Rojas v. Sea World Parks & Entm't, Inc.

• Decision Date: 10 May 2021
• Docket Number: Case No.: 3:21-cv-00145-BEN-MSB
• Citation: 538 F.Supp.3d 1008
• Parties: Samuel ROJAS, a minor, BY AND THROUGH his Guardian ad Litem, Walter ROJAS, Plaintiff, v. SEA WORLD PARKS & ENTERTAINMENT, INC., a Delaware corporation; and Does 1 through 25, inclusive, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of California

538 F.Supp.3d 1008

Samuel ROJAS, a minor, BY AND THROUGH his Guardian ad Litem, Walter ROJAS, Plaintiff,

v.SEA WORLD PARKS & ENTERTAINMENT, INC., a Delaware corporation; and Does 1 through 25, inclusive, Defendant.

Case No.: 3:21-cv-00145-BEN-MSB

United States District Court, S.D. California.

Signed May 10, 2021

Russel David Myrick, Rdm Legal Group, La Jolla, CA, for Plaintiff.

Guillermo Marrero, International Practice Group, P.C., San Diego, CA, for Defendant.

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMAND

[ECF No. 4, 7]

ROGER T. BENITEZ, United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Samuel Rojas, a minor, by and through his Guardian ad Litem, Walter Rojas ("Plaintiff") brings this action against Defendant Sea World Parks & Entertainment, Inc., a Delaware corporation ("Defendant") for personal injuries sustained while riding a ride at Sea World Park. see Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1 ("NOR").

Before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion to Remand (the "Motion"). ECF No. 4. The Motion was submitted on the papers without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1) and Rule 78(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. ECF No. 8. After considering the papers submitted, supporting documentation, and applicable law, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion to Remand.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Statement of Facts

Plaintiff alleges that on April 14, 2019, after he boarded the Sea Dragon Drop Ride at SeaWorld Park in San Diego, California, Defendant's employee, Doe 1, crushed and fractured Plaintiff's left wrist and forearm when Doe 1 attempted to latch the attraction's safety bar. NOR at 2¹ :13-16, 11. The Complaint alleges that because of that incident, Plaintiff incurred medical expenses and general damages. Id. at 2:16-18.

B. Procedural History

On December 3, 2020, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of San Diego styled Samuel Rojas, a minor, by and through his Guardian ad Litem, Walter Rojas v. Sea World Parks & Entertainment, Inc., et al. , Case No. 37-2020-00045846-CU-PO-CTL ("the State Court Lawsuit"). see NOR at 2:6-11. The Complaint alleges two causes of action for (1) premises liability and (2) general negligence. Id. at 2:12-13, 10, 11.

On December 28, 2020, Plaintiff served Defendant with the Summons and Complaint. NOR at 2:19-22; see also ECF No. 4-1 at 1:20-21. On January 26, 2021, Defendant filed its Notice of Removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (" Section 1441"), claiming that the case arises "between citizens of different states" as Defendant is a citizen of Delaware and Florida, while Plaintiff is a California resident.² ECF No. 1 at 3:12-15. On January 27, 2021, Defendant filed an Answer to the Complaint. ECF No. 2.

On February 22, 2021, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion to Remand. Motion, ECF No. 4-1 ("Mot."). On March 15, 2021, Defendant filed an Opposition. Opposition, ECF No. 7 ("Oppo."). Plaintiff did not file a reply brief.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. , 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994). Consequently, district courts are presumed to lack jurisdiction unless the Constitution or a statute expressly provides otherwise. Stock West, Inc. v. Confederated Tribes , 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989). The party seeking to prove federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing it. See, e.g. , McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. of Indiana , 298 U.S. 178, 189, 56 S.Ct. 780, 80 L.Ed. 1135 (1936) (providing that "the party who seeks the exercise of jurisdiction in his favor ... must allege in his pleading the facts essential to show jurisdiction"). Generally, federal subject matter jurisdiction exists due to the presence of a federal question, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or complete diversity between the parties, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332. In cases arising out of diversity jurisdiction, such as the present case, district courts have "original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between ... citizens of different States." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).

"Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress," where a plaintiff files a civil action in state court over which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, the defendant may remove that case "to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). In other words, a defendant may remove to federal court a claim filed in state court that could have initially been brought in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). However, a civil action otherwise removable solely on the basis of diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) "may not be removed if any of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) ; see also Martinez v. Omni Hotels Mgmt. Corp. , No. 20-CV-1924-MMA (BLM), 514 F. Supp. 3d 1227, 1232–33 (2021). "In determining whether a civil action is removable on the basis of the jurisdiction under section 1332(a) of this title, the citizenship of defendants sued under fictitious names shall be disregarded." 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(1).

In a case where there are more than two plaintiffs and more than two defendants, complete diversity must exist, meaning that all parties on opposite sides of the case must be from different states. See, e.g. , Strawbridge v. Curtiss , 7 U.S. 3 Cranch 267, 267, 2 L.Ed. 435 (1806), overruled in part on other grounds by Louisville, C. & C.R. Co. v. Letson , 43 U.S. 2 How. 497, 11 L.Ed. 353 (1844), overruled in part by Hertz Corp. v. Friend , 559 U.S. 77, 92–93, 130 S.Ct. 1181, 175 L.Ed.2d 1029 (2010) (adopting the nerve center approach to determine a corporation's citizenship, pursuant to which courts determine a business’ citizenship by its state of incorporation along with its "principal place of business," or "nerve center," which refers "to the place where a corporation's officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation's activities"). "A corporation shall be deemed a citizen of every State and foreign state by which it has been incorporated and of the State or foreign state where it has its principal place of business." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1).

Removing a case does not deprive another party "of his right to move to remand the case." 28 U.S.C. § 1448. If the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the plaintiff may seek to remand the case back to state court. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Courts strictly construe the removal statute against removal jurisdiction. see Grancare, LLC v. Thrower by & through Mills , 889 F.3d 543, 550 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Gaus v. Miles, Inc. , 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) ). Further, "[t]he presumption against removal means that ‘the defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper.’ " Moore-Thomas v. Alaska Airlines, Inc. , 553 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Gaus , 980 F.2d at 566 ). Courts resolve any doubt about the right of removal in favor of remand. Grancare , 889 F.3d at 550.

IV. DISCUSSION

To date, the only named defendant by Plaintiff is Defendant SeaWorld Parks & Entertainment, Inc., a Delaware corporation, with its principal place of business in the State of Florida. NOR at 3:3-6. As stated, the Court presumes Plaintiff is a citizen of the State of California who resides in the County of San Diego, where the injury occurred. Id. at 3:9-10, 8. Thus, disregarding the doe defendants, complete diversity exists between the named Plaintiff and the named defendant, and the Court's subject matter jurisdiction is proper. However, Plaintiff argues that his naming Doe Defendants 1 through 25 in the original superior court complaint destroys diversity jurisdiction because he alleges that "Doe defendants 1-25 were the agents or employees of other named defendants and acted within the scope of that agency or employment." NOR at 8. Plaintiff believes that if the doe defendants work at Sea World, which is located in San Diego, California, then, presumably, Doe Defendants 1 through 25, and especially Doe Defendant 1, must be California residents. Thus, Plaintiff argues the Court should grant his Motion to Remand "based on the underlying Complaint's plain allegations establishing DOE 1's California activities and diversity-destroying citizenship." Mot. at 1:8-13. He asserts that his "Complaint alleges DOE 1 is Sea World's employee, whose negligence directly caused Plaintiff's injuries, while in the course and scope of his employment in San Diego," and "[t]his Court should not ignore his California citizenship." Id. at 6:13-16.

Defendant responds that the Court should deny Plaintiff's Motion to Remand for two reasons: "First, this Court can rely on the plain language of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(1) stating that citizenship of fictious defendants should be disregarded for purposes of diversity." Oppo. at 2:18-20. "Second, if this Court chooses to consider whether DOE 1 is a citizen of California, it should necessarily conclude that naming DOE 1, constitutes fraudulent joinder and therefore deny the remand." Id. at 2:20-22.

As outlined below, this Court concludes that (1) Doe 1 does not destroy diversity jurisdiction; (2) Doe 1 is fraudulently joined; and (3) Doe 1 is subject to dismissal.

A. Doe 1 Does Not Destroy Diversity Jurisdiction.

To whether Doe 1 destroys diversity such that the Court should grant Plaintiff's Motion, the Court must examine the procedure of doe defendant pleading along with its interrelation to Section 1441. Although the Court finds the text of Section 1441 to be clear, district courts within the Ninth Circuit have applied it in an unclear manner. Ultimately, this Court concludes that Section 1441 ’s plain text and legislative history warrant rejection of the cases raised by...