the children's reasonable medical and dental care not covered by insurance. William agreed to list his children as beneficiaries of any life insurance policies he owned at that time.

On April 23, 1987, the chancellor increased child support to $400 per month for both children for 1987, and to $500 per month for 1988 and thereafter. On October 11, 1989, the chancellor permitted William to discontinue making child support payments for Christopher, and allowed William to make support payments directly to Hope.

On March 15, 1991, Hope and William agreed to college support payments of $400 per month of which $250 of this amount went to satisfy the previous child support order and $150 went to satisfy an arrearage of child support. By agreed court order, William paid college support directly to his daughter. Hope reached the age of 21 on June 16, 1992.

In January 1993, Hope allegedly ceased receiving child support payments. She also asserted that she never received support for any medical or dental bills. In addition, Hope contended that William had never presented her with a notice of beneficiary status for his life insurance policies.

On March 22, 1993, Frances filed a motion for contempt against William. Frances alleged that William had not paid child support as agreed. In addition, Frances alleged that William had not paid one-half of the uninsured medical and dental expenses. Furthermore, Frances alleged that William had not maintained a life insurance policy naming the children as beneficiaries.

The chancellor held a contempt hearing on June 9, 1993. Frances testified that William had neither paid child support and medical bills, nor provided for insurance as he had agreed to do. Hope testified that she had never sent the medical bills to her father, but William had notice of the unpaid medical expenses within the contempt pleading. In her college studies, Hope had sometimes enrolled for as few as nine semester hours, and passed only six hours. Hope admitted that she had been enrolled in college for four years and she anticipated another two years of college.

William countered that the property settlement did not require him to provide any medical payments after Hope reached her majority. William stated that the property settlement required him to assist the minor children in their medical and dental bills. This settlement released him from payments for medical or dental bills after the children's majority. William made the same assertion with regard to the life insurance policy.

William then asserted that the subsequent decree increasing the amount of child support released him from child support payments after majority, since it did not specify post-majority payments. William also asserted that Hope was intentionally prolonging her education, making further child support an inequitable burden on him.

The chancellor determined that William was contractually bound under his agreement to pay post-majority college support for his children while they attended school or college. Examining this agreement, the chancellor noted no requirement that the children attend school full-time.

The chancellor further interpreted the property agreement to mean that Hope was a minor child for purposes of medical and dental bills and insurance while she pursued her education. The chancellor held that William's obligation to support Hope under this agreement would last for a reasonable time. The chancellor determined six years to be a reasonable time. The chancellor decreed William should pay child support for two additional years.

The chancellor further decreed that the amount of support should be $400 per month. The chancellor also required William to pay one-half of all past and future medical bills. In addition, the chancellor ordered William to pay $1,000 of Frances' attorney fees, from a request of approximately $1,700.

The chancellor found William in civil contempt for non-payment of that child support. Aggrieved, William filed his notice of appeal to this Court on June 30, 1993. Frances cross-appealed for full payment of attorney fees.

III. ANALYSIS

1) DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE APPELLANT SHOULD PAY CHILD SUPPORT AFTER THE CHILD REACHED THE AGE OF 21?

2) DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DETERMINING THE PROPER ALLOWANCE OF CHILD SUPPORT?

The standard for appellate review is that the chancellor's finding is affirmed "unless the chancellor was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous or an erroneous legal standard was applied." See, e.g., Crow v. Crow, 622 So.2d 1226, 1228 (Miss.1993). Substantial evidence must support the decision. Mullins v. Ratcliff, 515 So.2d 1183, 1189 (Miss.1987). ¹

This Court has held it will enforce post-majority agreements for child support, during a child's college attendance. Crow, 622 So.2d at 1230. In this case, William contracted with his wife in 1983, at the time of the divorce, and made such an agreement. Therefore, the chancellor was correct in enforcing the agreement between these two contracting parties.

William further asserts that the original agreement set "collegiate" child support at $100 per month. He argues that this amount represents his maximum obligation. He argues that subsequent court orders increasing child support did not expressly extend the increase for "collegiate" child support past majority and that the court's failure to do so ends his obligation to pay increased obligations after majority.

The chancellor found that subsequent orders increasing Hope's child support referred back to the original divorce agreement. The chancellor found that William incurred increased obligations to pay during Hope's education implicitly through each modification.

There was ample evidence in the record to support the chancellor's interpretation of the "collegiate" child support agreement. Hope testified that she received $250 per month until January 1993, six months after reaching majority. Clearly, William's actions demonstrated that he believed the collegiate child support agreement transcended Hope's majority. Furthermore, no later modifications limit the age for Hope to receive support. William himself entered an agreed order on March 15, 1991, obligating himself to pay $250 per month child support to Hope. William agreed to pay this amount "in accordance with the applicable Divorce Decree."

In addition, William's attorney stated that child support was indeed $250 per month. The attorney's statements constitute an admission under rule 801(d)(1)(A) of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence. As early as 1837, this Court has held that an attorney's statements are binding on his principal in limited circumstances. Wenans v. Lindsey, 2 Miss. 577, 578 (1837). Moreover, other evidence showed that William agreed to pay $250 directly to Hope after she reached majority, if she was attending college.

Furthermore, and just as importantly, this original support order was subject to increase as changed conditions arose. Tedford v. Dempsey, 437 So.2d 410, 417 (Miss.1983). Frances could have had the order modified by court order. The fact that William agreed to this change does not allow him to argue that no court order forced him to pay that amount. This Court affirms the chancellor's finding on the post-majority award of support for Hope's college education.

3) DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FINDING SUPPORT SHOULD CONTINUE AFTER FOUR YEARS WHEN THE ADULT CHILD WAS NOT MAKING ADEQUATE PROGRESS TOWARD A COLLEGE DECREE?

The indefiniteness surrounding William's agreement...