Rome v. State

Decision Date10 August 1977
Docket NumberNo. 49588,49588
Citation348 So.2d 1026
PartiesHenry Floyd ROME v. STATE of Mississippi.
CourtMississippi Supreme Court

James M. Hall, Wiggins, for appellant.

A. F. Summer, Atty. Gen., by Henry T. Wingate, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.

Before PATTERSON, SUGG and BROOM, JJ.

BROOM, Justice, for the Court.

Burglary conviction resulted from Rome's trial in the Circuit Court of Stone County which court sentenced him to six years imprisonment. Probable cause for Rome's arrest, and admissibility of the fruits of the search of his person and car are the chief issues before us. We reverse.

During the night of November 11, 1975, the Stone County Courthouse was burglarized and almost $2,000 stolen. Not knowing of the burglary, police officer Bodie (designated also as Bodine in the record) was on routine foot patrol in the courthouse vicinity after midnight when a noise came to his attention. It sounded like the tearing of metal and was coming from the vacant Montroy house south of Mr. Parson's office. His suspicions aroused by the noise, Bodie spotted two men (one on the Montroy porch and the other nearby bending over something on the ground), at which time he made known his identity and ordered them to halt. One of the subjects escaped by running east toward the street; the other ran toward (as if to attack) Bodie, who took him into custody and radioed Officer Griffin for assistance without giving any details about any crime. The arrestee identified himself as Paul Vincent from New Orleans, but his driver's license identified him as Robert Paul Hebert. Police officers took Vincent to the police station where a search of his person revealed a seven inch knife and approximately $1200 cash plus other money labeled "Bi-Centennial Tags $108.00."

After Police Chief Simpson arrived at the police station a short time later, Officer Griffin returned to the area of the Montroy house from where he observed a 1970 or 1971 Chevrolet car traveling slowly in an easterly direction on Border Avenue at a point 75 to 100 yards from where Vincent was captured. Following the car, Griffin noted that it had a Louisiana license tag, which caused him to think it was connected with the earlier events. Griffin "blue-lighted" and stopped the car after it "speeded up a little," although he observed no law violation or erratic behavior on the part of the car or its driver. Then he took into custody the driver (whose driver's license showed his name as one "Cooper") later identified as Henry Floyd Rome. Officer Griffin's testimony was that under these circumstances he might have arrested any person who drove down the street where Rome was arrested at fifteen miles per hour, even if the car had a Mississippi tag.

After Griffin's arrest of Rome, subsequently discovered evidence (which went to the jury) was obtained from his person and car connecting him with the courthouse burglary. Evidence taken from a search of Rome's person included a card from Golden Slipper Steak House bearing telephone number 524-0513. The arrest of Rome made possible and led to a search of his car (several hours later, about 10:00 a. m.) by the law officers armed with a search warrant, from which search there was obtained incriminating evidence. Rome argues that his arrest by Officer Griffin was without probable cause and was illegal, and that, therefore, reversible error occurred when the jury was allowed to receive the critical items of evidence taken from his person and car. The argument was originally made by motion to suppress, which the trial judge overruled.

WAS THE ARREST OF ROME BASED ON PROBABLE CAUSE, MAKING ADMISSIBLE INTO EVIDENCE THE FRUITS OF THE SEARCH OF HIS PERSON? The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and § 23 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890, in almost identical language, secure citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures. Mississippi Code Annotated § 99-3-7 (1972) authorizes warrantless arrests "when a felony has been committed" and the investigative officer or person has reasonable ground to suspect and believe the person proposed to be arrested committed the felony. Probable cause means more than bare suspicion, but does not necessarily require sufficient evidence to support a criminal conviction. Powe v. State, 235 So.2d 920 (Miss.1970).

Powe has similarities to our present case and it, too, turned on the question of probable cause for a warrantless arrest. In Powe the burglar alarm at the Coca-Cola Bottling Company in Hattiesburg was activated. This drew police officers patrolling in the vicinity to the building where they found that an outer door had been prized open. While reconnoitering the area, the officers arrested one suspect found on the premises. The officers were informed that a second person was seen there described as: approximately six feet tall, of medium size, and having dark complexion and dark hair. By further investigation, the officers in Powe found parked on a nearby street (bearing a Louisiana tag) an automobile which they ascertained belonged to none of the residents in the area. After putting the automobile under surveillance, the officers observed a man running away from the wooded area near the plant toward the automobile. They immediately arrested him and we upheld the legality of the arrest, but in Powe the officers had a description of the second suspect in question, which is not true here as to Rome. Another case in which we dealt with probable cause is Holt v. State, Miss., 348 So.2d 434, decided July 27, 1977. There, in finding probable cause, we noted that an investigative law officer (1) knew a felony had been committed, (2) had sufficient reason to believe that the perpetrators of the crime were in a certain residence, and (3) had information as to how the robbers were dressed, plus other details connecting the suspects with a known robbery. Accordingly, we held that the officers had a right to enter the residence to arrest the robbers and make a search, but the present case is skimpy on probable cause when compared to Holt.

Hall v. State, 288 So.2d 850 (Miss.1974), held that in determining whether a search is reasonable, we must review the arresting officer's action in the light of practical everyday...

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8 cases
  • Turner v. State
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • February 4, 1999
    ...much contention and debate in the trial record and for that reason will not be assumed by this Court. ¶ 15. Both sides cite Rome v. State, 348 So.2d 1026 (Miss.1977), for support of their position as to this issue. In Rome, the facts were as follows: The Stone County Courthouse was burglari......
  • Stringer v. State
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • July 16, 1986
    ...our Constitution. Penick v. State, 440 So.2d 547, 551-52 (Miss.1983); Powell v. State, 355 So.2d 1378, 1380 (Miss.1978); Rome v. State, 348 So.2d 1026, 1029 (Miss.1977); Simmons v. State, 301 So.2d 565, 568 (Miss.1974); Scott v. State, 266 So.2d 567, 568-69 (Miss.1972); Ferguson v. State ex......
  • Henry v. State
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • February 5, 1986
    ...State, 202 Miss. 43, 49, 30 So.2d 414, 415-416 (1947); Branning v. State, 215 Miss. 223, 226, 60 So.2d 633, 634 (1952); Rome v. State, 348 So.2d 1026, 1028 (Miss.1977). On these facts there is no showing that probable cause existed for a warrantless arrest of J.W. Henry. In saying this, I e......
  • Lanier v. State
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • April 11, 1984
    ...prudent men would order that person's arrest." 394 So.2d at 328. See also Jones v. State, 358 So.2d 414 (Miss.1978). In Rome v. State, 348 So.2d 1026, 1027 (Miss.1977), we stated that "probable cause means more than bare suspicion, but does not necessarily require sufficient evidence to sup......
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