Romes v. Commonwealth

• Decision Date: 27 April 1915
• Citation: 164 Ky. 334,175 S.W. 669
• Parties: ROMES v. COMMONWEALTH.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

175 S.W. 669

164 Ky. 334

ROMES v. COMMONWEALTH.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

April 27, 1915

Appeal from Circuit Court, Pike County.

W. T Romes was convicted of bribery, and he appeals. Reversed with directions to grant a new trial.

John F Butler and J. J. Moore, both of Pikeville, for appellant.

James Garnett, Atty. Gen., Chas. H. Morris, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Chas. Hobson, of Frankfort, for the Commonwealth.

CARROLL J.

The appellant was indicted for receiving a bribe to vote at the regular election held in November, 1913, and upon his trial was found guilty, and his punishment fixed at a fine of $150 and exclusion from office and suffrage. The indictment was under section 1586 of the Kentucky Statutes, providing in part, that:

"Any person guilty of receiving a bribe for his vote at an election, or for services or influence in procuring a vote or votes at an election, shall be fined from fifty to five hundred dollars, and be excluded from office and suffrage. 'Bribe' or 'bribery' means any reward, benefit or advantage, present or future, to the party influenced or intended to be influenced, or to another at his instance, or the promise of such reward, benefit or advantage."

The principal ground urged for reversal is that the evidence was not sufficient to justify the submission of the case to the jury, and therefore the trial court should have directed the acquittal of the accused.

The evidence for the commonwealth was, in substance, as follows: Don Ramsey testified that at the regular November election in 1913 in Pike county he gave to the appellant $4 "for his vote," in consideration of which he agreed to vote "for the whole Republican ticket." He further said that no one except himself and appellant was present when the transaction took place, nor did any person see him give appellant the money. Will Ramsey, another witness for the commonwealth, after testifying that he had known the appellant for several years, was asked:

"Q. Are you acquainted with the reputation, from what the people who know him generally say about him, as to whether or not he is a man that would accept a bribe for his vote? A. I am. Q. What is that reputation? A. He is regarded as a man that will take money in an election for his vote. I gave him money for his vote myself in 1908, 1909, and 1912."

The appellant in his own behalf testified that he had never accepted or agreed to accept money for his vote, and was never influenced to vote for money or other like consideration. The admission of the evidence as to the general reputation of appellant for selling his vote and receiving bribes to vote at other elections was objected to by counsel for appellant.

It is provided in section 1594 of the chapter on elections, of which section 1586 is a part, that:

"A jury shall never convict any one, under the provisions of this chapter, upon the testimony of a single witness, unless sustained by strong corroborating circumstances."

The evidence of Don Ramsey was sufficient to show that the appellant accepted a bribe for his vote at the election in 1913. But, under this statute, a conviction could not be had on his testimony alone. So that the question is: Was his evidence sustained by strong corroborating circumstances, or by any circumstances that would answer the requirement of the statute? Another question is: Was evidence of the general reputation of the appellant as a vote seller, and evidence that he had received bribes for his vote at other elections, competent?

It will be observed that the language of the statute declaring the quantity of evidence necessary to secure a conviction in cases like this is simple and direct, and under it, when only one witness testifies to the act of bribery, there must be other evidence, either direct or circumstantial, supporting the evidence of the principal witness. Of course, if two witnesses testify to the act, no corroborating circumstances would be necessary, but, when only one witness testifies to the act, then his evidence must be supported by corroborating circumstances.

It is insisted, however, for the commonwealth, that the evidence of Will Ramsey was competent and sufficient corroboration. But, if the competency of this evidence should be assumed, it did not corroborate at all the evidence of Don Ramsey. The general reputation of appellant may have been that of a bribe taker, and he may have accepted bribes for his votes at the elections held in 1908, 1909, and 1912, but his bad reputation, or what he did in these years, did not corroborate the evidence of Don Ramsey as to what he did in 1913 or show, independent of his evidence, that appellant, in 1913, accepted a bribe for his vote. To comply with the statute there must have been some corroboration of the identical transaction testified to by Don Ramsey. Appellant could be convicted only upon evidence that he accepted a bribe for his vote at the time charged in the indictment, and therefore the corroboration must go to the offense charged; and evidence of the commission of other like offenses independent of, and having no connection with, the offense charged, was not corroborative evidence or any evidence that the offense charged was committed. Nor was evidence of the reputation of appellant as a bribe taker corroborative of the fact that he was guilty of accepting the bribe for which he was being prosecuted. Bad reputation alone is, of course, not sufficient evidence of guilt to warrant a conviction for a specific offense.

When, however, the commission of the offense has been shown by sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction, evidence of bad reputation, when it is allowable at all, is admissible as further circumstantial corroboration of its commission, and not as substantive evidence of guilt. Corroborating evidence is evidence that tends to connect the accused with the particular crime under investigation, and it must have such relation to and be connected with this crime as to furnish some evidence, direct or circumstantial, of its commission.

But aside from this, the evidence of other acts of bribery was not competent. The offense charged against appellant consisted of a single act of bribery. It was not a part of any scheme or plan. The charge was confined to a particular transaction, and, when the accused is put upon his trial charged with the commission of one distinct...