Rohland v. St. Louis & S. F. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 07 June 1886
• Citation: 1 S.W. 147,89 Mo. 180
• Parties: ROHLAND v. ST. LOUIS & S. F. RY. CO.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

1 S.W. 147

89 Mo. 180

ROHLAND v. ST. LOUIS & S. F. RY. CO.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

June 7, 1886.

1. COURTS — JURISDICTION — PRESUMPTIONS.

Nothing is presumed to be within the jurisdiction of an inferior court except that which expressly appears to be so.

2. JUSTICE OF THE PEACE — JURISDICTION LOCAL.

The jurisdiction of a justice of the peace is purely local and statutory, and, in a suit against a railway corporation for the killing of live-stock, it must affirmatively appear that the action was brought in the township where the injury occurred, or in some adjoining township, under the statutes of Missouri, (section 2835, Revision 1879.)

Appeal from Webster circuit court.

Action in justice's court to recover damages for the killing of plaintiff's cattle by defendant's cars. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.

Smith & Krauthoff, for respondent, Charles Rohland. John O'Day, for appellant, St. Louis & S. F. Ry. Co.

SHERWOOD, J.

Plaintiff brought suit against defendant before a justice of the peace in Ozark township, Webster county. The petition alleged that defendant, being incorporated, on February 12, 1883, was operating a railroad through Northview, in said county, and on said date, near said station, "the defendants were running a freight train on said road, and failed and neglected to whistle, as required by law, at said station, and said train struck and killed a steer of this plaintiff of the value of $35;" that said steer was killed by the carelessness and negligence of said defendant. There was a trial before the justice, and an appeal to the circuit court by defendant, where the case was tried at the September term, 1883. After the jury were sworn, against defendant's objections, the court permitted plaintiff to amend his petition. Defendant excepted. The only amendments were the interlineations of words "or rung the bell" after the word "whistle," and "or at the crossing" after the word "station." Neither the original nor amended petition stated in what township the animal was killed.

Section 2835, Rev. St., so far as pertinent here, is as follows: "Except as otherwise provided by law, justices of the peace shall have original jurisdiction of * * * all actions against any railroad company in this state to recover damages for the killing or injuring of horses, mules, cattle, or other animals, within their respective townships, without regard to the value of such animals, or the amount claimed for killing or injuring the same." And section 2839, after providing where suits cognizable before a justice of the peace shall be brought, winds up with a new clause, (the fifth,) which enlarges the territorial areas of a justice's jurisdiction, by providing that "any action against a railroad company for killing or injuring horses," etc, "shall be brought before a justice of the peace of the township in which the injury happened, or any adjoining township."

It is quite too clear for argument that the section just quoted fixes in express language, and in immovable terms, the territorial boundaries of the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace in this class of cases, and beyond these boundaries that jurisdiction cannot pass. The general words in the first clause, which confer jurisdiction on...