Roosa v. Roosa
| Decision Date | 23 April 2019 |
| Docket Number | NO. 2017-CA-01707-COA,2017-CA-01707-COA |
| Citation | 328 So.3d 117 |
| Parties | The ESTATE OF Joan B. ROOSA, Deceased: Christopher A. Roosa, John D. Roosa, Stuart Allen Roosa, Jr., All Individually; Kathleen Roosa and Danielle Roosa, by and through their Next Friend and Natural Guardian, John D. Roosa; Sophia Roosa, Stuart Allen Roosa, III and Barron Roosa, by and through their Next Friend and Natural Guardian, Stuart Allen Roosa, Jr.; Christopher A. Roosa, as Executor and Trustee of the Joan B. Roosa Family Trust; and Velda Ann Powell, Appellants v. Rosemary D. ROOSA, Appellee |
| Court | Mississippi Court of Appeals |
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS: JOHN G. McDONNELL, COURTNEY McDONNELL SNODGRASS, Biloxi
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: PAUL M. NEWTON JR.
BEFORE J. WILSON, P.J., GREENLEE AND McCARTY, JJ.
McCARTY, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. This case chiefly concerns whether submitting a codicil for probate triggers a forfeiture provision in a decedent's will. If the clause is triggered, the question becomes whether good faith prevents application of the forfeiture. Finding no error in the chancery court's refusal to forfeit a daughter from inheriting under her mother's will, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2. This appeal involves litigation that has been ongoing since Joan Roosa died in October 2007. Joan had an ample estate partly from businesses operated by her and her husband, Colonel Stuart Roosa, who had flown the command module Kitty Hawk to the moon on the Apollo 14 mission. Joan executed a will in 2002 and a codicil to it in 2004; a second codicil was executed in 2007. At the time of her death, Joan had four children—Christopher, Rosemary, Stuart, and John—and a number of grandchildren. Under the terms of the will and the first codicil, all of the children and grandchildren were to receive some proceeds under the will. In contrast, under the second codicil, the bulk of the estate was left to the benefit of Rosemary alone.
¶3. Christopher, the executor of Joan's estate, submitted Joan's will and the first codicil for probate in the Harrison County Chancery Court, First Judicial District. Shortly after, Rosemary submitted the will, the first codicil, and the second codicil for probate. Christopher and Joan's other children, including Joan's grandchildren, contested the validity of the second codicil, claiming among other things that Rosemary had undue influence over Joan.
¶4. A jury was empaneled to determine the validity of the second codicil. After trial, the jury returned a general verdict for Christopher and the other contestants, rejecting the second codicil. The chancery court subsequently entered an order stating the second codicil was refused for probate.
¶5. Joan's will had a forfeiture provision which would deprive any beneficiary from taking under the will if they contested the will. Christopher sought to have this forfeiture provision enforced against Rosemary since she filed the second codicil for probate, claiming that she interfered with Joan's wishes. Initially, the chancery court found that Rosemary's actions in probating the second codicil were in good faith, which meant that the forfeiture provision did not prevent her from inheriting her share of Joan's estate. The chancery court reiterated this factual and legal finding in several orders during the years of contention between the parties. After intervening law from the Mississippi Supreme Court, the chancery court held that the forfeiture provision was unenforceable because it lacked a good faith and probable cause exception. After extended motion practice from Christopher, the chancery court deleted the language from prior orders finding that Rosemary had acted in good faith.
¶6. Christopher now appeals, asserting the chancery court erred in: (1) finding that the forfeiture provision was not enforceable against Rosemary; (2) refusing to give the jury interrogatories; (3) allowing Rosemary to use Joan's car while waiting to settle Joan's estate; and (4) allowing Rosemary's former attorneys to intervene.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶7. "When reviewing a chancellor's legal findings, particularly involving the interpretation or construction of a will, this Court will apply a de novo standard of review." In re Last Will & Testament of Carney , 758 So.2d 1017, 1019 (¶ 8) (Miss. 2000). With respect to other issues in a will contest, "[t]ypically this Court will not disturb a chancellor's findings of fact unless the chancellor was manifestly wrong and not supported by substantial, credible evidence." In re Estate of Wright , 829 So.2d 1274, 1276 (¶ 5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002).
¶8. The chancery court found that Rosemary should not forfeit her share of her mother's estate due to attempting to probate the second codicil. Christopher argues that the forfeiture provision should be enforced against Rosemary because she did not act in good faith when submitting the second codicil for probate. In response, Rosemary argues that submitting a codicil for probate is not contesting the will, so the forfeiture provision is not triggered at all. Alternatively, Rosemary contends that the forfeiture provision is not applicable since she submitted the second codicil in good faith.
¶9. An in terrorem clause in a will acts to frighten a beneficiary that any benefit they might receive will be forfeited if they contest or otherwise dispute the validity of the will. See Taylor v. Rapp , 217 Ga. 654, 124 S.E.2d 271, 272 (1962). Joan's will contained just such a forfeiture provision. It read in relevant part:
If any beneficiary hereunder shall contest the probate or validity of this Will or any provision thereof, or shall institute or join in (except as a party defendant) any proceeding to contest the validity of this Will or to prevent any provision thereof from being carried out in accordance with its terms (regardless of whether or not such proceedings are instituted in good faith and with probable cause), than all benefits provided for such beneficiary are revoked and such benefits shall pass to the residuary beneficiaries of this Will (other than such beneficiary) in the proportion that the share of each such residuary beneficiary bears to the aggregate of the effective shares of the residuary.
¶10. The forfeiture clause explicitly states that "regardless" of whether a beneficiary starts proceedings "in good faith and with probable cause" that they will be forfeited from benefitting under the estate. During the life of the litigation, the Mississippi Supreme Court declared forfeiture provisions like this unenforceable as a matter of law. See Parker v. Benoist , 160 So.3d 198, 205 (¶ 15) (Miss. 2015). The Court held that "[a] strict interpretation of no-contest provisions in wills would hamper courts' goal of determining what is, once and for all, the will of the testator," and that "[a] bona fide inquiry into the validity of the will should not be defeated by language contained in the will itself." Id. at 206. As a result, if a will contained a forfeiture provision, it also had to have a requirement that it would only be enforced if it had a good faith exception. Id.
¶11. Rosemary's will contained the exact same forfeiture provision that the Supreme Court held unenforceable in Parker . Id. at 203 (¶ 9). As a result, the chancery court found that "as a matter of law the [forfeiture] clause in this case is unenforceable because it fails to contain a good faith exception." This does not delete the forfeiture provision but instead reforms it to include an exception for good faith actions by beneficiaries. Id. at 205-06 (¶¶ 12-15).
¶12. The first question we must resolve is whether the forfeiture clause even applies to Rosemary. Her argument on appeal is that it cannot be applied since she did not contest the will per se but instead only submitted the second codicil for probate. However, the plain language of Joan's will captures more conduct than simply contesting the will. The forfeiture clause applies when any beneficiary tries to "prevent any provision [of the will] from being carried out in accordance with its terms ...." The second codicil Rosemary submitted to probate dramatically changed the amounts her siblings would take under their mother's will (among other significant changes). Under the express language of the forfeiture provision in Joan's will and the specific nature of the second codicil, we find that the forfeiture provision is applicable to Rosemary.
¶13. This does not end the inquiry, as we must determine whether Rosemary acted in good faith in submitting the second codicil for probate. In Parker , our Supreme Court noted that the evidence was sufficient for it to determine good faith and probable cause, rather than remand for the chancery court to conduct an inquiry. Id. at 206-07 (¶ 16). Likewise, we will determine if sufficient evidence supports Rosemary's claim that she submitted the second codicil in good faith and based on probable cause. In the context of a will contest, "[p]robable cause exists when, at the time of instituting the proceeding, there was evidence that would lead a reasonable person, properly informed and advised, to conclude that there was a substantial likelihood that the challenge would be successful." Id. at 206 (¶ 15) . "The determination of good faith and probable cause should be inferred from the totality of the circumstances." Id.
¶14. Even though the chancery court amended its orders finding that Rosemary acted in good faith, we can affirm a chancery court's judgment for different reasons. See Sanderson Farms Inc. v. Gatlin , 848 So.2d 828, 843 (¶ 44) (Miss. 2003). Here, we find sufficient evidence existed that Rosemary acted in good faith when submitting the second codicil. Knox White, an attorney and Joan's brother-in-law, assisted Joan with the second codicil. Knox died prior to trial, but...
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