Roper v. State
| Decision Date | 24 April 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. S07A0322.,S07A0322. |
| Citation | 644 S.E.2d 120,281 Ga. 878 |
| Parties | ROPER v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Bernard Knight, Decatur, for Appellant.
Daniel James Quinn, Asst. Dist. Atty., Gwendolyn Keyes Fleming, Dist. Atty., Thurbert E. Baker, Atty. Gen., Chad Eric Jacobs, Asst. Atty. Gen., for Appellee.
Joseph Roper was tried before a jury on a felony murder count, which alleged that he was a convicted felon and that he had killed Donald Smith while possessing a firearm in violation of OCGA § 16-11-131. He did not deny firing the fatal shots, but he claimed justification as his sole defense. However, the jury returned a guilty verdict, and the trial court imposed a life sentence. Thereafter, new appellate counsel filed a motion for new trial which raised, among other grounds, the ineffectiveness of trial counsel. The trial court denied the motion for new trial, and Roper appeals.*
1. Roper enumerates the general grounds. At the outset of the trial, he stipulated to his status as a convicted felon. Accordingly, the question is whether the evidence, when construed most strongly in support of the jury's guilty verdict, is sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that he killed Smith while in possession of a firearm.
The State's evidence showed that Smith had accosted one man behind a market and was in the process of robbing a friend of Roper's when Roper drove into the parking lot. After being informed of these events, Roper retrieved a gun from under the driver's seat, walked to the corner of the building and peeked around. He did not confront Smith, but returned to his car and left the door open. Eventually, Smith came around the corner of the store. He had a gun in his hand, but was not pointing it at anyone. Roper jumped from his vehicle and shouted at Smith to "Pull it." An eyewitness testified that, "after he said that, he shot [Smith] three times." Smith never aimed his gun at Roper.
At trial Roper offered a different version of the shooting. He testified that Smith turned the corner of the building and ran toward the car while holding a gun. Roper pointed his weapon at Smith because, in his words,
I know when I seen him come up with the gun, I realized my life was in danger. I realized that he was going to take something from me or do something. I just seen him shoot at [a friend] and I just heard about when he robbed [another man], so I thought he was fixing to come and do something to me.... I thought he was fixing to shoot me.
Roper repeatedly denied that, at the time he fired the shots, he was acting in defense of anyone other than himself. For example, when asked several times on cross-examination whether he was protecting someone from being robbed by Smith, Roper said "I was trying to protect myself" or gave similar testimony. When asked why he did not think that Smith was a threat to anyone else in the parking lot, Roper replied:
Because he came back this way. Now, if he want to get anybody that was on this side, he would have done got them, he passed them and came around to the end of my car. When I know he got to the end of my car and stopped, I know my life was in danger. I simply told him, I said, don't do it man. I tried to discourage him.... I'm saying that I did it because he was fixing to kill me, he was fixing to do something to me.... [I had to kill him f]or me to keep my life.
On appeal, Roper's general grounds argument merely highlights his version of events and reasserts his claim of self-defense. Witness credibility is a matter for the jury, as is the question of justification; therefore, the jury was free to reject the claim that [Roper shot Smith] in self-defense. [Cit.] The evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find [Roper] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the felony murder of [Smith]. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
Price v. State, 280 Ga. 193, 195(2), 625 S.E.2d 397 (2006).
2. The remaining enumerations of error all relate to the jury charge on Roper's justification defense. The trial court gave a general instruction on justification which correctly stated that the use of force is authorized in defense of oneself or third persons. With regard to the underlying felony offense of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, however, the trial court only charged the jury that the use of force was authorized in defense of oneself. In a subsequent recharge, the trial...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Davenport v. State
...443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Woolfolk v. State, 282 Ga. 139(1), 644 S.E.2d 828 (2007); Roper v. State, 281 Ga. 878, 879(1), 644 S.E.2d 120 (2007). 2. Davenport contends that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of the victims' mother. The only objection ra......
-
Parrott v. State
...293 Ga. 332, 339(7)(d), 745 S.E.2d 630 (2013) (citation and punctuation omitted).23 See Division 2, supra.24 See Roper v. State, 281 Ga. 878, 881(2), 644 S.E.2d 120 (2007) ( “Because the [justification/self-defense] charge that was given was adjusted to the evidence and was not erroneously ......
-
Johnson v. State
...jury instruction must be adjusted to the evidence and embody a correct, applicable, and complete statement of law.” Roper v. State, 281 Ga. 878, 880, 644 S.E.2d 120 (2007) (citations and quotation marks omitted). The charge at issue properly reflected Georgia law as adjusted to the evidence......
-
Szorcsik v. State
...beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). See also, e.g., Roper v. State, 281 Ga. 878 (1), 644 S.E.2d 120 (2007) (witness credibility is for jury to decide, as is the question of justification; therefore, jury is free to reject claim......