Romines v. Coleman
| Decision Date | 27 April 2023 |
| Docket Number | 2022-SC-0424-MR |
| Parties | STEVEN RUSH ROMINES APPELLANT v. HONORABLE TIMOTHY R. COLEMAN EDMONSON CIRCUIT COURT APPELLEE AND JOHN MATTINGLY REAL PARTY IN INTEREST/ APPELLEE |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS NO. 2022-CA-0378 EDMONSON CIRCUIT COURT NO. 21-CI-00136.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT STEVEN RUSH ROMINES: R. Kenyon Meyer Jeremy S. Rogers Sarah D. Reddick Dinsmore & Shohl LLP.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE HONORABLE TIMOTHY R. COLEMAN: Todd V McMurtry Hemmer DeFrank Wessels PLLC.
OPINION
Upon denial of his motion to dismiss for improper venue, Steven Romines and Romines, Weis &Young, P.S.C. (Romines's law firm) brought an original action under Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 76.36[1] in the Court of Appeals seeking a writ to prohibit the Edmonson Circuit Court, Judge Timothy R. Coleman presiding, from proceeding with John Mattingly's defamation suit against Romines and his law firm. The Court of Appeals denied relief and appellants appealed to this Court as a matter of right pursuant to Ky. Const. § 115. Having determined that Romines has an adequate remedy by appeal for all the errors he claims, and that no great and irreparable injury to the administration of justice will occur should the underlying matter proceed before the circuit court, we affirm the Court of Appeals.
This matter arises from the death of Breonna Taylor in Louisville which resulted in significant accusations of police misconduct, demands for accountability and policy changes, protests, property damage, injuries, arrests, at least one additional death, and considerable criminal and civil litigation.
On March 13, 2020, officers of the Louisville Metro Police Department executed a search warrant on Taylor's apartment. Mattingly was one of the officers executing the warrant. At the time, Kenneth Walker was in the apartment with Taylor. When officers breached the door of Taylor's apartment, Walker discharged a pistol striking Mattingly. Officers then returned fire striking Walker and fatally injuring Taylor.
Walker was criminally charged with shooting Mattingly, with Romines serving as his defense counsel. The Jefferson County Commonwealth Attorney eventually dismissed the charges against Walker.
Romines also represented Walker in two separate civil actions; one in the Jefferson Circuit Court and the other in federal court. In the state action, Walker named Mattingly individually as a defendant. Mattingly counterclaimed against Walker for the personal injuries he had suffered resulting from being shot by Walker.
Following the filing of Mattingly's counterclaim, Romines made a responsive statement on a news report to WHAS TV, an ABC network affiliate in Louisville, which was published and then republished online by other outlets and individuals. Romines stated:
One would think that breaking into the apartment, executing [Walker's] girlfriend and framing [Walker] for a crime in an effort to cover up her murder, would be enough for them. Yet this baseless attempt to further victimize and harass [Walker] indicates otherwise.
As a result of this statement, Mattingly filed a complaint in Edmonson County, where he resided, against both Romines and his law firm (collectively referred to hereafter as "Romines") alleging that Romines's statements constituted actionable defamation.
Romines publicly responded again and told a news reporter for the Courier Journal: "As I have said many times, it is a universal truth that liars, racists, and dirty cops all hate being exposed as liars, racists, and dirty cops."
Following the publication of that second statement, the circuit court granted Mattingly leave to amend to include the latest statement as another act of defamation by Romines.
Romines moved to dismiss the defamation action based on improper venue and a failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
Following the circuit court's denial of his motion to dismiss, Romines filed a petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition with the Kentucky Court of Appeals requesting that it order the circuit court to either dismiss Mattingly's "unconstitutional lawsuit" with prejudice or order that Mattingly's suit be transferred to Jefferson County. The Court of Appeals denied the petition for a writ by an order dated September 1, 2022. Romines appealed to this Court.
Romines argues in support of a writ that Edmonson County is not the proper venue for Mattingly's claims, and that his defamation action should otherwise be barred by: (1) the First Amendment to the United States Constitution; (2) the judicial statements privilege; and (3) the "libel proof plaintiff doctrine."
In this action, Romines seeks extraordinary relief pursuant to CR 81. By its nature, extraordinary relief is reserved for circumstances where the right of appeal from a final judgment will be inadequate, or where a trial court's action will damage our judicial processes. Kentucky law in this arena is both well developed and firmly established. In Bender v. Eaton, 343 S.W.2d 799, 800 (Ky. 1961), the Court analyzed the law relating to extraordinary writs and counseled caution in entertaining petitions stating:
This careful approach is necessary to prevent shortcircuiting normal appeal procedure and to limit so far as possible interference with the proper and efficient operation of our circuit and other courts. If this avenue of relief were open to all who considered themselves aggrieved by an interlocutory court order, we would face an impossible burden of nonappellate matters.
Furthermore, this Court has held that "the decision whether to grant a writ of prohibition lies in the sound discretion of the reviewing court." Edwards v. Hickman, 237 S.W.3d 183, 189 (Ky. 2007). While deference to such discretion falls aside when it has been established that the lower court would be acting outside its jurisdiction (see, e.g., Hoskins v. Maricle, 150 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Ky. 2004), and Chamblee v. Rose, 249 S.W.2d 775, 777 (Ky. 1952)), we have continually asserted that whether to grant the writ is still discretionary.
A petitioner's allegations of error alone do not justify extraordinary relief under CR 81. Under our standards a writ for extraordinary relief may only be granted upon a showing by the petitioner that: (1) that the lower court is proceeding or is about to proceed outside its jurisdiction and there is no remedy through an application to an intermediate court; or (2) the lower court is acting or is about to act erroneously, although within its jurisdiction, and there exists no adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise and great injustice and irreparable injury will result if the petition is not granted. Cline v. Weddle, 250 S.W.3d 330, 334 (Ky. 2008) (quoting from Hoskins v. Maricle, 150 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Ky. 2004)).
In Bender, our predecessor Court analyzed these two distinct classes of cases in which appellate courts could grant extraordinary relief. The first class, acting without jurisdiction, is not found in this matter before us. As to the "second class," error within its jurisdiction, this Court explained the two-stage analysis to be performed:
In the second class of cases relief ordinarily has not been granted unless the petitioner established, as conditions precedent, that he (a) had no adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise, and (b) would suffer great and irreparable injury (if error has been committed and relief denied). See Manning v. Baxter, 281 Ky. 659, 136 S.W.2d 1074; Smith v. Shamburger, 314 Ky. 850, 238 S.W.2d 844. This is a practical and convenient formula for determining, prior to deciding the issue of alleged error, if petitioner may avail himself of this remedy. As a general rule, if he has an adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise, or will not suffer great and irreparable injury, the petition should be dismissed forthwith.
After finding that a petitioner has passed test (a), the proper procedural method is to only then apply test (b) to determine whether or not the petitioner, even though lacking an alternate adequate remedy, will suffer great and irreparable injury. This means something of a "ruinous" nature. Osborn v. Wofford, 239 Ky. 470, 39 S.W.2d 672, 673 (1931). Ordinarily if this cannot be shown, the petition will be dismissed.
From the foregoing, it should be clear that showing both lack of an adequate remedy by appeal and great and irreparable injury amount to a threshold for one seeking extraordinary relief based on error within the circuit court's jurisdiction. Until this threshold is met, questions of circuit court error do not arise. Bender, 343 S.W.2d at 801. Even then, the reviewing court still has the discretion to deny the writ, where prudence dictates doing so. Edwards, 237 S.W.3d at 189.
Lastly, under the rarest circumstances, this Court has entertained "certain special cases" where the petitioner has failed to make a specific showing of a "great and irreparable injury" under test (a). However, such will only occur when:
[A] substantial miscarriage of justice will result if the lower court is proceeding erroneously, and correction of the error is necessary and appropriate in the interest of orderly judicial administration. It may be observed that in such a situation the court is recognizing that if it fails to act the administration of justice generally will suffer the great and irreparable injury.
We will first address Romines' argument that Edmonson County is the wrong venue for Mattingly's alleged SLAPP[2] suit. We...
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