Rogers v. Trumbull

• Decision Date: 10 July 1903
• Citation: 73 P. 381,32 Wash. 211
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: ROGERS v. TRUMBULL.

73 P. 381

32 Wash. 211

ROGERS v. TRUMBULL.

Supreme Court of Washington

July 10, 1903

Appeal from Superior Court, Jefferson County; Geo. C. Hatch, Judge.

Action by Jerry S. Rogers against John Trumbull. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Dismissed.

Trumbull & Trumbull and A. H. Sawyer, for appellant.

A. W Buddress, for respondent.

MOUNT J.

On September 8, 1902, the superior court for Jefferson county rendered a judgment against appellant and in favor of respondent foreclosing two certificates for delinquent taxes upon real estate. On March 9, 1903, the appellant served upon respondent's attorney a notice of appeal, and on the same day filed an appeal bond, which had theretofore, on the 7th day of March, been approved by the trial court. This bond was not served. Respondent moves to dismiss this appeal upon two grounds: (1) That the appeal was not taken within the time allowed by law; and (2) that the appeal bond was not served upon respondent as required by law.

1. Under the statute in force at the time the judgment was rendered (1 Ballinger's Ann. Codes & St. § 1757), the appellant had six months after the rendition of the judgment within which to take his appeal. He had, therefore, all of the 8th day of March, 1903. This day was Sunday, and therefore, under the statute, was excluded (2 Ballinger's Ann. Codes & St. § 4896), and appellant therefore had all of the next day, March 9th, in which to give his notice of appeal. Spokane Falls v. Browne, 3 Wash. 84, 27 P 1077; Bank v. Willey, 7 Wash. 535, 35 P. 411. On March 9th the act of 1903 took effect, amending the act under which this appeal is prosecuted. The amended act limits the time within which an appeal may be taken to 30 days after the rendition of the judgment. Laws 1903, p. 74, c. 59, § 4. This appeal was taken after the amendatory act took effect. It is contended by counsel, on behalf of the motion, that the amendatory act is retrospective, and, since more than 30 days had elapsed after the judgment was rendered, appellant's notice of appeal was too late. The amendatory act of 1903 does not purport to be retroactive in its terms. It simply provides, 'Appeals from the judgment of the court may be taken to the Supreme Court at any time within thirty days after the rendition of said judgment.' Retroactive statutes are generally regarded with disfavor. Those not remedial will not be construed to operate retrospectively unless the intent that they shall do so is plainly expressed. Sutherland on Statutory Construction, § 463. The same author at section 482, says: 'Where statutory relief is prescribed for a cause which is continuous in its nature * * * the future continuance of the cause may be supplemented by the time it was continuous immediately before the act was passed to constitute the statutory period. No person can claim a vested right in any particular mode of procedure for the enforcement or defense of his rights. Where a new statute deals with procedure only, prima facie it applies to all actions--those which have accrued or are pending, and future actions. If before final decision a new law as to procedure is enacted and goes into effect, it must from that time govern and regulate the proceedings. But the steps already taken, the status of the case as to the court in which it was commenced, the pleadings put in, and all things done under the late law, will stand, unless an intention to the contrary is plainly manifested; and pending cases are only affected by general words, as to future proceedings,...