Romero v. Nev. Dep't of Corr., Case No.: 2:08-cv-808-JAD-VCF
| Decision Date | 27 November 2013 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 2:08-cv-808-JAD-VCF |
| Parties | Helen Jane Romero, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Nevada Department of Corrections, et al., Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Nevada |
in Part Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment [Doc. 81] and Denying
This civil rights and wrongful death action arises out of the death of Anthony G. Beltran, who was fatally stabbed by his cellmate Jason Potter on December 28, 2006, while the two men were inmates at the Ely State Prison ("ESP"), operated by the Nevada Department of Corrections ("NDOC"). Beltran's mother Helen Romero—as administratrix of Beltran's estate and as guardian ad litem of his children—sued NDOC; NDOC director Glenn Whorton; warden E.K. McDaniel; corrections officers Trent Howes, Michael Stolk, Theresa Landon, and Robert Otero; and caseworkers Robert Chambliss and Mark Drain. Doc. 24. Romero generally alleges that while Beltran was having his handcuffs fastened by guard Howes through the food slot in the cell door prior to being led to the shower, Potter attacked Beltran with a shank fashioned from a metal piece of a typewriter—all to gain greater status in the Aryan Warriors organization. Beltran was taken to a medical facility where he died of his 14 stab wounds.
Romero theorizes that Beltran's death "was made possible" by NDOC's policies and practices regarding cellmate selections and protecting prisoners from other violent inmates. Doc. 24at 3-4. She contends that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference to Beltran's safety and constitutional rights and asserts a § 1983 claim for violations of Beltran's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights against NDOC Director Whorton, Warden McDaniel, and prison guards and caseworkers Howes, Landon, Otero, Drain, and Chambliss. Id. at 17-22. She also alleges a wrongful death claim against NDOC and the NDOC and ESP employees, along with claims against NDOC for negligent training, supervision and retention, and a vicarious liability claim against the State of Nevada. Id. at 23-25. Plaintiff also sues Doe and Roe Defendants I-X, specifically describing these fictitious defendants' purported roles. Id. at 9-10.
On November 29, 2010, all defendants save Howes filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment. They argue that the § 1983 claim can only be brought on behalf of Beltran's estate and against defendants in their personal capacities, and, regardless, this multi-faceted claim fails for lack of evidence that these defendants personally participated in the conduct on which the § 1983 claim is based. They contend that Romero's wrongful death claim fails because the attack was unforeseeable, and that her remaining claims for negligent training, supervision, retention, and vicarious liability fail for lack of evidence, and they further aver that they enjoy qualified immunity from all of Plaintiff's claims. Finally, they ask the Court to dismiss the claims against the doe and roe defendants because, "despite ample discovery, Plaintiff has failed to replace the doe defendants with a named defendant."
The Court heard oral argument on this motion on October 1, 2013. Having thoroughly evaluated the papers and heard and considered the parties' oral arguments, the Court grants the motion for summary judgment in part, dismisses the claims against the doe and roe defendants, and denies Plaintiff's motion to reopen discovery, all based on the reasons set below.
The Court must first clarify which defendants joined in the Motion for Summary Judgment and may therefore benefit from its results. Defendants' original motion was brought on behalf of NDOC, McDaniel, Stolk, Otero, Drain, Chambliss, Whorton, and Landon. Doc. 81 at 1. The motion concluded with a reference to "Defendants," without apparent limitation, id. at 27, but at the October 1, 2013, hearing, counsel for the Nevada Attorney General's Office, who serves as counselfor the Moving Defendants indicated that it was her belief that she did not represent Howes and thus he must be separately represented. Docket entries, however, reflect that counsel for the Moving Defendants also represents Howes, so the Court issued an Order requesting clarification on which Defendants had joined in the motion. Doc. 137 at 1. The Nevada Attorney General's Office's status report acknowledges that the office answered on Howes' behalf, Doc. 69, "[t]here have been no subsequent motions to withdraw as counsel of record," Doc. 139 at 2, and thus, the Motion for Summary Judgment was filed on Howes' behalf, too. Id. Romero disputes that Howes is a movant, particularly because "the Deputy Attorney General advised the Court that she did not represent Trent Howes" at the hearing. Doc. 140 at 2.
The Court finds that the Motion for Summary Judgment failed to explicitly include Howes as a moving defendant such that the Plaintiff had a fair opportunity to respond to the motion as to Howes. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(b) closes the window for summary judgment motions "30 days after the close of all discovery," unless the Court orders otherwise. Id. That deadline has long since passed.1 However, in light of the parties' mutual confusion, and to ensure that Plaintiff is afforded a full and fair opportunity to respond to any arguments by Howes while also ensuring that this matter proceeds to trial only on truly disputed issues, the Court will permit Defendant Howes the opportunity to file a motion for summary judgment as to Romero's claims relating only to him.2
Defendant Howes shall have 21 days after the date of this Order to file such motion for summary judgment. Romero shall then have 21 days to respond, and Howes shall have 10 days to file any reply. The Court cautions the parties that in light of the already protracted history of the summary judgment proceedings in this case, any request for an extension of these filing deadlines will be viewed with extreme disfavor.
"A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense—or the part of each claim or defense—on which summary judgment is sought." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).3 The burdens on summary judgment are key. A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the Court of those portions of the pleadings and discovery that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). When the nonmovant bears the burden at trial, the movant can meet its burden by either (1) presenting evidence to negate an essential element of the nonparty's case; or (2) by demonstrating that the nonomoving party failed to make a showing sufficient to establish an element essential to that party's case. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24. "When the party moving for summary judgment would bear the burden of proof at trial, it must come forward with evidence which would entitle it to a directed verdict of the evidence went uncontroverted at trial." C.A.R. Transportation Brokerage Co. v. Darden Resorts, Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).
After the movant has met its Rule 56(c) burden, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to come forward with specific facts showing a genuine issue of material fact remains for trial. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986). Although "[t]he evidence of [non-movant] is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [her] favor," id. at 587, she "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Id. The nonmoving party cannot avoid summary judgment by relying solely on conclusory allegations unsupported by facts. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). "A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by: (A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record . . . or other materials; or (B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). "A trial court can only consider admissible evidence in ruling on a motion for summary judgment," and evidencemust be authenticated before it can be considered. Orr v. Bank of America, 285 F.3d 764, 773-74 (9th Cir. 2002). A principal purpose of summary judgment is "to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24. "The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
Moving Defendants seek summary judgment on all claims asserted against doe and roe defendants on the basis that Plaintiff has made no effort to amend the complaint to specifically name these individuals and serve them with process so they can participate in this five-year-old case. Doc. 81 at 26-27. They contend that dismissal of fictitious defendants is required when the Plaintiff—like Romero—has failed to request amendment to substitute known persons in place of does and roes before the expiration of the amendment deadline. See id. Plaintiff offers zero response to this argument. Instead, she asks in a separate motion filed nearly three years after the summary judgment motion to reopen discovery to allow her to take the defendants' depositions—depositions that were originally noticed for Fall of 2010 but were purportedly vacated to accommodate a conflict in defense counsel's schedule. Doc. 134 at 2. The Court finds that the delays and comprehensive lack of discovery diligence in this case preclude a finding of good cause...
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