Rooney v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co.

• Decision Date: 17 April 1899
• Citation: 53 N.E. 435,173 Mass. 222
• Parties: ROONEY v. NEW YORK, N.H. & H.R. CO.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

173 Mass. 222

53 N.E. 435

ROONEY v. NEW YORK, N.H. & H.R. CO.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

April 17, 1899

COUNSEL

J.E. Cotter, for plaintiff.

Benton & Choate, for defendant.

OPINION

KNOWLTON J.

The defendant made no request for instructions to the jury, but excepted to two portions of the charge. The evidence tended to show that the plaintiff received a nervous shock at the time of the accident, which resulted in insanity. The accident occurred in October, 1894, and there was evidence that in August, 1895, an acquaintance of the plaintiff, about her age, named James Dunn, was run over by a train and killed, and that the plaintiff, not long afterwards, saw his dead body. On October 24, 1895, another railroad accident occurred at Hyde Park, and the plaintiff saw the bodies of the injured persons lying in the railroad station a short time after the accident. There was evidence tending to show that these two occurrences subsequent to the accident to her had some effect on her mental condition. The defendant excepted to the charge of the judge in regard to its liability, in view of these subsequent events, which occurred before it became necessary to commit the plaintiff to a hospital for the insane. We see no error in this part of the charge. The jury were instructed that the defendant would not be liable, if the plaintiff's condition was not caused by the accident to her, but by these two subsequent occurrences, or either of them. The judge further said "If, from all the evidence in the case, you are unable to distinguish the cause of this mental disease,--that is, if you are unable to distinguish whether it was the accident of October, 1894, or the accident to James Dunn, or the accident at Hyde Park, that was the cause of this mental disease,--it would be your duty to find for the defendant on that issue. That is, you are not to compare these various accidents one with the other, and try to find out which had the most important effect; but if you find that they, combined together, brought about this mental disease, it would be your duty, on that issue, to find for the defendant." This exception must be overruled.

The only remaining exception is to the part of the charge on the subject of damages. The judge first gave instructions on that subject referring to the different elements of damage, and then proceeded as follows: "Evidence has been introduced as to her earning capacity before the injury and after the injury. You are to compensate her for that. If she has suffered from loss of capacity, you are to compensate her for that. I can make you no suggestions, gentlemen, as to what you ought to do with reference to the computation of damages upon that point. If you find this is only temporary in its nature, and you are satisfied she will recover within a short time or a longer time, it is for you to say what she ought to receive by reason of the injury to her capacity to earn wages by labor. If you find, on all the evidence, that this is a permanent injury, and that for the rest of her life she will be deprived of the ability to labor that she had before the injury, it is for you to say what she ought to receive as compensation. Counsel for the plaintiff made some suggestions to you as to the rule for you to consider. He afterwards stated he would not state it as a rule, and I shall not state it as a rule; and, I wish you to understand it, I only make the suggestion. The suggestion was made that you were to consider the difference between the earning capacity she had before the injury and after, and then set apart a capital sum, the interest of which would be equal to the difference between what her capacity was before the injury and afterwards. I call your attention to that suggestion, and suggest to you, as reasonable men, whether that is the proper rule. Supposing that you should adopt that rule of estimating these damages, you can see very well for yourselves, as business men, that you would be providing a certain sum to be paid to her yearly for interest as long as she lives, and at her death there will be a certain sum in capital which would go to her next of kin. Now, gentlemen, you are not here to assess damages for the benefit of the next of kin, and I do not think that the counsel for the plaintiff would claim that. I only suggest this to you, gentlemen,--whether that would be reasonable for you to adopt that as a rule for compensation; to set apart a certain sum which should go to her next of kin. I can make a suggestion for you to consider, but I do not suggest that as a rule of damages. As some of you know, as business men, there is such a thing as an annuity; that is, a person may purchase an annuity. That annuity, of course, expires with the life of the individual, and you have to consider the reasonable probabilities of the life of that individual, in providing that annuity or in purchasing that annuity; and it is such a sum as will probably expire with the life of the individual,--that is, a certain sum, which, perhaps, taking the interest and a portion of the principal each year, will provide a certain sum annually. I do not suggest that as a rule for you to apply, but the only question is whether that is not a more reasonable plan than the plan suggested by the counsel for the plaintiff." The suggestion made by the plaintiff's counsel in the argument referred to in the charge was not objected to by the defendant, and no request was made for instructions in regard to it. The effect of the judge's reference to it in his charge was to point out one particular in which it would certainly lead to a wrong result. He then stated the principle on which annuities were computed; showing that the sum required to purchase an annuity was "a certain sum, which, perhaps, taking the interest and a portion of the principal each year, will provide a certain sum annually." Herein he pointed out the difference between the method suggested by the plaintiff's counsel and the true method of reckoning an annuity. He was careful, at the same time, to tell the jury that he did not suggest it as a rule for them to apply, and virtually to say that, if the principle applicable to the purchase of annuities was to be applied at all, it should be applied with a correction of the method proposed by the plaintiff's counsel. In the absence of any request by the defendant for an instruction on this point, either before or after the charge, we are of opinion that there is no ground of legal objection to the charge. It seems clear that, if all the elements entering into the problem could be accurately determined, the principle applicable to the purchase of an annuity would enter into the determination of the amount of damages to be allowed to the plaintiff for the loss of ability to earn wages. It was so held by this court in Copson v. Railroad Co., 171 Mass. 233, 50 N.E. 613; and there are many cases in other jurisdictions to the same effect. Railroad Co. v. Putnam, 118 U.S. 545-556, 7 Sup.Ct. 1; Sauter v. Railroad Co., 66 N.Y. 50; McDonald v. Railroad Co., 26 Iowa, 124-140; Railroad Co. Richards, 62 Ga. 306; Railroad Co. v. Allison, 86 Ga. 145, 12 S.E. 352; Railroad Co. v. Mahony's Adm'x, 7 Bush, 235; Walters v. Railroad Co., 36 Iowa, 458, 41 Iowa, 71; Railroad Co. v. Noell's Adm'r, 32 Grat. 394; Railway Co. v. Lundin, 3 Colo. 94; Railway Co. v. Woodward, 4 Colo. 1; The D.S. Gregory, 2 Ben. 226, 239, Fed.Cas. No. 4,100; Railway Co. v. Needham, 3 C.C.A. 129, 52 F. 371.

The practical difficulty in using annuity tables in cases of this kind, and in making computations upon the principle on which annuity tables are founded, is that there are too many elements which are uncertain, and which cannot be reduced to any close approximation to certainty. These tables are usually computed on the probabilities for sound lives, while in the cases on trial there are often many circumstances which make the probabilities as to length of life different from those estimated in the tables. In estimating damages for personal injury, the amount to be allowed for loss of ability to earn money depends upon conditions which are not constant but which vary from many causes. The physical condition of the plaintiff would very likely have changed from time to time from other causes, if there had been no accident. Her physical condition is usually likely to change as the years go on after the accident. The income to be obtained from labor or effort in any given calling is not a constant quantity from year to year as time goes on, but the ability to procure employment, and the prices paid for services, are likely to change. For these and other reasons, annuity tables will seldom be found helpful in a trial of such cases; and, if they are used, the jury should be carefully instructed to apply them only so far as the facts found correspond to those on which the tables are computed. So, too, a jury can apply the principle on which annuities are purchased only after they have found facts which form a proper basis for such a computation; but, if all such facts are found and made definite, the principle on which such tables are computed can properly be used in estimating the amount to be allowed as a present sum to compensate for a probable annual loss for a probable term of years. We do not think the judge said anything which misled the jury in this case. He was careful to leave them to follow his original instructions, and to tell them that he did not suggest an estimate of the value of an annuity. He could not tell them that they could not find the facts to be such as to furnish a proper basis for such a mathematical computation, if they, as men of intelligence, knew how to make it. It was for them to find the facts, and then to use methods of...