Rone v. Reeves

• Decision Date: 02 May 2000
• Citation: 20 S.W.3d 526
• Parties: (Mo.App. S.D. 2000) Lewis Rone, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. James E. Reeves, Personal Representative of the Estate of B.F. Rogers, Deceased, Defendant/Respondent. 22885 0
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

20 S.W.3d 526 (Mo.App. S.D. 2000)

Lewis Rone, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. James E. Reeves, Personal Representative of the Estate of B.F. Rogers, Deceased, Defendant/Respondent.

22885

Missouri Court of Appeals Southern District

05/02/2000

Appeal From: Circuit Court of Dunklin County, Hon. Stephen R. Sharp

Counsel for Appellant: Terry M. McVey

Counsel for Respondent: W. Edward Reeves

Opinion Summary: None

Garrison, C.J., and Barney, J., concur.

Kerry L. Montgomery, Presiding Judge

Lewis Rone (Appellant) appeals the trial court's denial of his petition seeking damages and specific performance in conjunction with a contract for the sale of land. Appellant claims the trial court erred in finding that the land descriptions in the contract were indefinite and unenforceable and in failing to grant specific performance of the contract.

The standard of review of this court-tried case is governed by the principles set forth in Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. banc 1976). We shall affirm the trial court's judgment unless it is not supported by substantial evidence, it is against the weight of the evidence, or unless it erroneously declares or applies the law. Id. at 32; In re Estate of Looney, 975 S.W.2d 508, 513 (Mo.App. 1998).

In addition, we accept as true the evidence and inferences therefrom that support the trial court's judgment and disregard contrary evidence. Crawford v. Detring, 965 S.W.2d 188, 189 (Mo.App. 1998). "We keep in mind that a trial court is free to believe or disbelieve all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness." Id. We present the facts in accordance with these guidelines.

Appellant owns and farms land in and around Portageville, Missouri. In the early months of 1994, a corporation approached Appellant seeking mineral rights to remove sand from his land. The corporation indicated that it would only be interested in making a deal with Appellant if it were assured a transportation right-of-way across the neighboring land owned by B. F. "Hot" Rogers (Respondent).¹

Thereafter, Appellant called Respondent to discuss a potential right-of-way and to set up a meeting at the law office of Jim DeReign. At this meeting, Respondent said he was not interested in granting the right-of-way. According to Appellant, Respondent instead made a "take it or leave it offer" for Appellant to purchase all of Respondent's land in the north end of Pemiscot County and all of his land in New Madrid County. Appellant expressed interest in the offer, but the parties did not discuss specifics such as the purchase price or the amount of acreage involved at this meeting.

After the initial meeting, Appellant and Respondent exchanged phone calls every week or ten days. Respondent explained that his attorney was out of town so he had been unable to get a contract drafted. During this time, Appellant investigated the extent of Respondent's land holdings in Northern Pemiscot County and in New Madrid County. Respondent consulted ASCS maps and plat maps to determine the location and total number of acres of Respondent's holdings. Based upon these sources, Appellant prepared a document showing the land that he believed Respondent intended to sell.

Appellant testified that eventually the parties had a telephone conversation in which Respondent offered to sell the land for $1100 per acre. The parties discussed the fact that Respondent had only an undivided one-half interest in some of the land. They agreed to meet at Mr. DeReign's office on May 6, 1994, to finalize the terms of the sale.

At the May meeting, Appellant brought the document showing what he believed to be the real estate Respondent intended to sell. Respondent looked over the document and made adjustments, including adding a ninety-acre farm that the plat maps failed to show as his property. The parties discussed the number of acres Respondent owned in each parcel of land. Respondent then indicated that Mr. DeReign should prepare a contract. They again went over the maps and indicated the parcels and number of acres before arriving at a final purchase price.

While the parties waited, Mr. DeReign drafted a document entitled "Option to Purchase Real Estate." The document purported to give Appellant the right to purchase 834 acres of real estate owned by Respondent for $1100 per acre, for a total price of $917,400. The document described the real estate as located in Pemiscot and New Madrid Counties, specifically referring to the land as follows:

Section 14, Township 20 North, Range 13 East-Pemiscot 160 acres individually

Section 14, Township 20 North, Range 13 East-Pemiscot 180 acres co-tenant

Section 15, Township 20 North, Range 13 East-Pemiscot 40 acres co-tenant

Section 13, Township 20 North, Range 13 East-Pemiscot 80 acres individually

Section 22, Township 20 North, Range 13 East-Pemiscot 80 acres individually

Section 19, Township 21 North, Range 14 East-New Madrid 94 acres individually

Section 28, Township 21 North, Range 14 East-New Madrid 99 acres individually

Section 29, Township 21 North, Range 14 East-New Madrid 101 acres individually

Mr. DeReign admitted the document did not contain complete legal descriptions of the real estate but said he believed the descriptions were sufficient for the agreement . He testified that his goal was to provide a "thumbnail sketch" of the property, with the complete legal descriptions to be provided when the sale was closed. Both parties signed the document. Respondent left the office briefly and returned with his wife's signature on the document. Appellant paid $5000 in consideration for the option to purchase the land.

Shortly thereafter, Respondent's attorney, Jim Ed Reeves, contacted Appellant and asked him to come to his office. Mr. Reeves attempted to give Appellant a $5000 check from Respondent in order to cancel the option. Appellant refused the check. On June 8, 1994, Appellant sent a certified letter notifying Respondent that he was exercising the option to purchase the land.

The sale was never completed. On February 15, 1995, Appellant filed a Petition for Specific Performance and Damages. A trial was held on the matter on December 16, 1997. Both Appellant and Mr. DeReign testified that they understood that Respondent intended to sell Appellant all of his land in Northern Pemiscot County and in New Madrid County even though the contract did not refer to "all" of Respondent's land. Mr. DeReign further testified that he believed the contract accurately reflected the parties' wishes as expressed to him.

Both parties submitted exhibits containing the complete legal descriptions of all land owned by Respondent in Northern Pemiscot County and New Madrid County. These exhibits showed several discrepancies between the number of acres in each tract as shown in the contract and the actual acreage owned by Respondent:

Tract Acres in Contract Acres Owned

S14-T20N-R13E 340 526

S15-T20N-R13E 40 80

S13-T20N-R13E 80 77

S22-T20N-R13E 80 81

S19-T21N-R14E 94 90S28-T21N-R14E 99 112.7²

S29-T21N-R14E 101 101.81

On February 19, 1999, the trial court entered a judgment denying the relief Appellant requested. The trial court determined that the contract prepared by Mr. DeReign did not identify the land to be conveyed in a manner sufficient to satisfy the requirements of section 432.010,³ the statute of frauds. The court found that "the evidence established that [Respondent] owned more land in some sections and townships than described in the contract." The court also noted that "[t]he contract refers to a non-existent section in New Madrid County." In its findings, the court also emphasized the fact that Respondent only had a partial ownership interest in some of the described land.

The trial court concluded, "The contract on its face neither sufficiently provides the means for determining the parties' intention as to each parcel of the land to be conveyed nor on its face refers to then--existing external evidence which might be utilized in determining the parties' intention and applying the description contained within the contract." After determining the contract was not legally enforceable, it denied Appellant's request for specific performance and damages.

Appellant raises two points on appeal. In Appellant's first point he complains the trial court erred in concluding the contract was unenforceable because the real estate involved was not sufficiently identified. In his second point, Appellant maintains the trial court erred in denying his claim for specific performance of the contract.

In Point I, Appellant contends the trial court erroneously applied the law in finding the contract was unenforceable because the "rough description" of the property in the contract merely provided the "key" to the identification of the land to be conveyed and could be properly clarified by parole evidence. Appellant suggests that the land descriptions in the contract "coincided with all of the property owned by [Respondent] in each...