Roman Cleanser Co. v. Murphy
| Decision Date | 25 February 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. 5,5 |
| Citation | 386 Mich. 698,194 N.W.2d 704 |
| Parties | ROMAN CLEANSER COMPANY, Employer-Appellee, v. William J. MURPHY, Claimant-Appellee, and Michigan Employment Security Commission, Appellant. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Louis J. Colombo, Jr., Birmingham, Mich., for appellee Roman Cleanser co.
Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., Robert J. Eisenberg and George M. Blaty, Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellant Michigan Employment Security Comm.
Stephen I. Schlossberg, John A. Fillion, Jordan Rossen, Stanley Lubin, Detroit, for International Union, UAW as amicus curiae.
Before the Entire Bench.
Appellant Michigan Employment Security Commission (hereinafter called the Commission) appeals from a decision of the Court of Appeals (29 Mich.App. 155, 185 N.W.2d 87) affirming the circuit court of Wayne county which had reversed the Commission, Referee and Appeal Board.
Claimant William J. Murphy was employed by Roman Cleanser Company (hereinafter called the Company) at its Detroit plant from August 11, 1965 to September 30, 1967. On the latter date he voluntarily left his work for reasons not attributable to his employer and moved to Kentucky. He found employment in Kentucky from November 29, 1967 to January 18, 1968, earning more than the statutory weekly minimum. 1 On January 18, 1968, he was laid off.
On January 31, 1968, claimant filed an interstate claim for unemployment benefits, claiming he had completed the six requalifying weeks required by section 29(3)(a) of the Michigan Employment Security Act and had become eligible for benefits.
On March 1, 1968, the Company wrote the Commission objecting to the claim and indicating that it would defend the action. It further offered to put claimant to work at its Detroit, Miami or Atlanta plant. After investigation by the Commission, notice of determination was mailed on March 13, 1968, to all interested parties indicating that petitioner was eligible for benefits for 20 weeks at $76 per week. The Commission's determination was as follows:
'Claimant left work 9--30--67 for reasons which were not attributable to employer.
'Therefore, the claimant is disqualified under subsection 29(1)(a) of the Act for the week ending 9--30--67 and is subject to a 6 week requalification period under subsection 29(3) of the Act.
'In this instance, the requalification requirement under subsection 29(3) of the Act has been satisfied on 1--27--68.
'In addition, the claimant's benefit entitlement with this employer is reduced by 6 weeks in accordance with subsection 29(4) of the Act.
'Claimant's employment with Wright and Crouch Const. Co. P.O. Box 755 Mayfield, Ky. from 11--29--67 to 1--18--68, verified, is held to requalify claimant.
No appeal was taken from this determination of March 13, 1968, within 15 days after the mailing or personal service of the notice as required by the statute.
The claimant was paid ten checks, the last being on May 1, 1968, covering benefits up to April 20, 1968.
On May 17, 1968, the Company again wrote to the Commission indicating work was still open for the claimant. The gist of this letter was the same as the letter of March 1, 1968. The Commission then conducted a further investigation and on June 13, 1968, issued a redetermination of its May 1, 1968 order. This redetermination read as follows:
'Employer, Roman Cleanser Company, has requested review in the matter of claimant's continued unemployment since separation 1--8--68 from Kentucky employer and the fact that the Michigan employer could place claimant in Detroit, Miami or Atlanta.
'Claimant has stated that he does not want to leave Kentucky at this time and therefore, will not accept the offered work. Based on the establishment of claimant's residence in Kentucky at this time, it is felt that the offered work is not suitable within the meaning of subsection 29(1)(c) and claimant is not subject to disqualification because of his refusal thereof.
This affirmed the previous determination.
On June 24, 1968, the Company appealed from the redetermination of June 13, 1968. A Referee was appointed and testimony was taken on two occasions. On September 5, 1968, the Referee upheld the June 13, 1968 redetermination of the Commission.
On September 9, 1968, the Company appealed the Referee's decision of the Appeal Board.
On January 17, 1969, the Appeal Board affirmed the Referee's decision, and on January 30, 1969, the Company took an appeal from the Appeal Board's decision to the Circuit court of Wayne county. The circuit judge found that the March 13, 1968 determination was not Res judicata. Proceeding upon the theory that the purpose of the Act was to protect persons involuntarily unemployed and that the Act is limited to the general welfare of this State, he held that the word 'residence' should be interpreted as residence in Detroit, Michigan, where claimant lived when he voluntarily quit his employment. Accordingly, he entered judgment in favor of the Company.
The Commission appealed. A majority of the Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's decision. Judge Charles L. Levin, dissenting, would have withheld appellate review on the merits because of the Company's failure to timely pursue statutory review of the Commission's determination of March 13, 1968. Rehearing was denied by the same division of the Court of Appeals. The Commission's application for leave to appeal was granted by this Court. 384 Mich. 828.
Three questions are raised by the Commission on appeal to this Court.
1. Was the Michigan Employment Security Commission's determination of March 13, 1968, relating to the claimant's separation from his Michigan employer a final order under the provisions of the Michigan Employment Security Act?
2. Did the Court of Appeals erroneously hold that the claimant could not requalify for benefits under section 29(3) while residing in Kentucky?
3. Did the Court of Appeals erroneously hold 'suitable' the Michigan offer of work set forth in the Company's protest of May 17, 1968?
4. Did the Court of Appeals further err by holding the claimant 'unavailable for work' within the meaning of the Michigan Employment Security Act?
All of the questions raised in this case were properly discussed and disposed of in the well-reasoned minority opinion of Judge Charles L. Levin in the Court of Appeals. We adopt the following portion of that opinion as the opinion of this Court:
'(I) do not think we can properly reach the meritorious question; the determination of March 13, from which no appeal was taken and which thereupon became final, is, by reason of the doctrines of Res judicata and collateral estoppel, 5 not subject- to collateral attack. 6
'The March 13 determination of the commission was that Murphy's employment by a Kentucky employer requalified him and that his refusal of an offer of employment in Michigan because he wished to remain in Kentucky did not disqualify him. Manifestly, the questions of the effect upon Murphy's right to receive benefits under the Michigan act of his move to Kentucky, and of his employment there, and of his refusal of employment in Michigan were all involved in and decided by the not appealed and, therefore, final determination of March 13.
'Roman Cleanser points out that under § 32a 7 'the commission may, for good cause,
* * * Reconsider any prior determination or redetermination after the 15-day period has expired and issue a redetermination affirming, modifying or reversing the prior determination or redetermination.' (Emphasis supplied.) It contends that the redetermination of June 13 (appealed to the circuit court and now before us on appeal from that court) is within the ambit of this language and, thus, the determination of March 13 is not protected by the doctrines of Res judicata and collateral estoppel.
'I think it is clear, however, that the June 13 redetermination 8 was not a 'reconsideration'
of issues already decided, but rather was made in response to the commission's statutory obligation under § 32(d) of the act 9 to determine whether
there had been a change of facts or of law affecting Murphy's right to continue to receive benefit checks.
'Under § 32(d), the issuance of each benefit check is a determination entitling the employer to a redetermination of the former employee's current eligibility and qualification. A redetermination may, thus, be obtained at any time upon a claim that there has been a change of facts or of law. But, absent a change of facts or of law, questions already decided may not be reopened unless 'for good cause' the commission 'reconsiders' under § 32a. 10
'If every § 32(d) redetermination reopens the issues resolved upon the original determination of eligibility, then the limitation in § 32a, providing that a reconsideration after the expiration of the 15-day appeal period may be made only for good cause shown, would, at least insofar as employer-sought redeterminations are concerned, be of little practical significance. If that were the rule, whenever a benefit check issues, the former employer, by simply requesting a redetermination pursuant to subsection (d), could rehash all the issues resolved by the original determination without showing good cause for reconsideration.
'How then are we to distinguish a redetermination of an original determination--a...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Nummer v. Treasury Dept., 97343
...Senior Accountants, Analysts & Appraisers Ass'n v. Detroit, 399 Mich. 449, 457-458, 249 N.W.2d 121 (1976); Roman Cleanser Co. v. Murphy, 386 Mich. 698, 703-704, 194 N.W.2d 704 (1972). See also Storey, supra at 373, 429 N.W.2d It is not seriously contested that the general requirements of co......
-
Senior Accountants, Analysts and Appraisers Ass'n v. City of Detroit
...clear that it was the legislative intention to make the determination final in the absence of an appeal. Roman Cleanser Co. v. Murphy, 386 Mich. 698, 703--704, 194 N.W.2d 704 (1972) reversing and adopting Judge (now Justice) Levin's dissent in Roman Cleanser Co. v. Murphy, 29 Mich.App. 155,......
-
Miller v. Detroit Pub. Sch.
...law recognizes that collateral estoppel bars the relitigation of conclusions made in previous actions. See Roman Cleanser Co. v. Murphy , 386 Mich. 698, 703–04, 194 N.W.2d 704 (1972). Collateral estoppel may be invoked when: (1) a question of fact essential to the judgment has been actually......
-
Dep't of Licensing & Regulatory Affairs/Unemployment Ins. Agency v. Lucente
...for benefits to the period covered by the benefit check in question and for future periods. See, e.g., Roman Cleanser Co. v. Murphy , 386 Mich. 698, 704-705, 194 N.W.2d 704 (1972) (holding that an employer could not compel reconsideration of an eligibility determination that preceded the pe......