Roper Corp. v. Reynolds
| Decision Date | 06 May 1977 |
| Docket Number | No. 53731,No. 1,53731,1 |
| Citation | 142 Ga.App. 402,236 S.E.2d 103 |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
| Parties | ROPER CORPORATION v. Carolyn S. REYNOLDS |
Noone, Stringer & Powers, Fred T. Hanzelik, Jay B. Stringer, Chattanooga, for appellant.
Brown, Harriss, Hartman & Ruskaup, Don L. Hartman, Rossville, for appellee.
On October 8, 1975, claimant in this workmen's compensation case suffered a strained back while working on the assembly line in defendant's appliance factory. Claimant and defendant executed an agreement on November 11, 1975, as to compensation for claimant's resulting disability. Claimant returned to work on December 30, 1975, and the agreement for compensation was supplemented by a memorandum which provided for termination of disability benefits. Both of these agreements were approved by the State Board of Workmen's Compensation.
On February 6, 1976, claimant requested a hearing for the determination of a change in condition. After a hearing the administrative law judge entered an award for claimant after finding as a matter of fact that following her return to work on December 30, 1975, the claimant continued to experience pain which became worse as a result of her work and caused her to become totally incapacitated to work on February 10, 1976; that she remained so incapacitated until March 8, 1976, at which time she returned to work but was unable to continue working due to the injury and again became incapacitated on March 9, 1976. The majority of the State Board of Workmen's Compensation adopted the award of the administrative law judge. The decision of the majority of the board was affirmed by the Superior Court of Walker County, and defendant appeals. Held :
1. Defendant contends that the claimant has not complied with the requirements set forth in Miller v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 136 Ga.App. 101, 103(1), 220 S.E.2d 89, that moving for a change in condition the claimant must show (1) that the condition has changed for the worse; (2) that because of this change claimant is unable to work for any employer; (3) because of inability to work the employee has either a total or partial loss of income; and (4) that the inability to work was proximately caused by the injury.
In the case sub judice there was evidence that for a brief time after claimant returned to work on December 30, 1975, she was given light work, but that soon thereafter she was returned to the job on the assembly line which had caused her strained back. This job involved lifting partially completed stoves weighing approximately 51 pounds. Claimant continued this work intermittently despite substantial discomfort until mid-February of 1976, when, upon advice of a physician, she was out of work for a period of time. Claimant again returned to work on March 8, 1976. On a form supplied by the defendant, claimant furnished defendant with a signed recommendation from a physician that her work be limited to lifting no more than 25 pounds and avoidance of prolonged standing. Claimant was given a job which complied with these recommendations but the following day, March 9, 1976, about noon, claimant was placed on an assembly line job which required prolonged standing, stretching and some bending. Early that afternoon claimant became faint due to the considerable pain and had to be carried to the office of the company nurse. Claimant testified that on advice of a physician she had not worked since March 9, 1976.
There was some evidence presented on claimant's behalf on each of the four points enumerated in Miller v. Argonaut, supra. The "any evidence" rule requires that we do not disturb the findings of the board that those requirements have been satisfied. West Point Pepperell, Inc. v. Baggett, 139 Ga.App. 813(1), 229 S.E.2d 666.
Defendant further contends that the supplemental memorandum of agreement terminating disability benefits is conclusive as to such a change in condition and in the absence of fraud, accident or mistake, an approved agreement is res judicata as to matters determined therein. But the board may review the award upon a hearing had pursuant to an application therefor filed under the provisions of Code § 114-709, as amended (see Ga.L.1937, pp. 230, 233; 1937, pp. 528, 534; 1943, pp. 167-169; 1968, pp. 3, 7; 1972, pp. 149, 150; 1973, pp. 232, 244), seeking a new award on account of further change in condition. Fieldcrest Mills, Inc. v. Richard, 141 Ga.App. 702(2), 234 S.E.2d 345, and cases cited therein.
2. Code § 114-710 provides that the finding of fact made by the members of the board within their power shall, in the absence of fraud, be conclusive, but that upon appeal to the superior court the court shall set aside the order or decree of the members of the board if any one or more of five listed conditions appears in the record of the case. Defendant's appeal raised each of these five listed grounds, and the court's affirmance of the board stated that, "no error of law appearing, and there being evidence in the record to authorize the findings of fact made by the board . . . the award . . . is affirmed." The defendant contends that this order reflects that the court did not consider each of the five enumerated grounds of appeal. We do not believe this is correct. The language of the court's order affirming that appeal is broad enough in its scope to encompass the five grounds raised by defendant and the court below was not required to specifically respond to each individual ground when broader language would suffice. See Mitchell v. Arnall, 203 Ga. 384, 385...
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