Roman Catholic Archbishop of Boston v. Rogers
| Decision Date | 14 May 2015 |
| Docket Number | NOCV2015-00324,CV2015-00324 |
| Parties | Roman Catholic Archbishop of Boston, A Corporation Sole v. Jon Rogers et al. [1] Opinion No. 130530 |
| Court | Massachusetts Superior Court |
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER FOR JUDGMENT
This case involves the closing of St. Frances X. Cabrini church (the " church") as an existing Roman Catholic parish. The decision to suppress, [2] i.e., close, the church was made by plaintiff, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Boston, a Corporation Sole (" RCAB"), and was announced in May 2004, to become effective on October 29 2004. A certain group of former parishioners of the church named as defendants in this action, disagreed with the decision to close. They elected to protest the decision in at least three ways. First, they commenced a " vigil" within church property in October 2004. The vigil continues to this date and consists of having one or more of their number present within the church building at all times--twenty--four hours a day, every day of the year--despite requests from the owner of the property to vacate. Next, in November 2004, some of the former parishioners initiated an appeal of the Decree of Suppression within the canonical process of the Roman Catholic church. Finally, they commenced a lawsuit in 2005 against the RCAB asserting an equitable interest in the church property. That lawsuit was dismissed and the dismissal was upheld by the Appeals Court as it concluded that the former parishioners lacked the requisite legal standing to assert a claim that the RCAB holds the church property in trust for the benefit of parishioners. Now the RCAB seeks to end the protest vigil. It requests equitable relief in the form of a declaratory judgment that the former parishioners, defendants and those acting in concert with defendants, are unlawfully and intentionally trespassing upon RCAB property in the conduct of their vigil. RCAB moved for a preliminary injunction immediately upon the filing of the complaint requesting the identical relief it seeks as an ultimate remedy, a permanent injunction to bar the continuing trespass. Pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 65(b)(2), I ordered that the trial of the action on the merits be advanced and consolidated for hearing with the request for a preliminary injunction. See Order on Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Paper No 12). Following that Order, defendants answered the complaint and asserted a counterclaim. Defendants also moved to dismiss RCAB's complaint arguing that this court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute over the alleged trespass. RCAB moved to dismiss defendants' counterclaim.
A hearing on the motions to dismiss and a trial of this action took place on May 5, 2015. For the reasons stated below, I deny defendants' motion to dismiss and allow RCAB's motion to dismiss the counterclaim. The following also constitutes my findings of fact and rulings of law, pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 52, after trial on the merits of RCAB's complaint.
Defendants the group of certain former parishioners, move pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), to dismiss RCAB's complaint on the ground that what is presented is an ecclesiastical dispute over which this court has no jurisdiction. Paper No. 21. Defendants contend that whether or not they may be found to be trespassers as a result of their around-the-clock protest vigil necessarily involves interpretation and application of canon law. In contrast, RCAB argues that the issue of trespass may be decided under neutral principles of civil law.
A plaintiff bears the burden of proving all jurisdictional facts. Williams v. Episcopal Diocese of Mass., 436 Mass. 574, 577 n.2, 766 N.E.2d 820 (2002). In deciding the issue, the court takes as true the pertinent allegations of the complaint, although it may also consider affidavits and other matters outside the face of the complaint submitted by the moving party. Ginther v. Commissioner of Insurance, 427 Mass. 319, 322 n.6, 693 N.E.2d 153 (1998).
The essential facts for deciding defendants' motion to dismiss are the following. The RCAB is a Massachusetts religious and charitable, non-profit corporation organized and existing under Chapter 506 of the Acts of 1897. The church at issue is located at 27-31 Hood Road in Scituate, Massachusetts. In approximately 1960, the then Archbishop of Boston, Richard Cardinal Cushing, created the St. Frances X. Cabrini Parish. The record owner of the land upon which the church is located is the RCAB. RCAB purchased the land upon which the church is located on May 19, 1960.
In May of 2004, the Archbishop of Boston, Cardinal Sean O'Malley, informed the pastor and parishioners of St. Frances X. Cabrini Parish that the parish was to be closed as part of a reconfiguration process within the archdiocese. A Decree of Suppression was issued on October 5, 2004, to be effective on October 29, 2004, that closed the operation of the parish. On October 26, 2004, defendants, and others acting in concert with them, commenced a protest vigil. The vigil consists of having one or more individuals participate in the vigil by staying inside the church at all times--24 hours a day, 7 days a week. The vigil has continued, without interruption, to the present date.
In November 2004, certain of the defendants initiated a canonical appeal of the decision to close the parish within channels of the Roman Catholic church hierarchy. RCAB elected not to pursue a legal remedy to end the protest vigil during the pendency of the canonical appeal. According to the RCAB, the appeal has finally been decided by the Vatican's highest court, the Apostolic Signatura, affirming the decision to close the parish. Certain defendants, on the other hand, contend that they are still pursuing an appeal through yet another canonical channel.[3] By letter dated July 29, 2014, Cardinal Sean O'Malley asked defendants to end the vigil. By letter dated February 3, 2015, the RCAB notified defendants that they must vacate the church on or before March 9, 2015, or the RCAB would take civil recourse against them. This action was commenced on March 10, 2015.
In support of their motion to dismiss, defendants rely upon a portion of what they contend is canon law. They point to Canon 1214 which they say provides as follows: " By term church is understood a sacred building designated for divine worship to which the faithful have the right of entry for the exercise, especially the public exercise, of divine worship." The source for defendants' quotation of Canon 1214 is a Memorandum of Decision in a case from the Superior Court-- Roman Catholic Bishop of Springfield v. Anop, Superior Court, Hampden County No. 2011-831, (Moriarty, J.) (February 3, 2012) (" Anop "). In Anop, the court referenced an affidavit submitted by an ordained priest and canon lawyer submitted in that case stating the content of Canon 1214. Anop, p. 6. No affidavit has been submitted in the present case regarding Canon 1214.[4] Because Canon 1214 was discussed in Anop, however, I will address it in this case.
The essence of defendants' argument for dismissal of this action is that the question of whether they may be viewed as trespassers necessarily involves interpretation and application of ecclesiastical principles. Because, under well established law, " disputes involving church 'doctrine, canon law, polity, discipline, and ministerial relationships'" are beyond the court's jurisdiction, Maffei, supra, at 243, quoting Williams, supra at 579, defendants say the action must be dismissed. Defendants rely on Anop where the court dismissed an action of trespass brought by the Bishop of Springfield against parishioners conducting a protest vigil.
I reject defendants' argument and respectfully disagree with the decision of the court in Anop .[5] In my opinion, defendants' argument conflates the issues of whether the parish may be closed (an ecclesiastical question) with whether an owner in control of property may determine when individuals may be on the property (a civil law question). Because the latter may be decided by the application of neutral principles of property law, this court may proceed to hear the facts and decide whether defendants' vigil is a trespass and whether an injunction should issue.
The Supreme Judicial Court in Maffei held that a court has " jurisdiction over church property disputes if and to the extent, and only to the extent, that they are capable of resolution under 'neutral principles of law' - which the United States Supreme Court has defined as 'well-established concepts of trust and property law familiar to lawyers and judges.'" Maffei, supra at 243-44, quoting Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603, 99 S.Ct. 3020, 61 L.Ed.2d 775 (1979). The Court recognized that " [t]he State has an obvious and legitimate interest in the peaceful resolution of property disputes, and in providing a civil forum where the ownership of church property can be determined conclusively." Id. at 243, quoting Jones, 443 U.S. at 602. Accordingly, I must examine whether the present case can be decided on neutral principles of law without involving or relying upon canon law. For the reasons that follow, I find that the dispute is capable of resolution under neutral principles of law.
" One is subject to liability to another for trespass irrespective of whether he thereby causes harm to any legally protected interest of the other, if he intentionally (a) enters land in the possession of the other, or causes a thing or a third person to do so, or (b) remains on the land, or (c) fails to remove from the land a thing which ...
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