Roper v. Alamo Oil & Refining Co.

• Decision Date: 12 March 1926
• Docket Number: (No. 126.)
• Citation: 284 S.W. 305
• Parties: ROPER v. ALAMO OIL & REFINING CO. et al.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 305

284 S.W. 305

ROPER v. ALAMO OIL & REFINING CO. et al.

(No. 126.)

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Eastland.

March 12, 1926.

Appeal from District Court, Eastland County; Geo. L. Davenport, Judge.

Action by Elisha Roper against the Alamo Oil & Refining Company, E. Witt, and others. From judgment discharging defendant Witt, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Owen & Owen, of Eastland, for appellant.

Wagstaff, Harwell & Wagstaff, of Abilene, for appellees.

PANNILL, C. J.

Appellant in this suit declared on a promissory note payable to his order and signed by the following parties: Alamo Oil & Refining Company, by E. Witt, president, R. W. Smith, G. W. Dawson, Geo. B. Dortois, manager, Cleveland Baker, secretary-treasurer, Joe M. Sears and Tom W. Crutcher. On the trial before the court, appellant dismissed as to Alamo Oil & Refining Company, Geo. B. Dortois, and Cleveland Baker. Judgment was in appellant's favor against Sears, Smith, and Crutcher, but against appellant on his claim against E. Witt personally, from which judgment discharging Witt this appeal is prosecuted.

Conclusions of fact were filed in which the court found that appellee Witt did not sign the note as an individual, but was merely signing the name of the concern, and that authority existed in Witt so to do.

Appellant attacks the finding of the court and judgment based thereon on several grounds:

First, that Witt's signature was "descriptio personæ," and that the words preceding his signature were merely descriptive of him. This is obviously untenable. Article 6001a20, Complete Tex. St. 1920, or Vernon's Ann. Civ. St. Supp. 1922, art. 6001—20, being section 20, Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, provides that where a person adds to his signature words indicating that he signs for or on behalf of a principal, he is not liable on the instrument if he was duly authorized. Appellant's proposition relating to the question considered is just the converse of the statute referred to. The courts have rendered many decisions on this question contrary to the common usage and understanding of the business world, but no case decides the very converse of the statute. Bank v. Korn (Mo. App.) 179 S. W. 721; Bank v. Bickel, 143 Ky. 754, 137 S. W. 790; Brannan's Negotiable Instruments (3d Ed.) sec. 20, page 70, and authorities cited.

Second, appellant seeks to hold appellee Witt personally liable, notwithstanding he signed on behalf of his principal, by propositions asserting that there is no evidence of his authority, and that the purported principal does not appear to be a legal entity, and therefore Witt signed for a fictitious person. As these assignments require a review of the evidence, they will be discussed together.

The statement of facts shows that the Alamo Oil & Refining Company was some kind of a voluntary association, the exact nature thereof is not disclosed. It owned a...