Romano v. Romano
| Decision Date | 16 February 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 92-2793,92-2793 |
| Citation | 632 So.2d 207 |
| Parties | 19 Fla. L. Weekly D338 Carol L. ROMANO, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Paul J. ROMANO, Paul's Place Inc., and Sound Pulse International, Appellees/Cross-Appellants. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Alfred J. Horowitz of Horowitz & Rolnick, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant/cross-appellee.
Cynthia M. Byrne of Law Offices of Mark V. Silverio, Miami, and Douglas Isenberg of Law Offices of Douglas Isenberg, North Miami, for appellees/cross-appellants.
Carol Romano, the former wife, appeals, and Paul Romano, the former husband, cross appeals, from a final judgment dissolving the parties' marriage and distributing their marital assets. Finding error in the trial court's: (1) failure to clearly identify marital and nonmarital assets; (2) refusal to credit the former wife with marital funds spent by the former husband; and (3) deviation from an equal division of the marital assets, we reverse.
The parties were married in late September of 1987 and lived together for approximately three and a half years, until April 1991, when they separated. No children were born of the marriage. The former husband was employed by Paul's Place, Inc., and Sound Pulse International, Inc., corporations in which he was the sole stockholder. The former wife did not work.
During the marriage, the parties jointly purchased a marital home in Broward County, Florida. The home was purchased for $179,000, with the former husband contributing $29,000 of his nonmarital funds and the former wife contributing $7,000 of her nonmarital funds towards the down payment.
In July of 1991, the former wife filed a petition to dissolve the parties' marriage and equitably distribute their marital property. On September 10, 1991, during the pendency of the proceedings, the former husband was ordered to pay the former wife $1,000 per month as temporary support, as well as various ongoing debts, such as the former wife's car payments and insurance, mortgage payments and other costs associated with the marital home, and temporary attorney's fees.
At trial, the parties stipulated that, as of September 5, 1991, the marital assets totalled approximately $505,203 (excluding the home), all of which represented an accumulation of the former husband's earnings throughout the marriage. The parties also stipulated that: (1) $15,000 of this amount was premarital money brought into the marriage by the former husband; (2) $22,000 of that amount was previously distributed in equal parts to the parties; and (3) that amount was further reduced by approximately $50,000 paid by the former husband for tax liability on marital income. Finally, the parties stipulated in open court to the sale of the marital home for $199,000, and that, under the Landay 1 formula, "[the former husband] would receive 56 percent of the net proceeds after costs of sale, closing costs, et cetera to pay off the mortgage, and [the former wife] would receive 44 percent."
The former husband testified to having an affair with another woman while he was married but separated from his wife. He admitted to loaning this "other woman" $2,240, spending $600 to pay some of her veterinary bills, and paying some of the expenses for a business trip the two took together, with all of the money coming from funds he earned during the marriage. He also acknowledged having an annuity through American Express with a cancellation value of $5,190. An account statement reflecting activity from January to June of 1991 was introduced into evidence, but it does not reveal when or how the annuity was obtained.
Lloyd Winfield, the former husband's accountant, testified approximately $11,214 in accounts receivables in Paul's Place had accrued prior to the parties' marriage in September, 1987, although it was paid after the marriage. He further testified that, according to the October 31, 1987, tax return he prepared, the corporation had accounts payable totalling approximately $46,000. He could not definitively say if that amount of debt accrued before or during the marriage. However, he testified the debt was paid after October 31. He also admitted that, if the former husband brought only $15,000 into the marriage, he had to generate $31,000 to pay the $46,000 in payables.
After hearing argument, the court decided it was not going to give the former wife credit for: (1) marital funds expended by the former husband on his mistress; (2) the American Express annuity; and (3) funds used to pay off the $46,000 in business payables. Rather, in its final judgment, the trial court used $505,000 as its starting point for purposes of equitable distribution, and then reduced that figure to $330,800 based only on the following deductions: (1) $22,000 previously distributed between the parties as mentioned above; (2) $50,000 in taxes paid by the former husband as mentioned above; (3) the $15,000 the former husband brought into the marriage as mentioned above; (4) $48,000 owed by the former husband for additional taxes; (5) $11,000 in accounts receivable which accrued prior to the marriage; (6) $19,700 in marital credit card debts; (7) $6,000 paid by the former husband for the debt on the former wife's Porsche; and (8) $2,500 removed by the former wife from the former husband's safe. Then, the court awarded the former husband 70% of this $330,800, or $231,560, and only 30% ($99,240) to the former wife. Several factors were listed in the final judgment supporting this disparity, including the fact that there were no minor children born of this marriage and the former wife did not care for the former husband's children from a previous marriage, and that the former husband already paid the former wife $65,000 in temporary support. In addition, the court ordered the former husband to pay an additional $10,600, representing the former wife's credit card debts, as well as her attorney's fees and costs, which totalled approximately $11,000. 2 Finally, the court reserved ruling to clarify the parties' joint stipulation as to the distribution of the net proceeds from the sale of the marital home.
Pursuant to that reservation, the former wife filed a Motion for Clarification. Consequently, the court entered an order which stated, "The court clarifies the parties stipulation entered in open court on April 23, 1992 to mean that the wife shall receive 44% and the husband 56% of the net seller proceeds of sale of the marital home after payment of closing costs of sale including mortgage payoff." Notwithstanding, the parties failed to reach an agreement on the exact division of the proceeds.
First, we find the trial court failed to properly identify the parties' marital and nonmarital assets as required by section 61.075(3), Florida Statutes (1991), which requires a trial court clearly identify marital and nonmarital assets, and designate which spouse shall receive each asset. For instance, the trial court made no findings with regard to the former husband's annuity, which it is undisputed that he obtained during the marriage. From this record, we are unable to discern whether the annuity is a marital or nonmarital asset. Since we are reversing the trial court's equitable distribution, on remand, the trial court is directed to take additional testimony on this issue and determine if the annuity is a marital asset subject to equitable distribution.
In addition, we agree with the former wife that the trial court erred in refusing to credit her for monies the husband lent to, or spent on, his mistress. The former husband testified at trial that he had an affair with another woman while he was married but separated from his wife. He further admitted to spending at least $2,840 of marital funds on her behalf. Where marital misconduct results in a depletion or dissipation of marital assets, such misconduct can serve as a basis for an unequal division of marital property, or can be assigned to the spending spouse as part of that spouse's equitable distribution. See Eckroade v. Eckroade, 570 So.2d 1347 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); Rosenfeld v. Rosenfeld, 597 So.2d 835, 838 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Poe v. Poe, 522 So.2d 50 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988). "Dissipation" has been defined in the domestic relations context as "where one spouse uses marital funds for his or her own benefit and for a purpose unrelated to the marriage at a time when the marriage is undergoing an irreconcilable breakdown." Gentile v. Gentile, 565 So.2d 820, 823 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) (quoting Hellwig v. Hellwig, 100 Ill.App.3d 452, 55 Ill.Dec. 762, 769, 426 N.E.2d 1087, 1094 (1981)) (emphasis added). Consequently, contrary to what the former husband suggests, the fact that the parties were separated at the time of the expenditures actually works in favor of awarding the former wife a credit for them.
We also agree with the former wife that the trial court erred in refusing to debit the former husband for a portion of the $46,000 in account payables owed by his corporation, Paul's Place. The evidence showed the former husband brought a total of only $26,000 into the marriage, $15,000 in cash and $11,000 in corporate receivables. The trial court gave him full credit for that $26,000 when the court should have given the former wife a credit for that portion of the debt that is equal to the corporate receivables. By not doing so, the court essentially gave the former husband a windfall. The $20,000 balance is to be treated as marital debt that has already been paid.
We also find the factors relied upon by the trial court to support its unequal division are insufficient under Florida...
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