Rolla 31 School Dist. v. State
| Citation | 837 S.W.2d 1 |
| Decision Date | 23 June 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 74730,74730 |
| Parties | 78 Ed. Law Rep. 131 ROLLA 31 SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Appellants/Cross-Respondents, v. STATE of Missouri, et al., Respondents/Cross-Appellants. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Missouri |
Thomas E. Tueth, Celynda L. Brasher, St. Louis, for appellants/cross-respondents.
William L. Webster, Atty. Gen., Audrey L. Hanson, Robert Presson, Edwin H. Steinman, Jr., Asst. Attys. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondents/cross-appellants.
This appeal arises from the enactment in 1990 by the General Assembly of sections 162.700 and 162.975, RSMo, mandating that school districts in Missouri provide special education services to handicapped preschoolers beginning at age three. Missouri law had previously required such a program for children five and older, but not for preschoolers. The Missouri legislation was motivated by federal legislation that offered additional federal aid to states that adopted such a program and withdrew some existing federal aid from states that did not extend the program to preschoolers.
The plaintiffs below are five school districts 1 and four individual taxpayers of two of the school districts, all referred to collectively as the "school districts." Defendants below are the State of Missouri, the State Board of Education, Department of Elementary and Secondary Education (DESE), and various state officials, 2 referred to collectively as the "state."
The Circuit Court of Cole County granted the cross Motions for Summary Judgment filed by each party. This ruling raised two important issues. Both are appealed, one by each party.
The first issue involves the validity and interpretation of a provision contained in the 1991 appropriation of more than $1 billion for the free public schools under the School Foundation Program (the major appropriation of state funds for public schools). This provision (set-aside) states that $3 million of the School Foundation Program used in prior years for a voluntary handicapped program for three- and four-year olds will now be used for the mandated program under the above sections. The school districts assert in Count III of their petition that this set-aside is invalid because it conflicts with the last sentence of previously enacted section 162.975.2, which provides that funds for the mandated program "shall be appropriated annually for such program from general revenue funds and shall be separate from the funds apportioned for the school foundation program." The school districts contend that a general statute takes precedence over an appropriation and that, therefore, the set-aside allocating $3 million from the School Foundation Program for the mandated program is invalid. The Circuit Court of Cole County granted the state's Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing Count III, thereby ruling this first issue against the school districts, who appeal.
The second issue presents the questions of whether the failure of the legislature to provide specific, state funding for the entire cost of the mandated program violates the Hancock Amendment and whether, absent a specific appropriation such as an appropriation for categorical aid for this purpose, general unrestricted funds paid to the school districts under the School Foundation Program can be used to meet the Hancock Amendment requirements for the mandated program. The school districts made these claims in Counts I and II of their petition; the Circuit Court concluded that the Hancock Amendment was violated and, therefore, granted the school districts' Motion for Summary Judgment on Counts I and II; the state appeals from this determination.
Special education services for handicapped preschool children were mandated by the General Assembly in 1990 by amending section 162.700.1 to read, in pertinent part, as follows:
1. The board of education of each school district in this state, except school districts which are part of a special school district, and the board of education of each special school district shall provide special educational services for handicapped children three years of age or more residing in the district as required by P.L. 99-457, as codified and as may be amended.... This subsection shall apply to each full school year beginning on or after July 1, 1991.
§ 162.700.1, RSMo Supp.1990. At the same time, the legislature made two statutory changes regarding funding for the mandated program. It amended section 162.975.2 to read as follows:
2. For approved classes of handicapped and severely handicapped children under five years of age, but not under the age of three, state aid shall not exceed sixty-seven percent of approved cost of the program as specified in the project application. Funds shall be appropriated annually for such program from general revenue funds and shall be separate from the funds apportioned for the school foundation program.
§ 162.975.2, RSMo Supp.1990 (emphasis added). It also enacted section 162.700.5, which provides:
5. Any and all state costs required to fund special education services for three- and four-year-old children pursuant to this section shall be provided for by a specific, separate appropriation and shall not be funded by a reallocation of money appropriated for the public school foundation program.
§ 162.700.5, RSMo Supp.1990 (emphasis added).
Although the mandated program was adopted in 1990, it was not scheduled to begin until July 1, 1991. Therefore, the first appropriation relating to it was a year later in the spring of 1991. The appropriation, which totaled $8,033,400.00, was contained in two sections of the appropriation bill:
Section 2.010. To the Department of Elementary and Secondary Education
For the purpose of funding distributions to the free public schools under the School Foundation Program as provided in Chapter 163 RSMo, provided that Three Million Dollars ($3,000,000) shall be used to continue support for existing programs for handicapped three and four year olds
(0 F.T.E.) .................. $1,140,560,000
1991 Mo.Laws 9 (emphasis added).
For the purpose of funding Special Education Programs for Handicapped Pre-School Children
(0 F.T.E.) .............. $5,033,400
Prior to the 1991-92 school year, section 162.700.3 allowed school districts the option of participating in a voluntary program providing special education programs to handicapped children ages three and four. During the 1990-91 school year, the school districts that participated in the optional program received $1,988,105.00 from the School Foundation Program for special education teachers and teachers' aids for three- and four-year-old students. The School Foundation Program also paid for occupational therapy, physical therapy, speech therapy, diagnostic services and transportation at an estimated cost of $1.1 million for the three- and four-year-old students participating in the optional program. Thus, in 1990-91, the year immediately preceding the effective date of the mandatory program, the 131 school districts participating in the optional special education program received approximately $3 million in categorical aid to that program from the School Foundation Program.
The state argues, rather halfheartedly, that under the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers contained in Article II, Section 1 of the Missouri Constitution, the legislature is entitled to supremacy in the matter of appropriations and, therefore, the courts cannot and should not intrude into this area. The state suggests that the trial court may have granted the school districts' Motion for Summary Judgment on Counts I and II on this basis. We do not believe the trial court based its decision on such a conclusion; we believe the trial court was responding to the school districts' request for an order requiring the legislature to fund the childhood special education program by a separate appropriation. The trial court was simply pointing out that, while it can and did declare the method of funding used by the legislature to be invalid, it does not have authority to direct the legislature to fund the program in any certain manner. In any event, we reject the contention that courts do not have jurisdiction to decide constitutional issues in areas in which the legislature is entitled to supremacy by reason of the separation of powers doctrine under Article II, Section 1, of the Missouri Constitution. In State ex rel. Cason v. Bond, 495 S.W.2d 385, 389 (Mo. banc 1973), this Court said, See also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). Determining the constitutionality of such a statute is not only the prerogative, but the duty, of this Court.
The school districts rely on three Missouri cases, the bedrock of which is State ex rel. Davis v. Smith, 335 Mo. 1069, 75 S.W.2d 828 (banc 1934), for the proposition that an appropriation that contravenes general statutory law is unenforceable 3. Davis, a member of the Board of Barber Examiners, sought a writ of mandamus to require the state auditor to pay Davis $125 compensation for attending board meetings. An appropriation had transferred $3,000 from the general revenue funds to the Board of Barber Examiners' Fund to pay the Board's compensation. The Davis court construed the general statute to prohibit the payment of salaries to members of the Board from the General Fund; the statute limited the payment of salaries to the amount of revenue received by the Board during the year. Davis claimed that the appropriation statu...
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