Ronald G. Edwards v. Madison Township
| Decision Date | 25 November 1997 |
| Docket Number | 97-LW-5542,97APE06-819 |
| Parties | Ronald G. Edwards, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Madison Township et al., Defendants-Appellees |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
Moore Yaklevich & Mauger, W. Jeffrey Moore and Jud R. Mauger, for appellant.
Crabbe Brown, Jones, Potts & Schmidt, and Larry James, for appellees.
On November 2, 1995, Ronald G. Edwards filed a complaint in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas against Madison Township, the Madison Township Police Department ("department"), Charles R. Stevens, Chief of Police,[1] the Fraternal Order of Police, Capital City Lodge No. 9 ("FOP"), Madison Township Administrator David Brobst and Dennis White, Vicki Phillips and Robert Garvin, Madison Township trustees. The complaint set forth various claims for relief, including: breach of contract, violation of R.C. 4113.52 (whistleblower statute), violation of Sections 1983, 1985 and 1988, Title 42, U.S. Code, "violation" of R.C. 2905.12 (coercion), "violation" of R.C. 2921.31 (obstructing official business) and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The FOP was later dismissed as a party.
A jury trial commenced on April 7, 1997. At the close of Mr. Edwards' case, the defendants (hereinafter collectively referred to as "appellees") moved for a directed verdict. The trial court granted the motion as to all of Mr. Edwards' claims. A decision and judgment entry were filed on May 20, 1997.
Mr. Edwards (hereinafter "appellant") has appealed to this court, assigning one error for our consideration:
"THE COMMON PLEAS COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A DIRECTED VERDICT TO THE APPELLEE."
When a motion for a directed verdict is made, what is being tested is a question of law%%the legal sufficiency of the evidence to take the case to the jury. Ruta v. Breckenridge-Remy Co. (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 66, 68. In considering such a motion, the trial court must construe the evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party and consider neither the weight of the evidence nor the credibility of witnesses. Strother v. Hutchinson (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 282, 284. The benefit of all reasonable inferences is given to the nonmoving party. Ruta at 68.
In order to submit the case to the jury, the plaintiff must produce some evidence as to every essential element. See Strother at 285. If there is substantial competent evidence to support the nonmoving party upon which evidence reasonable minds might reach different conclusions, the motion must be denied. Wagner v. Roche Laboratories (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 116, 119.
All of appellant's claims centered around his employment as a police officer with Madison Township. At the time of the incidents alleged in the complaint, appellant was a detective, and Charles F. Stevens was Chief of Police. In July 1994, appellant learned of an incident involving Chief Stevens and a juvenile who had been arrested. In July or August 1994, appellant, in his capacity as detective, was given "a suspected physical abuse" report from Children's Hospital. In the report, the juvenile alleged that Chief Stevens had beaten and choked him.
On the day he received the report, appellant spoke with Chief Stevens about the incident and asked the Chief how he should handle it. The Chief told appellant that the incident involved merely an "attitude adjustment," that appellant should not worry about it and that he (the Chief) would take care of it. Appellant told Chief Stevens that he thought the Chief should not handle it, but the Chief told appellant it was not appellant's problem. Appellant tape recorded this conversation.
Approximately one week later, appellant received a message from Franklin County Children Services regarding the incident with the juvenile. Chief Stevens took the message and said he would handle it. Soon thereafter, Chief Stevens told appellant that he had spoken with the juvenile's mother and everything was fine.
On September 12, 1994, appellant was injured on the job in an unrelated incident. Appellant immediately went on injury leave.
In December 1994, while still on injury leave, appellant met with Trustee Phillips regarding the juvenile incident. Appellant told her everything he knew about the matter, including the fact that he had a tape recording of his conversation with the Chief, and related his concern over whether the matter was being handled properly.
By January 1995, appellant's injury leave had run out, and he was using his sick leave. On January 6, 1995, the Chief wrote appellant a letter indicating that medical documentation was necessary to continue appellant's use of sick leave. In addition, appellant was ordered to report for light duty on January 16, 1995 if such documentation was not provided. The letter also indicated that appellant would be placed on unpaid leave status if he failed to report for duty and that appellant may be subject to disciplinary action.
On January 16, 1995, appellant had not provided medical documentation, and Chief Stevens placed appellant on leave without pay status and filed disciplinary charges against appellant.[2] Ultimately, appellant provided medical documentation in support of his continued absence from work, and appellant's pay was reinstated retroactively. In addition, the disciplinary charges against appellant were resolved, in essence, in favor of appellant.
On January 19, 1995, Chief Stevens wrote appellant a letter informing him that preliminary results of an internal investigation into appellant's job performance indicated appellant was negligent in his duties and that effective January 21, 1995, appellant was administratively reassigned to patrol operations.
On November 28, 1995, disciplinary charges were filed against appellant. Again, these charges arose out of appellant's failure to provide medical documentation as to his continued absence from work. These charges were dismissed after appellant provided the necessary documentation.
Appellant never returned to work after his September 12, 1994 injury. At some point, appellant applied for and went on permanent disability retirement. The foregoing facts essentially constitute the bases for appellant's claims. Utilizing the directed verdict standards set forth above, we must determine whether or not a directed verdict as to appellant's claims was appropriate. We will address each claim individually.
Appellant contends appellees' actions constituted breach of contract, specifically, breach of the collective bargaining agreement ("agreement") between Madison Township and the FOP. Appellant asserts he produced sufficient evidence that appellees breached the agreement. However, a directed verdict as to this claim was appropriate because the common pleas court lacked jurisdiction over this claim.
In State ex rel. Fraternal Order of Police, Ohio Labor Council, Inc. v. Franklin Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 287, citing Franklin Cty. Law Enforcement Assn. v. Fraternal Order of Police, Capital City Lodge No. 9 (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 167, paragraph two of the syllabus, the Supreme Court of Ohio stated that if a party asserts claims arising from or dependent on collective bargaining rights created by R.C. Chapter 4117, the remedies provided in such chapter are exclusive. The State Employees Relations Board ("SERB") has exclusive jurisdiction to decide matters committed to it pursuant to R.C. Chapter 4117. Franklin County Law Enforcement Assn. at paragraph one of the syllabus.
There are two general areas in which SERB has exclusive jurisdiction over charges of unfair labor practices: (1) where one of the parties files charges with SERB alleging an unfair labor practice under R.C. 4117.11, or (2) where a complaint brought before the common pleas court alleges conduct that constitutes an unfair labor practice specifically enumerated in R.C. 4117.11, and the trial court dismisses the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. State ex rel. Fraternal Order of Police, Ohio Labor Council, Inc. at 289, citing E. Cleveland v. E. Cleveland Firefighters Local 500, I.A.F.F. (1994) 70 Ohio St.3d 125, 127-128.
The alleged wrongful acts of appellees in "demoting" appellant and "suspending" appellant's pay, if true, would constitute unfair labor practices under R.C. 4117.11(A)(1). Because appellant's breach of contract claim arises from and/or is dependent upon the agreement, such claim should have been brought through SERB. Accordingly, although for reasons different than the trial court's, a directed verdict as to appellant's breach of contract claim was appropriate.
Appellant also contends that he produced sufficient evidence of a Section 1983, Title 42, U.S. Code ("Section 1983") claim. Section 1983 provides a remedy to persons whose federal rights have been violated by governmental officials. Shirokey v. Marth (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 113, 116, citing Monroe v. Pape (1961), 365 U.S. 167, overruled on other grounds in Monnell v. Dept. of Social Services of City of New York (1978), 436 U.S. 658. Section 1983 itself does not create constitutional rights; it creates a cause of action for the vindication of constitutional guarantees found elsewhere. Shirokey at 116, quoting Braley v. City of Pontiac (C.A.6, 1990), 906 F.2d 220, 223. Section 1983 is limited to deprivations of federal statutory and constitutional rights. Shirokey at 116.
The elements of a Section 1983 claim are as follows: (1) the conduct in controversy must be committed by a person acting under color of state law, and (2) the conduct must deprive the plaintiff of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. 1946 St Clair Corp. v. Cleveland (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 33,...
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