Roles v. State

• Decision Date: 18 December 1979
• Docket Number: No. 12989,12989
• Citation: 100 Idaho 717,604 P.2d 731
• Parties: Raymond Allen ROLES, Petitioner-Appellant, v. STATE of Idaho, Respondent.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 731

604 P.2d 731

100 Idaho 717

Raymond Allen ROLES, Petitioner-Appellant, v. STATE of Idaho, Respondent.

No. 12989.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

Dec. 18, 1979.

Alan E. Trimming, Boise, for petitioner-appellant.

David H. Leroy, Atty. Gen., Lynn E. Thomas, Eugene A. Ritti, Deputy Attys. Gen., Boise, for respondent.

Before SHEPARD, BAKES and BISTLINE, JJ., MAYNARD and HARGRAVES, JJ. Pro Tem.

PER CURIAM:

The petitioner appellant Raymond Allen Roles filed a petition for post conviction relief after a judgment of conviction on a felony charge of receiving stolen property. In a subsequent prosecution, this conviction was used to establish persistent violation status on petitioner appellant.

In the challenged conviction a co-defendant, Marineau, was charged with burglary. Both defendants were represented by the same court-appointed attorney. Roles contended in his petition for post conviction relief that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel, as guaranteed by the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution, as a result of the trial court's appointment of a single attorney for both himself and his co-defendant.

The record in this case indicates that Roles and his co-defendant were charged in a criminal information in July, 1973. On August 21, 1973, Roles' co-defendant entered a plea of guilty to the burglary charge. On the same date Roles attempted to plead guilty to the charge of receiving stolen property. However, the trial court was not satisfied that Roles sufficiently understood the nature of the charge to which he was pleading, declined to accept the proffered guilty plea, and entered a plea of not guilty. A trial date was set for January 7, 1974. On September 11, 1973, Roles' co-defendant was sentenced to probation for his burglary conviction.

On January 7, 1974, Roles once again sought to plead guilty, and his plea was then accepted. Upon questioning by the court following Roles' offer to plead guilty, the defendant stated that he believed he was fairly and adequately represented by his attorney, that he had discussed the charge, his defenses, and the guilty plea and its consequences with his attorney. Upon questioning by the court, Roles stated that he understood that his guilty plea constituted a waiver of jury trial, the right to confront witnesses against him, and the privilege against self incrimination. The question that a possible conflict of interest was faced by Roles' counsel as a result of the attorney's representing both Roles and the co-defendant was not raised by the trial court, by Roles, or by his attorney prior to Roles' petitioning for post conviction relief from the judgment of conviction in September, 1977.

A single court appointed attorney cannot represent conflicting interests of multiple defendants charged with the same crime. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942); State v. Oldham, 92 Idaho 124, 438 P.2d 275 (1968). The Supreme Court of the United States recently held that a criminal conviction is subject to reversal where the trial court improperly required joint representation over timely objection of the defendant. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978). The court in Holloway, however, stated that "(r)equiring or permitting a single attorney to represent codefendants, often referred to as joint representation, is not Per se violative of constitutional guarantees of effective assistance of counsel." 435 U.S. at 482, 98 S.Ct. at 1178, 55 L.Ed.2d at 433.

In Holloway the trial court persisted in requiring the public defender to represent three co-defendants despite the counsel's objection that a multiple defense confronted him with conflicting interests, making it impossible for him to provide effective assistance for each client at trial. The defense counsel in Holloway moved prior to trial for appointment of separate counsel "on the grounds that one or two of the defendants may testify and if they do, then I will not be able to cross examine them because I have received confidential information from them." The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of conviction, holding that where the defense counsel properly raised the problem of a conflict of interest, the trial court erred in failing to make inquiry to determine whether the appointment of separate counsel was necessary in the case to assure that the defendants received adequate representation.

Defendant Roles asserts here that because it was likely that his co-defendant would testify against him at trial if he pleaded not guilty to the charges against him, there was a conflict of interest between Roles and his co-defendant, making the joint representation of the two co-defendants a basis for reversal of Roles' conviction. However, while an actual conflict of interest might have occurred if Roles had proceeded to trial with his original court appointed counsel, his guilty plea prevented that conflict from ever materializing. Joint representation of co-defendants does not of itself constitute denial of a criminal defendant's right to effective counsel. Holloway v. Arkansas, supra.

The trial court found, in denying Roles post conviction relief, that Roles' plea of guilty made on January 7, 1974, was knowingly and voluntarily made and that Roles understood the consequences of the plea. As a result, the court found that the plea was valid. State v. Colyer, 98 Idaho 32, 557 P.2d 626 (1976); State v. Monneyham, 96 Idaho 145, 525 P.2d 340 (1974); I.C.R. 11. There was no showing that Roles' trial counsel recommended a guilty plea to the charge in order to avoid a conflict of interest problem which would have been presented had Roles proceeded to trial and the state called Roles' co-defendant as a witness in its case in chief. Absent a showing that there was at least a possible conflict of interest between the co-defendants at the time the joint representation existed which may have inhibited the attorney's ability to act for the best interests of each co-defendant at all times during that representation, there is no basis for the defendant's claim that his sixth amendment right to effective counsel was abridged. Under the circumstances of this case, defendant Roles has not shown that his trial counsel faced a conflict of interest as a result of his joint representation of the two co-defendants. ¹

Affirmed.

BISTLINE, Justice, dissenting.

It is true that Roles pleaded guilty and equally true that in the post-conviction proceedings the trial court found that the plea was knowingly and voluntarily made. But, does it necessarily follow therefrom that there was not at times pertinent a conflict arising out of the dual representation? Roles asserts that his guilty plea was induced by the fact that Marineau, charged on the same information with Roles, was pleading guilty and would testify against him. The Court's opinion sees only a Potential conflict of interest, which failed to materialize when Roles entered his guilty plea, and emphasizes that there was "no showing that Roles' trial counsel recommended a guilty plea to the charge in order to avoid a conflict of interest problem . . . ." Such reasoning is faulty and begs the very question presented. Obviously trial counsel wouldn't do such a thing, and it has not been suggested at all. Trial counsel did have to advise two clients whose interests were not the same. It is not reasonable to believe that trial counsel could, in justice to both clients, encourage or advise one to plead guilty and testify for whatever benefit might flow from so doing without realizing the probability that the other's case might thereby be prejudiced. The commentary to § 3.5(b) of the A.B.A. Standards for Criminal Justice explains:

" * * * In many instances a given course of action may be advantageous to one of the defendants but not necessarily to the other. The prosecutor may be inclined to accept a guilty plea from one of the co-defendants, either to a lesser offense or with a lesser penalty or other considerations; but this might harm the interests of the other defendant. The contrast in the dispositions of their cases may have a harmful impact on the remaining defendant; the one who pleads guilty might even, as part of the plea agreement, consent to testify against the co-defendant. Moreover, the very fact of multiple representation makes it impossible to assure the accused that his statements to the lawyer are given in full confidence. Defense counsel necessarily must confront each with any conflicting statements made by the other in the course of planning the defense of the cases. In this situation he may find that he must 'judge' his clients to determine which is telling the truth, and his role as advocate would inevitably be undermined as to one if not both defendants."

ABA, Standards Relating to the Defense Function (Approved Draft, 1971), at 213-214.

As Roles points out, had the case gone to trial, trial counsel in defending Roles would have been obligated to attempt to discredit Marineau.

Important here, too, is the fact that Roles and Marineau did not independently retain the same attorney; the situation arose out of a court appointment. Roles cannot be faulted for not knowing at the time that he was thus being cast in a difficult position, and which might not be at all for his own good.

The judgment of conviction should be set aside and Roles allowed to withdraw his plea of guilty, and stand trial on the charge against him. Doing so imposes but a small burden on the State and secures to Roles his constitutional rights.

I dissent also by reason of the Court's failure to set down positive guidelines, noting that the State as well as the defendant has requested that we do so. The Court does call attention to the applicable standards of the American Bar Association, which place responsibility on both the trial court and counsel to assure that a defendant's constitutional right to effective...