Rood v. Selective Ins. Co. of S.C.
| Decision Date | 16 August 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2021AP392 |
| Parties | Charles Rood, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Selective Insurance Company of South Carolina and Randall Rademaker, Defendants-Respondents, Selective Insurance Company of South Carolina, Involuntary-Plaintiff-Respondent, Mt. Morris Mutual Insurance Company, Defendant. |
| Court | Wisconsin Court of Appeals |
APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for St. Croix County No 2018CV403 EDWARD F. VLACK III, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Stark, P.J., Hruz and Gill, JJ.
¶1 Charles Rood was injured in the course of his employment with Stockton Stainless, Inc., when his supervisor, Randall Rademaker, drove a large, telescopic forklift (also known as a "telehandler" or a "lull") over Rood's left foot and leg. Rood collected worker's compensation benefits from his employer's insurer Selective Insurance Company of South Carolina ("Selective"), but he later filed this negligence action against Rademaker and Selective, pursuant to his employer's "Commercial General Liability" policy ("the Policy") with Selective. The circuit court later dismissed Rood's negligence claim on summary judgment, concluding that the claim was barred by the exclusive remedy provision in Wisconsin's Worker's Compensation Act. See WIS. STAT. § 102.03(2) (2019-20).[1]
¶2 Rood now appeals and argues that an endorsement to the Policy, the "Fellow Employee Extension," waives the exclusive remedy provision in WIS. STAT. § 102.03(2). In the alternative, Rood contends that an exception to the exclusive remedy provision in § 102.03(2) applies because the telehandler was not owned or leased by his employer and it constitutes a "motor vehicle."
¶3 We conclude that the Policy's express terms, including the Fellow Employee Extension, do not demonstrate an intent to waive the exclusive remedy provision. The Fellow Employee Extension can be reasonably construed as broadening the definition of an insured to include an employee where worker's compensation law would not apply and where an employee's conduct might fall under an exception to the exclusive remedy provision in WIS STAT. § 102.03(2). In addition, the telehandler that caused Rood's injury does not constitute a "motor vehicle" as that term is used in § 102.03(2). Consistent with the purposes of the Worker's Compensation Act and its exclusive remedy provision, the term "motor vehicle" in § 102.03(2) encompasses only those vehicles that are designed primarily for travel on a public roadway or those vehicles that are used on a public roadway at the time of an accident. Here, the telehandler's primary purpose was not for travel on a public road, nor was it used on a public roadway at the time of Rood's injuries. Accordingly, we affirm.
¶4 The following facts are not in dispute for purposes of this appeal. For several months in the fall of 2016, Rood was employed by Stockton Stainless, and his work involved installing stainless steel piping at a factory in Texas. On October 19, 2016, Rood suffered serious foot and ankle injuries after Rademaker drove a telehandler over Rood's left foot and leg. Rademaker was using the telehandler to lift and transport steel piping from an unloading area into the factory while Rood walked alongside the telehandler.
¶5 A telehandler is designed to generally "meet[] the needs of most construction, masonry, landscape and agricultural applications." The telehandler at issue was not owned or leased by Stockton Stainless but, rather, was located at the Texas factory "for all contractors to use." According to Rood, the telehandler was capable of being driven on a public highway and had a driver's cockpit, a "15-foot boom lift," tractor tires, headlights, signal blinkers, and a slow-moving-vehicle sign on the back.
¶6 At the time of Rood's injuries, Stockton Stainless had both a worker's compensation insurance policy and a commercial general liability insurance policy with Selective-the Policy at issue in this appeal. Selective subsequently paid Rood's worker's compensation benefits pursuant to Wisconsin law and the worker's compensation insurance policy.
¶7 Sometime later, Rood filed this lawsuit, alleging that he suffered injuries due to Rademaker's negligent operation of a motor vehicle and that Selective agreed to defend and indemnify Rademaker under the Policy issued to Stockton Stainless. The parties eventually filed cross-motions for summary judgment.
¶8 The circuit court issued a written decision granting summary judgment in favor of Selective and Rademaker while denying Rood's motion for summary judgment, dismissing his negligence claim in the process. Applying the reasoning in Brantner v. ABC Manufacturing Co., 217 Wis.2d 143, 579 N.W.2d 742 (Ct. App. 1998), the court concluded that the Policy did not waive the exclusive remedy provision in WIS. STAT. § 102.03(2). It also determined that the telehandler was not a "motor vehicle" within the meaning of § 102.03(2), pursuant to our supreme court's interpretation of the term "motor vehicle" in Rice v. Gruetzmacher, 27 Wis.2d 46, 133 N.W.2d 401 (1965).[2] ¶9 Rood now appeals. Additional facts will be noted as necessary below.
¶10 We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, using the same methodology as the circuit court. Ehr v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 2018 WI.App. 14, ¶7, 380 Wis.2d 138, 908 N.W.2d 486. Summary judgment must be granted if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions and affidavits establish that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. WIS. STAT. § 802.08(2).
¶11 Rood's appeal challenges the circuit court's summary judgment decision, and it requires the resolution of two main issues. First, whether the "Fellow Employee Extension" in the Policy waived the exclusive remedy provision in WIS. STAT. § 102.03(2), and, second, whether the telehandler was a "motor vehicle" pursuant to an exception to § 102.03(2). To determine whether summary judgment is appropriate in this appeal, we must interpret both the Policy and § 102.03(2). The interpretation of an insurance contract is a question of law that we review de novo. Grigg v. Aarrowcast, Inc., 2018 WI.App. 17, ¶26, 380 Wis.2d 464, 909 N.W.2d 183. In addition, the interpretation and application of a statute to undisputed facts are also questions of law that we review de novo. Ehr, 380 Wis.2d 138, ¶7.
¶12 In Wisconsin, worker's compensation is generally an injured employee's exclusive remedy against an employer, coemployee, and worker's compensation insurance carrier. WIS. STAT. § 102.03(2). An insurer, however, can waive statutory immunity under § 102.03(2) when the express terms of the insurance policy demonstrate an intent to waive that immunity. Brantner, 217 Wis.2d at 147; Maas v. Ziegler, 172 Wis.2d 70, 82-83, 492 N.W.2d 621 (1992).
¶13 When interpreting an insurance policy, Jackson v. Wisconsin Cnty. Mut. Ins. Corp., 2014 WI 36, ¶17, 354 Wis.2d 327, 847 N.W.2d 384 (citation omitted). A contract must also be construed so as to give a reasonable meaning to each provision of the contract and to avoid a construction which renders portions of a contract meaningless, inexplicable or mere surplusage. See Goebel v. First Fed. Sav. &Loan Ass'n of Racine, 83 Wis.2d 668, 680, 266 N.W.2d 352 (1978).
¶14 As relevant to this appeal, under the Policy's "SECTION I - COVERAGES," "COVERAGE A," Selective agrees to "pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of 'bodily injury' or 'property damage' to which this insurance applies." (Emphasis added.) The Policy's "SECTION I - COVERAGES," "COVERAGE A," also contains several exclusions, including exclusions for obligations arising under a worker's compensation law and for bodily injury to an employee:
In addition, an "insured" is initially defined under the Policy as including employees acting in the scope of their employment, but not if the employee causes bodily injury to a coemployee while in the course of his or her employment:
¶15 Rood recognizes that this initial policy language does not provide coverage for his injuries, nor does it waive the exclusive remedy provision in WIS. STAT. § 102.03(2). He argues, however, that an endorsement to the Policy alters these provisions in such a manner as to waive the exclusive remedy provision. Specifically, Rood emphasizes that the "Fellow Employee Extension" changes the definition of an insured-removing the exception for an employee's actions that...
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