Rogers v. Trim House
| Decision Date | 03 January 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 12798,12798 |
| Citation | 588 P.2d 945,99 Idaho 746 |
| Parties | William John ROGERS, SSA 519 66 6853, Claimant-Appellant, v. The TRIM HOUSE, Employer, and Department of Employment, Defendants-Respondents. |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Louis Garbrecht, III, Idaho Legal Aid Services, Twin Falls, for claimant-appellant.
Wayne L. Kidwell, Atty. Gen., R. LaVar Marsh, Deputy Atty. Gen., Donald L. Harris, Asst. Atty. Gen., Boise, for defendants-respondents.
This is an appeal from an Order of the Idaho Industrial Commission denying unemployment compensation benefits to the claimant-appellant.
Claimant, William Rogers, began working for The Trim House in September of 1974 as an automobile upholsterer. This employment was covered employment under the Employment Security Law. As part of his employment, the claimant would prepare oral bids, which were offers to customers to do upholstery work for a specified amount of money. In December of 1974 he started a three year apprenticeship program through the Bureau of Apprenticeship and Training, at the end of which time he would be eligible for a journeyman upholsterer's license. On or about December 10, 1976, the claimant quit his employment with The Trim House because he felt his wages of $3.45 per hour, plus an offered raise of approximately $90 per month, were not enough. At the time of this separation, he did not apply for unemployment benefits. Within a few days, the claimant returned to The Trim House to do upholstery work on a commission basis. Upon completion of this work, he asked for his job back and returned to work as a regular employee on December 24, 1976. Mr. Gepner, his employer, paid him $3.45 per hour when he returned to work.
Shortly after returning to work, the claimant made a bid on a car which belonged to a friend. In his employer's opinion this bid was too low for the amount of work done. On January 10, 1977 Mr. Gepner called the claimant to his office to discuss this bid. After a heated discussion in which the claimant believed his honesty was being questioned, the claimant quit his employment for the second time. The claimant then filed for unemployment benefits on February 15, 1977 based on his January 10 separation only.
A claims examiner at the Department of Employment determined that the claimant was ineligible for unemployment benefits. The claimant then appealed to an appeals examiner, who affirmed the denial of benefits by the claims examiner.
In his decision the appeals examiner noted that "it was established at the hearing that the claimant quit his employment on or about December 10, 1976, was rehired on December 24, 1976, and quit again on January 10, 1977." As a result the appeals examiner specifically concluded that "since the claimant did not have earnings amounting to eight times his weekly benefit amount after December 10, 1976, it is necessary that a ruling be made on both separations" even though prior to the hearing Rogers received no notice that the appeals examiner might hear new evidence and might determine his eligibility based on the December 10 separation. The appeals examiner then determined that in addition to the claimant's January 10, 1977 voluntary separation being without good cause, his December 10, 1976 voluntary separation was also without good cause. The appeals examiner modified the February 28, 1977 determination of the claims examiner to include his determination of the December 10 separation.
The Industrial Commission affirmed the decision of the appeals examiner in its order dated October 13, 1977. The claimant now appeals to the Idaho Supreme Court pursuant to I.A.R. 11(d).
Essentially Rogers raises three assignments of error on appeal. The first suggests possible procedural and legal errors in the appeals examiner's decision regarding the December 10 separation, an issue which Rogers contends was not properly before the appeals examiner and should not have been considered or ruled upon. The second assignment of error addresses the Industrial Commission's refusal to admit evidence of the apprenticeship program, in which Rogers was taking part, during his employment with The Trim House. The third alleged error challenges the Industrial Commission's affirmance of the appeals examiner's conclusion that Rogers did not quit for "good cause."
In White v. Idaho Forest Industries, 98 Idaho 784, 572 P.2d 887 (1977) we held that the due process requirements of this state's constitution, Idaho Const., art. 1, § 13, precludes an administrative tribunal from raising issues without first giving the affected party fair notice and providing him with a full opportunity to meet the issue. The record before us here indicates that prior to the hearing before the appeals examiner, the Department of Employment did not give any notice to Rogers that it would consider the issue of his December 10 separation. This issue was not properly before the appeals examiner. It was therefore error for him to make any finding or determination with respect to the December 10 separation and to modify the determination issued February 28, 1977 to include that separation. The question remains, however, as to whether the appeals examiner's determination with respect to the December 10 separation was prejudicial error necessitating reversal of the Industrial Commission's order denying Rogers unemployment benefits or whether it was harmless error. Here, appellant Rogers has the burden of showing prejudicial error. Obray v. Mitchell, 98 Idaho 533, 567 P.2d 1284 (1977); Annau v. Schutte, 96 Idaho 704, 535 P.2d 1095 (1975). In his reply brief Rogers argues that because both the appeals examiner and the Commission upheld the determination of claimant's ineligibility based upon the December 10 separation, he has met his burden of showing prejudicial error. We disagree.
A reading of the appeals examiner's decision indicates that his determinations that both the December 10 and January 10 separations were without "good cause" were entirely separate from one another. The appeals examiner found that "(o)n or about December 10, 1976, the claimant quit his employment because he was not satisfied with his pay scale, and the employer would not meet the pay the claimant wanted." From this he concluded that:
The claimant left his employment on or about December 10, 1976, because he was dissatisfied with the wages he was receiving. He was working under an apprenticeship program and no evidence has been presented to show that he was not being paid as agreed under this program. Under these conditions the claimant has not established he had no reasonable alternative but to quit his employment.
Based on the above finding of fact and conclusion, the appeals examiner determined that the December 10 separation "was due to a voluntary quit without good cause" and that Rogers "was ineligible on This separation effective February 13, 1977." (emphasis added)
Independent of the December 10 separation, the appeals examiner made findings and conclusions to the following effect.
The claimant's separation on January 10, 1977 occurred due to a bid on an upholstery job and paint job on a car belonging to a personal friend of the claimant. . . .
The employer was satisfied with the claimant's work in general. However, according to the employer the claimant did resist constructive criticism which was necessary about his work at times.
It is apparent that the job completed for the claimant's friend after he returned to work on December 24, 1976, was the main cause for the second separation. . . .
. . . the claimant did owe it to his employer to try to work out an agreeable solution to (sic) low bid if at all possible and has not established to the satisfaction of this examiner that he had no reasonable alternative but to quit his employment.
. . . claimant voluntarily quit his employment on January 10, 1977, without good cause. He is ineligible on This separation effective February 13, 1977. (emphasis added)
Given the independent nature of the appeals examiner's findings and conclusions in connection with the December 10 and January 10 separations, we hold that it was harmless error for him to have considered the December 10 separation. Harmless error is not grounds for reversal. Obray v. Mitchell, supra. We therefore decline to reverse the Industrial Commission's order affirming the appeals examiner's denial of unemployment benefits to Rogers on this ground.
Rogers next contends that the Commission violated the Provisions of I.C. § 72-1368(g) in sustaining an objection at the Commission hearing to Rogers' testimony with respect to the apprenticeship program, with which he was involved during his employment...
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