Rogers v. State
Decision Date | 17 June 1981 |
Docket Number | No. 2,No. 67334,67334,2 |
Parties | Steve ROGERS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee |
Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
James C. Gordon, Abilene, for appellant.
Patricia A. Elliott, Dist. Atty. and R. Jack Grant, Asst. Dist. Atty., Abilene, Robert Huttash, State's Atty., Austin, for the State.
Before ONION, P.J., and TOM G. DAVIS and CLINTON, JJ.
This appeal is taken from an order revoking probation that resulted from a conviction for theft of property over the value of $200.00. Appellant pleaded guilty to the offense of theft on September 17, 1979 and punishment was assessed at two years confinement and a fine of $500.00. Imposition of the sentence was suspended and probation was granted.
The record reflects that on May 14, 1980 the State filed a motion to revoke probation alleging six different violations of the conditions of his probation, namely: (1) that appellant failed to report to his probation officer during the month of February; (2) that appellant failed to work faithfully at suitable employment insofar as possible; (3) that he failed to advise his probation officer within 48 hours of any change in his address or place of employment; (4) that appellant failed to pay his fine of $500.00 at the rate of $50 per month for the months of October, 1979 through April 1980; (5) that he failed to pay his monthly probation fee of $15 for the months of November, 1979 through April, 1980; and (6) that appellant "THE COURT: And when you tell me that you can't get a job--It's not the fact that the jobs aren't there; they are there. Now, there are all kinds of excuses for not obeying this order.
failed to pay $43.00 court costs on or before October 17, 1979. Immediately preceding the hearing held on June 26, 1980, appellant signed a stipulation of evidence and confessed to all six of the violations contained in the State's motion to revoke probation. Appellant also entered an oral plea of "true" to these allegations before the trial judge. At the conclusion of this hearing the trial judge ruled as follows:
On September 26, 1980 the trial court announced that "this is a continuation of a hearing that was had on June 26, 1980;" and summarily revoked appellant's probation on the basis of the six violations appellant previously stipulated to as being "true." The trial judge refused to permit any additional evidence or testimony. There is no allegation of any subsequent violations contained in the record before us; indeed, the record is wholly silent as to what, if anything, occurred during the ninety day interim between June 26, 1980 and September 26, 1980. There is simply no hint whether or not appellant obeyed the oral instructions of the trial judge and upheld the conditions of his probation.
By his first ground of error appellant contends that the trial judge denied him his right to due process and fundamental fairness in that having once exercised his discretion to continue appellant on probation at the conclusion of the hearing on June 26, 1980, he was without authority to revoke appellant's probation on September 26, 1980 in the absence of allegations or proof of any subsequent violations. Appellant primarily relies on this Court's decisions in Wallace v. State, 575 S.W.2d 512 (Tex.Cr.App.1979) and Wester v. State, 542 S.W.2d 403 (Tex.Cr.App.1978). The State responds by asserting that the trial judge merely continued the hearing, therefore he did not exercise his authority to continue, modify, or Accordingly, the issue is refined so that it devolves into the question of whether the trial judge continued appellant's probation, or continued the hearing itself on June 26, 1980. Both types of continuances are statutorily authorized in Article 42.12, Sec. 8, V.A.C.C.P. as follows:
In Wallace v. State, supra, at 514, the Court wrote:
In Furrh v. State, 582 S.W.2d 824, 827 (Tex.Cr.App.1979) the Court opined that:
The decisions in Furrh and Wallace, both supra, stand for the proposition that the trial court having once exercised its authority and modified the conditions of probation, may not change that disposition at a subsequent hearing where no further violation was shown.
On the other hand, as the State correctly notes, in Stanfield v. State, supra, at 946, the Court held that by continuing the hearing, the trial court "took its decision under advisement." In Ex parte Feldman, supra, at 721, the Court held that the trial court may continue the hearing:
"... keeping before it the violations already proven, and permitting the careful consideration of mitigating or exacerbating circumstances, including the subsequent conduct of the probationer, before making a final decision whether to revoke." 3
Herein lies the crux of the dilemma: On June 26, 1980 did the trial judge continue appellant's probation and modify it accordingly, or did he take his decision under advisement pending the outcome of subsequent conduct by appellant? It is far from clear, particularly when, as here, we have no idea what appellant's subsequent conduct was nor whether the trial judge was even apprised of it. The critical issue must finally be answered by what is contained in the record before us. The transcription of the court reporter's notes clearly reflect that the trial judge told appellant that he was "going to reinstate the probation; that is, for the time being," and then modified TOM G. DAVIS, J., dissents.
the terms of appellant's probation by requiring that he pay at least half of the $563.00 within the next sixty days. There was no written revocation order entered after the hearing on June 26, 1980, nor was appellant sentenced. As of June 26, 1980 appellant's case was certainly not disposed of as if there had been no probation. 4 Wallace v. State, supra. On balance therefore, we hold that the facts of the case presented here most nearly resemble the situation and the decision in Furrh v. State, supra. Accordingly, we hold that by his actions and oral instructions modifying the conditions of probation, the trial judge exercised his discretion and determined to continue appellant's probation on June 26, 1980; having done so, he was without authority to revoke appellant's probation on September 26, 1980 in the absence of allegations and proof of a subsequent violation. Appellant was therefore denied his right to due process of law. The order revoking his probation is set aside and the cause is remanded.
Before the Court en banc.
OPINIONON STATE'S MOTION FOR REHEARING
As the panel's opinion noted, this Court has delivered two lines of cases in which there was a long delay between the probation revocation hearing and the decision to revoke probation. The question in each case was whether due process of law 1 and due course of the law of the land 2 required another hearing to be held before probation was revoked. In one line of cases...
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