Rogers v. Tindell

• Decision Date: 29 September 1897
• Citation: 42 S.W. 86,99 Tenn. 356
• Parties: ROGERS v. TINDELL at al.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

42 S.W. 86

99 Tenn. 356

ROGERS v. TINDELL at al.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

September 29, 1897

Appeal from chancery court, Campbell county.

Bill by S. I. Rogers against S.W. Tindell and others. Complainant appeals from an order of the court of chancery appeals affirming the decree of the chancellor dismissing the bill. Reversed.

J. E Johnston, for appellees.

SNODGRASS C.J.

In June, 1886, Tindell recovered a decree against Rogers for $286 and costs, and for sale of land to satisfy it. The land was sold, and Tindell bought it at the price of $140. Biddings were opened, and Tindell raised his bid to $210, at which price he became the purchaser. The decree confirming this sale was entered May 4, 1887. In March following Tindell advanced his bid, crediting his decree with $69. Rogers offered to redeem in September, 1888, and tendered an amount sufficient to pay the original purchase price, $210 and interest. This tender was refused by Tindell upon two grounds: First, that the land was not redeemable; and second, that the tender did not include the $69 advanced some months after the original purchase, with its interest. The bill in the case before us was filed to enforce redemption. It made other questions, but they need not be noticed. The chancellor dismissed the bill, and the court of chancery appeals affirmed the decree. Complainant appealed, and assigned errors.

The point made by complainant, in objection to decree of the court below, before the court of chancery appeals, and the disposition of it by that court, are thus stated in its opinion: "Mr. Rogers insists that, inasmuch as the advance bid was not made within twenty days, the judgment creditor could not subsequently advance his bid. Code, § 2132; Mill. & V. Code, § 2955; Shannon's Code, § 3918. We do not think this statute bears the construction insisted upon. This precise point was ruled in the case of Holmes v. Jarrett, 7 Heisk. 506. It is there said that the only right which the purchasing creditor loses by failing to advance his bid within 20 days is the special preference which the statute gives during that time, but that afterwards he has the same rights as other judgment creditors." The quotation from the 7 Heisk. case is accurate, but the point there in judgment was whether one purchasing creditor, from whom the land had been redeemed by another, could himself again redeem from the latter. It was held, and properly, that he could, and that he had not lost such right, and, the court added, no other, except the special preference to advance his bid within 20 days, but that he still had the same rights as other judgment creditors. Before this case can be assumed even to say, much less to decide, that he had a right at all to advance his bid a second time, or after the expiration of 20 days, before redemption by another, it must be taken for granted that he was given such right by statute, and that such right was vested in all other creditors, because all that is said is that he had lost no right except that of advancement, and retained all the rights other creditors had. The question was not involved, whether he could make a second advance without an intervening redemption; for the facts did not raise it, and were not assumed to raise it. There had been no such second advance made or attempted. The first purchaser had not advanced his bid at all after his purchase. He had allowed the land to be redeemed by a second purchaser or redemptioner, and then the first offered to redeem from him. The statute is the only authority for redemption and for advancing bid. It is not a question of equity, but of strict law. It gives to the debtor or any judgment creditor, or creditor whose debt is acknowledged by deed, the right to redeem within two years after the sale. Code, § 2124; Mill. & V. Code, § 2947; Shannon's Code, § 3811 et seq. And, if the redemptioner be such creditor, it gives him the right within 20 days to advance his bid. Code, § 2127; Mill. & V. Code, § 2950; Shannon's Code, § 3814. And it gives the right of further redemption and like advancement of bid to creditors in the relation designated, but it gives only 20 days to advance after each purchase or redemption. Code, § 2129; Mill. & V. Code, § 2952; Shannon's Code, § 3816. The land is made thus redeemable for two years, no matter how often redeemed. Code, § 2130; Mill. & V. Code, § 2953; Shannon's Code, § 3817. But, in respect to increase or advance of bid, the statute expressly gives only the 20 days after each purchase or redemption, and provides that "in no case shall the holder or claimant of the property increase his bid against the debtor or any bona fide creditor offering to redeem the real estate except as above provided." Code, § 2132; Mill. & V. Code, § 2955; Shannon's Code, § 3819. It appears from the statute thus cited that each creditor had, and had only, 20 days after each purchase or redemption to advance his bid. When it is said, therefore, in the 7 Heisk. case, that a creditor lost no other right by...