Roos v. Red
| Decision Date | 28 June 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. B173506.,B173506. |
| Citation | 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 446,130 Cal.App.4th 870 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Nilda ROOS, et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. Eric RED, Defendant and Appellant. |
Brandon Baum, Palo Alto, and Carlos A. Lloreda, Jr., Los Angeles, for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
Horvitz & Levy, David M. Axelrad and David S. Ettinger, Encino; Doherty & Catlow and John Doherty, Los Angeles, for Defendant and Appellant.
Eric Red appeals from a judgment entered upon a verdict in favor of respondents, Nilda Roos and Wilma Baum, on their respective complaints against Red for wrongful death. Before trial respondents filed a motion in limine requesting the court apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel to factual findings made by the federal bankruptcy court in a discharge proceeding involving the parties. The bankruptcy court specifically found respondents' wrongful death claims were not discharged by Red's petition for bankruptcy because the claims were the result of Red's willful and malicious conduct. The trial court here granted the motion in limine, and thus, precluded Red from contesting the issue of liability on the wrongful death claims in front of the jury. On appeal Red claims the trial court erred in giving the bankruptcy court's findings collateral estoppel effect because doing so: (1) violated a federal bankruptcy statute (28 U.S.C., § 1411), which preserved his right to a jury trial on wrongful death claims; and (2) did not comport with fairness and sound public policy. We disagree. Red has not convinced us 28 United States Code section 1411 precludes the application of the well-established doctrine of collateral estoppel in this context or that the application of the doctrine was unfair or unsound. Consequently, we affirm.
Wrongful Death Claims. About 6:00 p.m. on May 31, 2000, Red was driving his sport utility vehicle (SUV) and struck another vehicle stopped at a red light on Wilshire Boulevard in Santa Monica.1 After pushing the car in front of his into the intersection, Red's SUV crossed opposing lanes of traffic, veered off the road and crashed through the front doors of a billiards pub. The SUV came to a stop when it hit the bar inside the pub. Two patrons of the pub, the adult sons of respondents Nilda Roos and Willa Baum, died as a result of the collision. Immediately after the collision, Red picked up a piece of broken glass and attempted to cut his throat.
In June 2000, respondent Roos filed a wrongful death action against Red. Respondent Baum filed her claim in May 2001 and both actions were consolidated in July 2001.
In October 2001, Red, who had briefly relocated to Texas,2 filed for bankruptcy protection in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Texas. Red sought to discharge all of his debts (including the claims filed in the tort actions stemming from the collision) by operation of law. Red also sought and received a stay of the state court wrongful death actions. Respondents appeared in the bankruptcy proceedings and asked the bankruptcy court to lift the stay so that the wrongful death actions could proceed in the California state court. Red opposed the request arguing to the bankruptcy court:
The bankruptcy court denied the respondents' request. In turn, respondents filed complaints in the bankruptcy proceedings to determine the dischargeability of their claims against Red and to object to the discharge. Specifically they alleged their claims were debts "for willful and malicious injury by the debtor" and were thus not subject to discharge in bankruptcy pursuant to 11 United States Code section 523(a)(6).
The parties conducted discovery in preparation for a trial in the bankruptcy court on respondents' complaints.3 In Red's pre-trial brief, among the issues he listed for the court's determination were whether: (1) the May 31, 2000 collision was the result of a voluntary and intentional act on Red's part; (2) Red intended to cause harm to the patrons of the pub; and (3) respondents had met their burden of proof and shown by a preponderance of the evidence Red acted willfully and maliciously in causing the collision.
In November 2002, the matter proceeded to a one-day bench trial in the bankruptcy court. During the trial evidence from percipient and expert witnesses was presented. Red introduced evidence from seven witnesses, offered 32 exhibits, and testified on his own behalf.
The contest in the trial court centered on the cause of the collision. Red contended the collision was the result of his unintentional and involuntary acts. He claimed he suffered from an episode of syncope (i.e., a brief loss of consciousness caused by a temporary loss of oxygen to the brain) and therefore he was unconscious from the moment his SUV hit the car on Wilshire Boulevard until it came to rest inside the pub. He stated he had suffered from several prior incidents of loss of consciousness, though he admitted that he did not tell anyone about them at the time they occurred.
Respondents claimed the accident, which occurred on the one-year anniversary of Red's failed marriage, was the result of his depressed mental state caused by distress over his personal and financial problems. They also presented a medical expert witness who testified Red's behavior and circumstances surrounding the collision did not support a finding of syncope.
The parties presented inconsistent eyewitness testimony; some witnesses stated that they saw Red upright, awake and alert during the incident. Two witness supported Red's version, testifying Red's eyes were closed and that he was leaning towards the right. At the end of the presentation of evidence, the parties submitted written closing arguments to the court and the matter was taken under submission.
On February 4, 2003, the bankruptcy court issued its opinion. The court concluded respondents' claims were not discharged under 11 United States Code section 532, subdivision (a)(6). The court determined the collision was the result of Red's voluntary and intentional actions; Red intended to harm the patrons of the pub; and respondents had met their burden to prove that the injuries resulted from Red's intentional and malicious conduct. The bankruptcy court found Red's defense of loss of consciousness incredible and unproved. The bankruptcy court concluded: "Mr. Red was conscious and alert and intentionally jammed his foot onto the accelerator . . . crashed through the front doors of the billiards pub at a speed approaching 35 mph, [and] killed two people—and that all of this occurred because of a fit of uncontrollable rage on the part of Mr. Red. . . ."
Red filed an appeal of the bankruptcy court's decision in the federal district court.4 While the appeal was pending, Red filed a motion in the bankruptcy court requesting a stay pending the appeal. The court denied the stay. But during the hearing on the stay, the court made comments indicating a belief that the state court wrongful death action would proceed to trial and that Red would "have an opportunity to convince a jury in the state of California that he was right. . . ."5
In April 2003, this case was returned to the active calendar in the superior court. Prior to trial, respondents filed a motion in limine requesting the trial court give the bankruptcy court's findings in the dischargeability proceeding collateral estoppel effect in the wrongful death actions. Specifically they requested that in view of the bankruptcy court's conclusion Red had acted willfully and maliciously in causing the accident, Red should not be allowed to relitigate his liability for the injuries.
Red opposed the motion arguing collateral estoppel should not apply because: (1) the issues in the bankruptcy proceeding were not identical to those at issue in the wrongful death action; (2) the matter was not "fully and fairly" litigated in the bankruptcy court because respondents' medical expert was not qualified to give his opinion, the bankruptcy judge was biased against him, and Red had located a new witness who did not provide evidence in the bankruptcy trial; (3) he had no right to a jury trial in the bankruptcy trial and thus application of collateral estoppel would deprive him of his constitutional right to a jury trial; and (4) application of collateral estoppel would be unfair, contrary to public policy and would not further the purposes of the doctrine.
The trial court granted the motion in limine, ruling Red could not contest the issue of liability and ordered that the jury trial be limited to the issue of damages. After a brief trial,6 the jury returned verdicts of $512,328.69 for respondent Roos and $500,000 for respondent Baum.
Red filed a motion for a new trial, requesting a new trial and stay pending the outcome of (then still pending) appeals of the bankruptcy court order in the federal court. The court denied the motion.
Red timely appealed from the underlying judgment.
Among the several points of contention in this appeal is whether the standard of appellate review governing a decision to apply collateral estoppel is de novo or an abuse of discretion. Some case law discusses the trial court's exercise of discretion in deciding to allow the "offensive" use of collateral estoppel. (E.g., Sandoval v. Superior...
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