Rolfe v. Clarke

• Decision Date: 16 May 1916
• Citation: 224 Mass. 407,113 N.E. 182
• Parties: ROLFE v. CLARKE.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

224 Mass. 407

113 N.E. 182

ROLFE

v.CLARKE.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

May 16, 1916.

Appeal from Superior Court, Middlesex County; Henry A. King, Judge.

Bill of Ellen M. Rolfe, administratrix de bonis non of the estate of Maria J. Wiltbank, against Elizabeth Clarke. From a decree for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed, and decree entered directing defendant to pay the amount of plaintiff's claim within 60 days, and in event of failure directing sale of the land.

E. J. Flynn, of New York City, for appellant.

Qua, Howard & Rogers, Melvin G. Rogers, and Stanley E. Qua, all of Lowell, for appellee.

CROSBY, J.

This is a bill in equity, brought by the administratrix de bonis non of the estate of Maria J. Wiltbank, to set aside as fraudulent and void a deed of certain real estate made by the plaintiff's intestate to the defendant and dated February 17, 1911. The suit was heard by a judge of the superior court who made certain findings of fact, and a final decree has been entered in favor of the plaintiff from which the defendant appealed.

The real estate so conveyed was worth $6,000 at the date of the deed, and $5,000 at the time of the hearing in 1915. At the time of the conveyance, the grantor owned no other property, except certain personal estate which is found to be of the value of $180. The real estate was conveyed subject to a mortgage thereon for $250, and the inchoate right of curtesy of the grantor's husband. On the date of the conveyance the grantor owed the plaintiff individually for services rendered the sum of $1,557, to recover which the plaintiff brought an action against the administratrix of the estate, and recovered a judgment for $1,657.16, including interest and costs, no part of which judgment has been paid.

When the conveyance was made and for some time previously, Mrs. Wiltbank had been suffering from a fatal disease from which she died on May 11, 1911. She was a sister of the defendant, and shortly after the date of the deed went to live with Mrs. Clarke and remained there until her death. The judge found:

That ‘Mrs. Wiltbank's conveyance to her sister rendered her insolvent and unable to pay her then existing creditors, including Ellen M. Rolfe’; that ‘there was no actual intent on the part of Mrs. Wiltbank in making this conveyance to her sister to hinder, delay or defraud her creditors or any of them unless such intent is to be presumed as matter of law from her acts in the premises'; that ‘one of the purposes of the grantor * * * in making this conveyance was to prevent her husband in case he survived her from becoming a statutory heir thereto or of any share or interest therein. But I do not find that this was her sole purpose. Another purpose of the grantor in making this conveyance was to give her sister in this manner substantial evidence of her love and affection and to compensate her sister for the care * * * which she expected to receive. * * *’

The judge also found that the grantor hoped and expected her sister would support her (the grantor's) husband, but that there was no express agreement to that effect at or before the making of the conveyance, that after the conveyance the defendant cared for the grantor during the last illness of the latter and that such care ‘was rendered in part if not wholly gratuitously and from love and affection’ and that the defendant paid to or on account of the grantor's surviving husband $7 a week until his decease in May, 1914, that ‘she did this in consideration in whole or in part of the release by the husband of his right of curtesy in said real estate and in accordance with an agreement between Mrs. Wiltbank and defendant after the conveyance here in question had been made.’

The judge further found:

That the ‘defendant took said premises in entire good faith and without knowledge or notice of complainant's claim. * * * That defendant should render to her sister such services and incur such expenses in her behalf was one of the considerations of the conveyance in question.’

The plaintiff contends that, upon the findings made by the judge, the sole consideration for the conveyance, by Mrs. Wiltbank to her sister, was founded upon love and affection, and because of the feeling of gratitude of the grantor on account of the care and attention received by her during her last illness from Mrs. Clarke. There is much force in this contention, but in view of the findings above referred to and other findings made by the judge, and the evidence presented at the hearing, all of which is reported, we are of opinion that a part of the consideration for such conveyance was the expectation and understanding on the part of the grantor that she and her husband should be supported as long as they lived respectively by the defendant, and that there was therefore a good and valid consideration for the deed.

The question remains whether the conveyance although given for a valuable consideration, was in fraud of the creditors of the plaintiff's intestate existing at the time when it was made.

The judge found that:

‘At the time of taking said conveyance said Elizabeth Clarke knew in general the nature and extent of said Maria J. Wiltbank's property.’

This is equivalent to a finding that the grantee knew the real estate which she received was substantially all the property of which her sister was possessed, and that the conveyance rendered the grantor insolvent and unable to pay her then existing creditors including Ellen M. Rolfe.

While it is found that the defendant did not know of the debt due to the plaintiff individually when the deed was given, still it is a reasonable inference, in view of the close and intimate relation of the parties, including the fact that they were sisters, and all the circumstances as disclosed by the evidence, that the defendant knew of the indebtedness to others, when she took title to substantially all the property her sister then owned. As was said by Knowlton, C. J., in Matthews v. Thompson, 186 Mass. 14, 71 N. E. 93,66 L. R. A. 421, 104 Am. St. Rep. 550:

‘The question whether a conveyance was made with an intent to hinder, * * * defeat or defraud creditors, in this commonwealth, is primarily a question of fact; but such facts as appear in this case are prima facie evidence of the...