Roney v. State

Decision Date07 September 1989
Docket NumberNo. A89A1156,A89A1156
Citation192 Ga.App. 760,386 S.E.2d 412
PartiesRONEY v. The STATE.
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

John G. Runyan, for appellant.

H. Lamar Cole, Dist. Atty., Charles M. Stines, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee.

BIRDSONG, Judge.

Appellant Wiley Roney appeals his conviction and sentence for trafficking in cocaine, obstruction of an officer, and driving while license is suspended.

While on stakeout on an unrelated case, Sgt. Jackson of the Moultrie/Colquitt County Drug Squad observed appellant drive into a motel parking lot and retrieve a little white package from the trunk of another vehicle. Appellant put the package in his pocket. He then talked to a woman, later identified as his wife, gave her some money and drove off. Sgt. Jackson radioed this information to Lt. Rayburn. Rayburn found appellant and asked him to step out of his vehicle. Appellant struck Rayburn on the chest with both hands, pushing him backwards, and then fled on foot. The police followed in hot pursuit. Sgt. Holmes saw appellant running with something in his hand. Officer Ethridge saw appellant fall down. Subsequently a white plastic bag containing over 28 grams of cocaine was found in this same area. The bag was dry and clean when it was recovered. Sgt. Jackson testified that the bag found looked like the "same type object" appellant had been in possession of in the motel parking lot. Appellant was apprehended and placed in arrest. Appellant was searched and found to be carrying $1,427 in currency.

Appellant's wife testified that she had given appellant the money, which was from her income tax return, the night before to make a car payment. She did not see appellant with a white paper bag, and he did not get anything out of the car trunk in the motel parking lot. Held:

1. Appellant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to establish appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Appellant does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence of the offense of obstruction of an officer either by argument or citation of authority in his brief. Accordingly, this issue is not before us on review. Court of Appeals Rule 15(c); Adams v. State, 187 Ga.App. 340(3), 370 S.E.2d 197.

Appellant asserts that the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to support his conviction of driving while his driver's license was suspended. The only evidence introduced to sustain this charge, in addition to that showing appellant was driving a motor vehicle on the day of the incident and was arrested after his escape attempt failed, is as follows: "[DISTRICT ATTORNEY]: Were you able to check his driver's license? [LT. RAYBURN]: Yes, whenever we brought him in to book him he didn't have any identification on him. We ran his driver's license and ... we found it to be suspended." (Emphasis supplied.) No objection was made to the introduction of this evidence. Hearsay evidence is without probative value and will not establish fact in issue even in the absence of a timely objection. See generally Slater v. State, 44 Ga.App. 295, 297, 161 S.E. 271. However, the record does not establish that this testimony was hearsay. Rather, it is equally plausible that Rayburn, in conjunction with one or more other persons, personally conducted the check that revealed appellant's license was suspended. On appeal we are required to construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. Watts v. State, 186 Ga.App. 358(1), 366 S.E.2d 849. Moreover, assuming but not conceding that this testimony may have been subject to a "best evidence" objection, compare State v. Hortman, 185 Ga.App. 756(1), 365 S.E.2d 887 and Denson v. State, 149 Ga.App. 453(2), 254 S.E.2d 455, appellant has waived this issue by failing to object timely on that ground. Rushin v. State, 63 Ga.App. 646(1), 11 S.E.2d 844. Accordingly, Rayburn's testimony was competent and would establish the fact that appellant who was driving on the day he was arrested and booked had a suspended driver's license.

To support the verdict of guilty of trafficking in cocaine and of driving while license was suspended, the circumstantial evidence must only exclude hypotheses that are reasonable; it need not exclude every inference or hypothesis except that of the defendant's guilt. Smith v. State, 257 Ga. 381, 382, 359 S.E.2d 662. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that the jury could rationally have found that it excluded every reasonable hypothesis except that of the defendant's guilt. Review of the transcript reveals ample evidence from which any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was guilty of the offenses of which he was convicted. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560; Baggett v. State, 257 Ga. 735(2), 363 S.E.2d 257.

2. Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of appellant's prior conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute.

Appellant objected at trial on the specific grounds that the conviction did not constitute a "similar offense," and because of the highly prejudicial impact that the evidence would have on the jury. "Evidence of similar [independent] crimes is admissible where its relevance to show identity, motive, plan, scheme, bent of mind and course of conduct, outweighs its prejudicial impact." Oller v. State, 187 Ga.App. 818(2), 371 S.E.2d 455. It may also be admissible in certain circumstances for "some other rational connection with the offense for which [an accused] is being tried." Jones v. State, 257 Ga. 753, 757-758, n. 6, 363 S.E.2d 529. But before such evidence is admissible, two conditions must be satisfied. First, there must be evidence that the defendant was in fact the perpetrator of the independent crime. Second, there must be sufficient similarity or connection between the...

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16 cases
  • Malcolm v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • 20 Septiembre 1993
    ...202 Ga.App. 488, 489(1), 414 S.E.2d 714 (1992); Freese v. State, 196 Ga.App. 761, 763(3), 396 S.E.2d 922 (1990); Roney v. State, 192 Ga.App. 760, 763(2), 386 S.E.2d 412 (1989). "[T]he evidence was not overly prejudicial here, as the jury was [given detailed limiting instructions before the ......
  • Adams v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • 3 Marzo 1993
    ...564; Boynton v. State, 197 Ga.App. 149, 150(1), 397 S.E.2d 615; Williams v. State, 194 Ga.App. 822, 392 S.E.2d 297; Roney v. State, 192 Ga.App. 760, 762, 386 S.E.2d 412; Guffey v. State, 191 Ga.App. 501, 503(2), 382 S.E.2d 202. We believe that invoking this test as a requirement for the tri......
  • Garmon v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • 5 Febrero 1990
    ...the similar offenses and the offenses charged in this case to warrant the admission of the complained of evidence. Roney v. State, 192 Ga.App. 760(2), 386 S.E.2d 412 (1989); Hattaway, supra at (1), 383 S.E.2d 140; Lockett v. State, 188 Ga. App. 645, 373 S.E.2d 768 (1988). Consequently, we f......
  • McMillan v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • 11 Marzo 2004
    ...evidence objection might have been available to McMillan, any such objection was waived by failure to make it. Roney v. State, 192 Ga.App. 760, 762(1), 386 S.E.2d 412 (1989); Rushin v. State, 63 Ga.App. 646, 648(1), 11 S.E.2d 844 Even assuming, without deciding, that Jackson's testimony reg......
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