Roquemore v. State, A--18207
| Decision Date | 27 August 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. A--18207,A--18207 |
| Citation | 513 P.2d 1318 |
| Parties | Rolland ROQUEMORE, Appellant, v. The STATE of Oklahoma, Appellee. |
| Court | United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma |
This is an appeal from the District Court of Kay County, Oklahoma, in which appellant, Rolland Roquemore, who will hereinafter be referred to as defendant, was convicted by a jury in Case No. CRF--72--21, on October 4, 1972, for the offense of Distribution of Marijuana. Judgment and sentence was imposed on October 30, 1972, wherein defendant was sentenced to serve two (2) to five (5) years imprisonment, and payment of a fine of One (1) Dollar. From that judgment and sentence this appeal has been perfected.
Defendant offers only one proposition of error which asserts that prejudicial error was committed when the prosecution was allowed to cross-examine defendant concerning the contents of certain letters defendant had written to a person in California. Insofar as this conviction must be reversed and remanded for a new trial, it is not necessary that all the facts be related, except to state that defendant allegedly sold a quantity of marijuana to one Oscar Neal Fortune, Jr., on February 10, 1972. Fortune admitted from the witness stand that he had also sold marijuana; and that the police had agreed not to prosecute him if he would make buys of marijuana from other people to facilitate their prosecution. The substance allegedly sold was identified as being marijuana. Defendant denied the illegal sale, but nonetheless the jury convicted defendant.
Defendant offered the testimony of his mother, father, and brother, who testified to the best of their knowledge defendant did not use drugs of any kind. Defendant also testified in his own behalf and denied that he sold the marijuana to Fortune, and also denied that he smoked marijuana.
On cross-examination the prosecutor inquired of defendant concerning three letters he had written to Margret Sharpe, who lived in California. The letters were introduced, over defendant's objection, as Exhibits 5, 6, and 7. The prosecutor argued that he was using the letters to impeach the testimony of defendant's other witnesses, as well as defendant's credibility, and was permitted to go into their contents in complete detail. Exhibit 5 contained a 'P.S.' which assertedly referred to 'super acid,' and notwithstanding the fact that defendant answered that the comment 'was a joke between me and her,' the prosecutor was permitted to pursue his questioning on this collateral matter, until defendant was required to identify 'acid' as being L.S.D. The prosecutor inquired, and over defendant's objection, defendant answered, 'I believe it is some sort of dope; some sort of drug.' The prosecutor continued, 'Is it L.S.D.?' Defendant answered, 'I wouldn't know.' Later the prosecutor quoted from the letter introduced as Exhibit 7,
All references to L.S.D. were collateral to the issue pertaining to the sale of marijuana on February 10, 1972, and was of no probative value to the charge confronting defendant. The examination concerning the three letters, wherein they did not pertain to marijuana, was beyond the scope of direct examination and related to offenses for which defendant was not on trial. Such evidence was collateral, irrelevant, and inadmissible on the charge for distribution of marijuana. The only effect it could have had was to prejudice defendant in the eyes of the jury.
This Court stated in Brown v. State, Okl.Cr., 487 P.2d 963, 965:
In the...
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