Roginski v. Rose
Decision Date | 03 October 1983 |
Citation | 97 A.D.2d 417,467 N.Y.S.2d 252 |
Parties | In the Matter of John ROGINSKI, Petitioner, v. Henry W. ROSE, Chairman, et al., etc., Respondents. |
Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
Cohn & Foley, Baldwin, N.Y. (William S. Cohn, Baldwin, of counsel), for petitioner.
W. Kenneth Chave, Jr., Town Atty., Hempstead (Denise Harvey Sher, Hempstead, of counsel), for respondents.
Before MOLLEN, P.J., and WEINSTEIN, BROWN and RUBIN, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.
Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of Hempstead, dated May 13, 1982, which, after a hearing, denied petitioner's application for a special exception permit to use his property for the precision machining of small parts.
Determination confirmed and proceeding dismissed on the merits, without costs or disbursements.
There was a rational basis for and substantial evidence in the record to support the determination of the Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of Hempstead that the proposed use did not comply with the standards in the ordinance that govern the granting of special exception permits.
A special use permit may be granted only upon the prior approval of the board of appeals (see Town of Hempstead Building Zone Ordinance, art. 7, §§ X-1.0, X-1.14). Such approval is subject to a determination by the board of appeals:
(Town of Hempstead Building Zone Ordinance, art 12, § Z-1.0, subd B, par [a] ).
Entitlement to a special exception permit is not a matter of right (Matter of Lemir Realty Corp. v. Larkin, 11 N.Y.2d 20, 24, 226 N.Y.S.2d 374, 181 N.E.2d 407) and compliance with ordinance standards must be shown before a special exception permit can be granted (see Matter of Tandem Holding Corp. v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Town of Hempstead, 43 N.Y.2d 801, 802, 402 N.Y.S.2d 388, 373 N.E.2d 282; Matter of Cappadoro Land Dev. Corp. v. Amelkin, 78 A.D.2d 696, 432 N.Y.S.2d 513, app. dsmd. 54 N.Y.2d 833). In making such a determination, the ordinance requires that the board of appeals shall give consideration, inter alia, as to whether the use may give off obnoxious odors or cause disturbing emission of vibration or noise (see art. 12, § Z-1.0, subd B, pars [b], c/s 5, 6).
At the hearing, in addition to other testimony, nearby residents testified that disturbing odors and noises were being emitted from petitioner's premises. We cannot say that the board's determination, that petitioner's proposed use did not comply with the ordinance in view of the proximity of the use to residences and the emission of obnoxious odors, vibration and noise, is without a rational basis and is not supported by substantial evidence (see Matter of Ferman v. Board of Appeals, Inc. Vil. of Sea Cliff, 69 A.D.2d 882, 415 N.Y.S.2d 469).
WEINSTEIN, Justice, dissents and votes to grant the petition to the extent of annulling the determination and remitting the matter to the board of zoning appeals for further proceedings, with the following memorandum:
Petitioner owns a parcel of land approximately 44 feet wide and 91 feet deep which is located within the Town of Hempstead in a strip zoned as a business district. The parcel, which is improved with a one story cinderblock and brick building, abuts a residential "B" district improved with one family dwellings. On or about November 12, 1981, petitioner applied to the Department of Buildings of the Town of Hempstead for a permit to use his premises for the precision machining of small parts. Said application was disapproved on the ground that the proposed use constituted a nonpermitted use within the meaning of section X-1.0 of article 7 of Town Building Ordinance. Pursuant to said section, the following uses are permitted as of right in the business zone:
Petitioner appealed the building department's negative determination to the zoning board of appeals on the ground that the requested use was one allowable under the provisions of section Z-5.0 (subd c, par 15) of article 12 of the ordinance which grants authority to respondents to approve a special exception for "[a]ny use of the same general character as any of the uses expressly permitted in a business district by this Ordinance". Petitioner contended, in essence, that the use requested is similar in nature to the occupations enumerated in the ordinance as "Hand Metal Working", "Blacksmith", "Tinsmith", and "Carpenter".
A public hearing was held before the appeals board on February 24, 1982. In a decision dated May 13, 1982, the board denied petitioner's application for the special exception permit, stating in pertinent part:
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