Rogers v. State
Decision Date | 23 April 1913 |
Citation | 159 S.W. 40 |
Parties | ROGERS v. STATE. |
Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
Appeal from District Court, Coryell County; J. H. Arnold, Judge.
John Rogers was convicted of arson, and he appeals. Affirmed.
T. R. Mears, of Gatesville, and Williams & Williams, of Waco, for appellant. C. E. Lane, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
Appellant was convicted of arson, and his penalty fixed at the lowest prescribed by law, five years in the penitentiary.
For a few years before August 27, 1911, F. B. Lam and W. L. Rogers were equal partners in two gins. They both lived, and said gins were situated, in the town of Oglesby, Coryell county, Tex. The gins were 150 yards apart. It seems that Lam ran one of the gins and Rogers the other. The mother of Lam was the sister of Rogers. Lam's father was a brother of the wife of W. L. Rogers. Appellant was 19 years of age in January, 1911. His home was then and all his life had been at his father's. His parents moved to Oglesby from a few miles in the country near thereto some four years before August, 1911, and had lived in Oglesby four years or more continuously before said last date. Some three weeks before August 27, 1911, Lam and Rogers had fallen out about their said partnership business. The state of feeling between them was very bitter each towards the other. It all grew out of and was connected with their gin business. On Sunday night August 27, 1911, the said gin-house which was run by said Lam was burned about 11 o'clock at night. It was worth from $6,000 to $8,000. The grand jury of Coryell county did not convene after said burning until January, 1912. On January 12, 1912, the grand jury began an investigation of said burning, and had a large number of witnesses summoned to appear at that time and they did appear at that time for that purpose.
Appellant was the second witness, it seems, the grand jury had before it on that subject. He was duly sworn, and testified as any other witness. He at first denied knowing anything about who burned the gin, or having anything to do with burning it, and denied being in the town of Oglesby at a certain well therein, and seeing certain persons thereabouts, and denied several other facts, afterwards sworn to in his written statement. The county attorney or some of the grand jurors then told him they in effect knew he was testifying falsely, but, if he would testify truthfully, they would forgive him, and not prosecute him for false swearing. Thereupon he admitted he had not been telling the truth, but would then do so. Then testified fully. His testimony was reduced to writing, and he signed and swore to it, in addition to having been sworn and testified orally. His written sworn statement is as follows: This sworn testimony was introduced on the trial of this cause. In addition to and independent of it, the state proved substantially and fully the same things by numerous witnesses. Some three or four witnesses testified that shortly before appellant burned this gin he told them that he was going to do so, and fixed said Sunday night as the time. He showed to one or more of the witnesses a can of oil that he had procured for that purpose. After the fire, he admitted to three or four witnesses that he had burned said gin, and when they, together with himself, were summoned before the grand jury, and before that too, he urged them not to give him away. In fact, the testimony without doubt clearly established that appellant burned the gin without reference to his own written testimony. His main or sole defense was insanity. The record in this case, as well as the statement of facts, is voluminous. We think it altogether unnecessary to further detail the testimony.
Appellant's first bill of exception is to the action of the court in overruling his motion for a continuance. It was sought on account of the absence of appellant's mother, who lived in Coryell county, but who was temporarily absent in Waco, McLennan county, and of his sister, Mrs. Amiott, who was a resident and lived in Waco, McLennan county. There is no question but that this was appellant's second application for a continuance. He first continued the case at the January term of the Coryell county district court. It appears that at that term both sides announced ready for trial. After proceeding with the trial for some time, a child of one of the jurors became very sick, and in accordance with the law the court permitted that juror, in company with a deputy sheriff, to go to his home in the country and see the child. After waiting a day or two, it became evident that the juror's child was too ill for him to leave and would probably die, and perhaps did. Appellant at the time he announced ready, when the case was called, stated that one of his material witnesses was absent, and that, if this witness did not arrive in time to testify, he would withdraw his announcement of ready, and would then make application to continue on that account. It had been some two or three days after this announcement and the proceeding to trial when this witness had still not arrived, and in the dilemma the case was in, and in order to avoid jeopardy, appellant then, with the consent of the state and court, withdrew his announcement of ready, and the case was continued on his application because of the absence of said witness. This presented some equitable matter for the court to consider in the second application, but it, as stated above, was unquestionably a second application when appellant sought a continuance on account of the absence of his mother and sister. The court in approving appellant's bill complaining of the action of the court in refusing his continuance qualified it by stating as follows: ...
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...to believe or conclude such party of unsound mind or abnormal. Turner v. State, 61 Tex. Cr. R. 97, 133 S. W. 1052; Rogers v. State, 71 Tex. Cr. R. 149, 159 S. W. 40; Plummer v. State, 86 Tex. Cr. R. 487, 218 S. W. 499; Long v. State, 82 Tex. Cr. R. 312, 200 S. W. 160; Gardener v. State, 90 ......
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