Rolland v. State

• Decision Date: 17 May 2006
• Docket Number: No. S06A0533.,S06A0533.
• Citation: 630 S.E.2d 386,280 Ga. 517
• Parties: ROLLAND v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

280 Ga. 517

630 S.E.2d 386

ROLLAND v. The STATE.

No. S06A0533.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

May 17, 2006.

John A. Beall, IV, Jonesboro, for Appellant.

Jewel Charmain Scott, Dist. Atty., Thurbert E. Baker, Atty. Gen., Ira Mark Sudman, Asst, Dist. Atty., Vonnetta Leatrice Benjamin, Asst. Atty. Gen., for Appellee.

SEARS, Chief Justice.

The appellant, Reginald Rolland, and his co-defendant, Georgette Thornton, were jointly indicted for the murder of Andre Harrison. After a joint trial, a jury found Rolland guilty of felony murder, aggravated assault, and concealing a death, and found Thornton guilty of felony murder and concealing a death.¹ In Thornton v. State,² we affirmed Thornton's convictions. On appeal, Rolland contends that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel; that the trial court erred by dismissing the malice murder count of the indictment; and that the trial court improperly curtailed his cross-examination of a polygraph examiner. Finding no merit to these contentions, we affirm Rolland's convictions.

1. Although Rolland does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Rolland shot the victim numerous times and then concealed his death.³ The evidence is thus sufficient to support Rolland's convictions.⁴

2. Rolland contends that the trial court erred ruling against his claim that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

a. At trial, Rolland's trial counsel conducted the trial with the goal of preserving his right to make final closing arguments to the jury.⁵ Rolland, however, contends that trial counsel did not understand that he could call a witness for impeachment purposes and not lose his right to conclude final arguments, and that trial counsel erred in not calling a key witness for impeachment purposes.

Rolland's assertion that trial counsel could have called a witness for impeachment purposes and not lost his right to conclude final arguments is erroneous. We have held that under OCGA § 17-8-71, the relevant inquiry is not the purpose for which evidence is introduced, but whether the defendant has in fact introduced evidence other than the defendant's oral testimony.⁶ Moreover, it has been held that when a defendant introduces evidence for impeachment purposes, he has lost the right to conclude final arguments.⁷ For these reasons, trial counsel did not perform deficiently by failing to call the impeachment witness as part of his strategy to preserve concluding closing arguments.

b. During the course of the trial, Thornton called a witness in her defense, which meant that Rolland, as well as Thornton, lost his right to make the final closing argument to the jury.⁸ Rolland contends that trial counsel's performance was deficient because he did not know that, if Thornton called a witness to testify, Rolland would lose his right to conclude closing argument, and that he should have abandoned the trial strategy of preserving his right to conclude final arguments in favor of a strategy of introducing evidence, particularly testimony from the impeaching witness in question. However, even assuming that trial counsel provided deficient performance in his trial strategy, we conclude that Rolland has failed to carry his burden to show that there is a reasonable probability that, if trial counsel had chosen to introduce evidence at trial, the outcome of the trial would have been different.

In this regard, Rolland points to two witnesses that trial counsel should have called to testify at trial. According to Rolland, one of these witnesses would have testified that she saw Thornton chase Rolland with a knife on one occasion. However, an examination of the record indicates that Thornton admitted to this conduct when she testified at trial and that Rolland also testified about the incident. Accordingly, we conclude that there is no reasonable probability that the other witness's testimony about Thornton would have changed the outcome of the trial.

The second witness that Rolland contends that trial counsel should have called to testify at trial testified at the hearing on Rolland's motion for new trial. The witness, Ralph Cheek, testified that he would have offered evidence impeaching a State's witness, Douglas Hollingsworth. At trial, Hollingsworth testified that he was in jail with Rolland just before trial; that Rolland told him that the victim was at his house to make a drug deal; that the victim previously had "ripped him off" on a drug deal; that the victim was "messing around" with his girlfriend; and that Rolland and the victim got in a fight and Rolland killed him.

At the motion for new trial hearing, Cheek testified that, if called as a witness at trial, he would have testified that he was in jail with Hollingsworth just before Rolland's trial that Hollingsworth told him that he was going to testify against Rolland; and that Hollingsworth said "he was gonna do anything to get out of this jail, he said he didn't care if he was lying or whatever, he said he was gonna get out."

We conclude, however, that even if Cheek had testified at trial, there is not a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different. First, at trial, Hollingsworth testified that he was in jail for driving on a suspended license; that he was also on probation in another county for driving on a suspended license; and that in the 1970s, he had been convicted of a felony. Thus, at trial, Hollingsworth's general credibility was attacked. Moreover, at trial, Hollingsworth testified that he was scheduled to be released from custody in a few days, and there was no evidence, either at trial or at the motion for new trial hearing, that Hollingsworth faced other immediate incarceration, thus undermining Cheek's claim that Hollingsworth said he would do anything to get out of jail. In addition, at trial, Hollingsworth's testimony was consistent with other testimony at trial, indicating that Hollingsworth had had discussions with Rolland about the details of Rolland and Thornton's relationship with the victim. For instance, several witnesses testified, as did Hollingsworth, that Rolland was upset with the victim for having sex with Thornton. Finally, in addition to Thornton's testimony that Rolland shot the victim, the evidence also showed that Rolland gave numerous inconsistent statements to the police after he was arrested; that Rolland was upset with the victim for having sex with Thornton; that there was testimony that Rolland planned to sell his house and a car immediately after the victim was killed; and that he called another person about a week after the victim's death and asked that...