Rolark v. University of Chicago Hospitals
Decision Date | 30 June 1988 |
Docket Number | No. 88 C 825.,88 C 825. |
Citation | 688 F. Supp. 401 |
Parties | Maxine ROLARK, Plaintiff, v. The UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO HOSPITALS, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Benjamin A. Streeter, III, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff.
Lisa A. Weiland, Terry J. Smith, Schiff Hardin & Waite, Chicago, Ill., for defendant.
The University of Chicago Hospitals, defendant herein, moves to dismiss this employment discrimination action on the grounds that plaintiff, Maxine Rolark, failed to follow two procedural prerequisites established under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (the Act), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and that this court is therefore without jurisdiction to hear plaintiff's claim.1 That motion is denied.
The first procedural error alleged by defendant is that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) processed plaintiff's claim without a prior deferral to the Illinois Department of Human Rights (IDHR). See § 706(c) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) ( ). Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4(g)(1) and 2000e-8(b) the EEOC entered into a "worksharing agreement" with IDHR to provide for processing of certain charges by the EEOC rather than the IDHR (pl. mem. in opp. to def. mo. to dis., exh. B). In entering into this agreement IDHR waived its exclusive 60-day right to process charges initially processed by the EEOC.
Defendant's contention that such an agreement violates statutory requirements was recently rejected in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Commercial Office Products Co., ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 1666, 100 L.Ed.2d 96 (1988) ( ). In light of this Supreme Court decision, issued after the briefing on this motion, defendant's claim of a procedural deficiency is foreclosed.
If the EEOC dismisses the claim or if 180 days pass without action on the part of the EEOC, the person aggrieved is entitled to notice — a right-to-sue letter — that her cause of action has accrued. See Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 361, 97 S.Ct. 2447, 2452, 53 L.Ed.2d 402 (1977) ( ). Section 706(f)(1) was intended in part to encourage conciliatory action prior to litigation in federal court by providing the EEOC with initial jurisdiction over employment discrimination claims. The 180-day provision limits the time that a complainant need tarry while he or she awaits the administrative process. When it is clear to the EEOC that due to its workload it is unlikely that any action will be taken before the expiration of the 180-day period, the district director, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(a)(2), may issue a right-to-sue letter at an earlier time, thereby giving the complainant an opportunity to litigate within 90 days thereafter.
Defendant challenges the validity of this regulation, arguing that Congress intended a full 180 days to pass before a complainant can bring an action under the Act, irrespective of the availability of the EEOC's participation. The district courts are divided on this question. Courts finding the regulation invalid have held that § 706(f)(1) establishes exclusive EEOC jurisdiction which cannot be waived. See, e.g., People of New York v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 656 F.Supp. 675 (W.D.N.Y.1984); Spencer v. Banco Real, S.A., 87 F.R.D. 739 (S.D.N. Y.1980); Grimes v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 480 F.Supp. 1381 (N.D.Ga.1979); Loney v. Carr-Lowrey Glass Co., 458 F.Supp. 1080 (D.Md.1978). They stress congressional emphasis on conciliatory efforts with the EEOC and conclude that the Act should not be judicially revised to accommodate the EEOC's caseload.
The only court of appeals to squarely reach the issue, decided that the early issuance of the notice of complainant's right to bring suit is in accordance with § 706(f)(1). Saulsbury v. Wismer & Becker, Inc., 644 F.2d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir.1980); Bryant v. California Brewers Association, 585 F.2d 421, 425 (9th Cir.1978) (), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 444 U.S. 598, 100 S.Ct. 814, 63 L.Ed.2d 55 (1980). Accord Cattell v. Bob Frensley Ford, Inc., 505 F.Supp. 617, 622 (M.D.Tenn.1980) ( ). See also Milner v. National School of Health Technology, 409 F.Supp. 1389 (E.D.Pa.1976); Schlei & Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law 916, n. 159 (1976) (compiling cases). Apparently no court in this jurisdiction has resolved the conflict.2
We hold that the 180-day time period does not operate as an absolute jurisdictional bar. Plaintiff's cause of action is not restricted by the administrative decisions of the EEOC. Cf. Jefferson v. Peerless Pumps Hydrodynamic, 456 F.2d 1359, 1361 (9th Cir.1972) ( ); Miller v. International Paper Co., 408 F.2d 283, 290 (5th Cir.1969) ( ). While Congress showed clear preference for conciliatory efforts at the administrative level prior to suit in federal court, there is nothing in the Act which prohibits the EEOC from relinquishing its jurisdiction. Further, defendant's use of § 706(f)(1) as a shield for employers charged with discrimination turns the purpose of that section on its head. The 180-day period was intended to afford victims of employment discrimination a private cause of action where the EEOC does not act, or does not act in a timely fashion. The EEOC's regulation simply recognizes that the caseload will sometimes be so heavy that it can be determined early on that no action can be taken within 180 days and the issuance of an early right-to-sue letter is a reasonable implementation of the Act. We do not think that Congress has so clearly resolved the dispute that the EEOC, which has been delegated the authority to administer Title VII claims,...
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