Roland v. Daimler Chrysler Corp.

Decision Date07 December 2000
Citation33 S.W.3d 468
Parties(Tex.App.-Austin 2000) Keeshon Roland and Teanna Roland, Appellants v. DaimlerChrysler Corporation, and/or DaimlerChrysler Motors Corporation; and Heart of Texas Dodge, Inc., Appellees NO. 03-00-00118-CV
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 126TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 99-13941-A, HONORABLE PAUL R. DAVIS, JR., JUDGE PRESIDING

Before Justices Jones, Kidd and Yeakel.

JONES, Justice.

Appellants, Keeshon and Teanna Roland, sued appellees, DaimlerChrysler Corporation, DaimlerChrysler Motors Corporation, and Heart of Texas Dodge, Inc. (collectively referred to as "DaimlerChrysler") for personal injuries sustained by Keeshon while riding in the open bed of a pickup truck. The suit was based on theories of negligence and strict liability, alleging that DaimlerChrysler failed to warn of the danger posed by riding in the open bed of a pickup truck that was manufactured and sold by DaimlerChrysler. Concluding that the danger was open and obvious, the trial court granted summary judgment for DaimlerChrysler. On appeal, the Rolands claim the trial court erred in holding as a matter of law that DaimlerChrysler had no duty to warn. We will affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment.

FACTS

The facts of this case are not in dispute. Keeshon Roland, who is not a minor, was riding in the open bed of a pickup truck traveling east on FM 20 in Caldwell County. The truck was driven by a third party who was intoxicated. The driver swerved, claiming he did so to avoid an animal (that was not seen by the other passengers in the truck), and struck a guard rail. Keeshon was ejected from the truck bed and was seriously injured. The truck was designed, manufactured, and sold by DaimlerChrysler.

DISCUSSION

The Rolands' only point of error asserts that the trial court erred in ruling that riding in the unprotected bed of a pickup truck is, as a matter of law, an open and obvious danger and in consequently granting summary judgment for DaimlerChrysler. The standards for reviewing a summary judgment are well established: (1) the movant for summary judgment has the burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; (2) in deciding whether there is a disputed material fact issue precluding summary judgment, evidence favorable to the nonmovant will be taken as true; and (3) every reasonable inference must be indulged in favor of the nonmovant and any doubts resolved in its favor. Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex. 1985). Because the propriety of the summary judgment is a question of law, this Court reviews the judgment de novo. Grocers Supply Co. v. Sharp, 978 S.W.2d 638, 642 (Tex. App.--Austin 1998, pet. denied).

In Texas, a manufacturer has no duty to warn of open and obvious dangers. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Shears, 911 S.W.2d 379, 382 (Tex. 1995). Whether a hazard is an open and obvious danger is a question of law, not of fact. Id. at 383. Although we have found no case in Texas directly on point, the facts in this case are similar to the facts in Caterpillar.1 In Caterpillar, the supreme court held that riding in a front-end loader which was open to the air was an open and obvious danger as a matter of law, and that the manufacturer had no duty to warn of such a danger. Id. at 382-83. The front-end loader was a construction vehicle operated with no sides or top, much like the bed of a pickup truck. Id. at 381. The driver of the loader was struck from behind by another loader and injured because of the lack of a cage to protect him. Similarly, the bed of a pickup truck provides little protection to any of its occupants.

The Rolands' evidence that the condition is not an open and obvious danger fails to convince us that the trial court erred. Keeshon's self-serving affidavit, stating that if he had been warned he would not have ridden in the bed, combined with the testimony of the Rolands' safety engineer, does not raise a question of material fact. The safety engineer relied on several exhibits from various associations and government agencies that detail attempts to raise public awareness of the danger posed by riding in the back of pickup trucks. One of these asserts that Texans continue to ride in the back of trucks because it is a "Texas way of life." This, however, does not tend to show that Texans are ignorant of the risks involved. This evidence neither supports nor undermines their conclusion. People often do dangerous things for reasons we may not understand, while fully appreciating the risks involved. Its open nature and the lack of restraining...

To continue reading

Request your trial
6 cases
  • Curtis v. Anderson
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 10 Abril 2003
    ...Standard of Review The propriety of a summary judgment is an issue of law subject to de novo review. Roland v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 33 S.W.3d 468, 469 (Tex.App.-Austin 2000, pet. denied); Grocers Supply Co. v. Sharp, 978 S.W.2d 638, 642 (Tex.App.-Austin 1998, pet. denied). A defendant is ......
  • Evergreen Nat. Indem. v. Tan It All, Inc.
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 19 Junio 2003
    ...of law, which we review de novo. Natividad v. Alexsis, Inc., 875 S.W.2d 695, 699 (Tex. 1994); Roland v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 33 S.W.3d 468, 469 (Tex.App.-Austin 2000, pet. denied). We apply the following standards in conducting our review: (1) a summary judgment movant has the burden to s......
  • Downs ex rel. Downs v. Bush
    • United States
    • Tennessee Supreme Court
    • 10 Septiembre 2008
    ...that the public also recognizes that riding in the cargo bed of a pickup ... presents even greater risks."); Roland v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 33 S.W.3d 468, 470 (Tex.Ct.App.2000) (affirming a trial court's grant of summary judgment in a products liability case because as a matter of law rid......
  • Painter v. Momentum Energy Corp.
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 20 Noviembre 2008
    ...to warn of obvious risks because a readily apparent danger serves the same function as a warning"); Roland v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 33 S.W.3d 468, 469 (Tex.App.-Austin 2000, pet. denied) ("In Texas, a manufacturer has no duty to warn of open and dangers."). Thus, there is only a duty to wa......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT