Rollins v. McHatton

• Decision Date: 03 July 1891
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court
• Parties: ROLLINS v. McHATTON.

27 P. 254

16 Colo. 203

ROLLINS v. McHATTON.

Supreme Court of Colorado

July 3, 1891

Appeal from district court, Arapahoe county; GEORGE W. ALLEN, Judge.

Action by R. P. Rollins, guardian of Thomas S. McHatton, against Frances A. McHatton, administratrix of the estate of Charles K. McHatton, deceased, to determine the right to the proceeds of an insurance policy. Judgment equally dividing the fund. Plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Charles K. McHatton, during his lifetime, held a certificate of membership in the endowment rank of the order of Knights of Pythias This certificate was also in effect a policy of insurance, the amount of the risk being $3,000. The following extract therefrom is deemed sufficient for a proper understanding of the case: 'And in consideration of the payment hereafter to the said endowment rank of all monthly payments as required, and the full compliance with all the laws governing this rank now in force or that may hereafter be enacted, and shall be in good standing under said laws the sum of three thousand dollars ($3,000.00) will be paid by the Supreme Lodge, Knights of Pythias of the World, to Mattie E. McHatton, wife, as directed by the said brother in his application, or to such other person or persons as he may subsequently direct by change of beneficiary entered upon the record of the supreme secretary of the endowment rank, upon due notice and proof of death and good standing in the rank at the time of death, and surrender of this certificate.' Mattie E. McHatton, wife of the said Charles, died before her husband. During her life-time the certificate was kept in her possession. After her death it passed into the custody of her mother, where it remained until the year 1887, when Charles procured it, and delivered it to R. P. Rollins, guardian of Thomas S., the minor son of himself and Mattie E., with instructions to hold it for the benefit of said son. It remained in the possession of Rollins until deposited in the county court after the death of Charles, in obedience to an order of that tribunal. Charles afterwards married appellee Frances A. McHatton, but died without making any other or further disposition of the certificate. No indorsement showing a change of beneficiary upon the 'record of the supreme secretary of the endowment rank' was made or attempted at the time of the delivery of the certificate to Rollins, or at any date subsequent thereto. Charles complied with the requirements of his contract in relation to assessments and dues, and at his death was a member in good standing. The association, being in doubt as to whom the money belonged, deposited it in the county court, where the estate of Charles was being administered upon, with the request that the court make such distribution thereof as the law required under the contract and existing circumstances. From the order of distribution made in the county court an appeal was taken to the district court, where judgment was entered upon an agreed statement of facts, dividing the money equally between the surviving widow and son. To review that judgment the present appeal was taken by the guardian aforesaid.

Edgar Caypless and Keeler &amp Sales, for appellant.

S T. Horn and I. E. Barnum, for appellee.

HELM C.J., ( after stating the facts as above.)

No doubt exists as to the authority of McHatton to change the beneficiary named in the insurance certificate under consideration. Aside from the fact that this power is conferred upon the member by the charters or by-laws of benefit societies, the present contract contains a provision expressly authorizing the same. It declares that upon the death of the assured the sum mentioned will be paid 'to Mattie E., wife, as directed by the said brother in his application, or to such person or persons as he may subsequently direct by change of beneficiary entered upon the record of the supreme secretary of the endowment rank.' Appellant asserts that the entire amount called for by the certificate belongs to the son, and that appellee, the surviving widow, takes nothing. Mattie E., the beneficiary named in the certificate, having died before the assured, no interest in the fund provided for ever vested in her. Thomas S., her surviving son and heir, could therefore have inherited no part thereof by virtue of such relationship. But appellant confidently relies upon the proposition that the delivery of the certificate to him for the use of the son constituted a sufficient change of beneficiary to vest in the son, immediately upon the father's decease, a right to the money. Upon this contention the principal controversy rests. Were the certificate silent as to the manner in which such substitutions are to be made, there might be room for appellant's contention. But, turning to the extract above given, we discover that other persons than the one originally named can receive the bequest only upon direction of the assured 'by change of beneficiary entered upon the record of the supreme secretary.' This provision thus plainly declares how another person may be substituted in place of the one first designated. The language used is too plain to be misunderstood, and we are not at liberty to supply new words, or to ignore the clear import of those employed by the contracting parties. The intent to permit a change of...