Rosa v. Comm'r of Corr.
| Docket Number | 3:22-cv-1260 (SVN) |
| Decision Date | 12 July 2023 |
| Parties | ALEXANDER ROSA, Petitioner, v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
RULING AND ORDER ON PENDING MOTIONS
Petitioner Alexander Rosa, who was formerly incarcerated within the Connecticut Department of Correction (“DOC”) and is now in a release program at Isaiah House,[1] filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 against Respondent, the Commissioner of the DOC. Pet ECF No. 1. Petitioner challenges a disciplinary sanction imposed by the DOC resulting in the loss of risk reduction earned credits. Id. at 6. The original petition raises four grounds for relief, all of which center on allegations that the DOC's disciplinary proceeding violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and that further due process violations have occurred in his related state habeas proceeding. Id. at 6-8.
Respondent has moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that Petitioner failed to exhaust his state court remedies. ECF No. 19. In addition to opposing Respondent's motion to dismiss Petitioner has filed a motion to amend his habeas petition ECF No. 15; two motions to stay this matter pending exhaustion of his state court remedies, ECF Nos. 21, 31; and a motion seeking leave to reply to Respondent's opposition to his first motion to stay, ECF No. 30. Because the reply brief at ECF No. 30 was timely filed in compliance with D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 7(d), Petitioner need not have sought permission from the Court before filing it. Accordingly, the Court DENIES AS MOOT Petitioner's motion at ECF No. 30, and the Court will consider the merits of the arguments raised in that brief. In addition, for the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Petitioner's motion to amend his habeas petition at ECF No. 15, GRANTS Respondent's motion to dismiss at ECF No. 19, and DENIES Petitioner's motions to stay at ECF Nos. 21 and 31.
On July 2, 2019, while in the custody of the DOC, Petitioner was charged with refusing housing. Rosa v. Comm'r of Corr., No. TSR-CV19-5000411-S, 2022 WL 1045637, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 1, 2022). According to the charge, Petitioner refused to remain housed in his cell because he claimed he had a bottom bunk pass and because he had experienced conflicts with his cellmate. Id. After the incident, he was escorted to restrictive housing, id., where he became agitated and refused to comply with the correctional officers' verbal commands, id. at *2. He was then charged with interfering with safety and security. Id.
Two disciplinary investigation reports, both dated July 8, 2019, and signed by Petitioner, recommended finding him guilty of refusing housing and interfering with safety and security by obstructing the execution of a correctional officer's duties. Id. at *1-2. Petitioner met with his “advisor” and informed him that he was not refusing housing and that he wanted DOC staff “to honor the bottom bunk pass he had been prescribed by the medical team.” Id. at *1. Petitioner also informed his advisor that he “had been mentally unstable” at the time he was escorted to restrictive housing. Id. at *2.
A disciplinary hearing was held on August 8, 2019, and a disciplinary process summary report was prepared by the hearing officer, Lieutenant Betances. Id. Although another correctional officer confirmed that Petitioner had a bottom bunk pass from the medical team, Lieutenant Betances observed that Petitioner “had been using the top bunk for over two weeks prior to the incident without issue and still refused to return to his assigned bunk.” Id. In addition, Lieutenant Betances observed that Petitioner “became extremely belligerent and refused to participate in the hearing.” Id. Lieutenant Betances found Petitioner guilty of refusing housing and interfering with safety and security and sanctioned him to a total forfeiture of thirty risk reduction earned credits, as well as other privileges. Id.
In total, Petitioner has filed four habeas petitions in Connecticut state court. Two of them, TSR-CV21-5000871-S and TSR-CV23-5001460-S, pertain to his underlying convictions and thus do not appear to be relevant to his disciplinary sanction. See Civ. No. 3:22-cv-1226 (SVN).
The other two petitions appear to be relevant to the disciplinary sanction. On October 25, 2019, Petitioner filed a habeas petition in Connecticut state court related to his disciplinary sanction, TSR-CV19-5000411-S. On April 1, 2022, the state habeas court denied the petition. Rosa, 2022 WL 1045637, at *4. Soon thereafter, Petitioner filed an appeal with the Connecticut Appellate Court, AC 45524; according to the public docket, that appeal is still pending. Petitioner filed what appears to be an interlocutory petition for certification with the Connecticut Supreme Court, SC 220141, which was subsequently dismissed, Rosa v. Comm'r of Corr., 345 Conn. 916 (2022). Separately, on September 9, 2022, Petitioner filed the fourth habeas petition in Connecticut state court, TSR-CV22-5001303-S. On June 7, 2023, the state habeas court dismissed that petition as moot.
On October 11, 2022, Petitioner initiated this federal habeas petition pursuant to § 2241. Pet. at 1. The original petition raised four grounds for relief: first, that the DOC's disciplinary proceeding violated the Due Process Clause because he was not provided an advocate or an opportunity to present witnesses or evidence; second, that the state habeas court violated the Due Process Clause by allowing perjured testimony; third, that the state habeas court violated the Due Process Clause by preventing Petitioner's access to the courts; and fourth, that the Connecticut Appellate Court violated the Due Process Clause by denying Petitioner's motions to appoint counsel. Id. at 6-8. Thereafter, Petitioner filed a motion for leave to file an amended petition, representing that the amended petition corrects various errors contained in the original petition regarding the history of his state court habeas proceedings. ECF No. 15. The amended petition rephrases Petitioner's grounds for relief, but they are substantively the same as the grounds raised in the original petition in all material respects. See Am. Pet., ECF No. 15-1, at 5-10. Respondent then filed the present motion to dismiss, contending that Petitioner has not exhausted his available state court remedies. ECF No. 19. In addition to opposing the motion to dismiss, Petitioner filed two motions to stay this matter pending exhaustion of his state court remedies. ECF Nos. 21, 31.
Because Respondent has not opposed Petitioner's motion to amend, and because Respondent's motion to dismiss directed at the original petition may be applied to the amended petition, the Court GRANTS Petitioner's motion to amend the petition. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a); Roller Bearing Co. of Am., Inc. v. Am. Software, Inc., 570 F.Supp.2d 376, 384 (D. Conn. 2008). The Court considers the merits of the remaining motions below.
A motion to dismiss a habeas petition, like any other motion to dismiss a civil complaint, is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Spiegelmann v. Erfe, No. 3:17-CV-2069 (VLB), 2018 WL 1582549, at *1 (D. Conn. Mar. 29, 2018) (). To survive dismissal, the petition must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Although “detailed factual allegations” are not required, a complaint must offer more than “labels and conclusions,” “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,” or “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-57.
Because Petitioner filed the present petition pro se, the Court must construe his filings “liberally” and interpret them “to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006). “Despite the special solicitude that the Court must show [Petitioner] out of consideration for his pro se status, his petition must still include sufficient factual allegations to meet the standard of facial plausibility to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).” Anderson v. Williams, No. 3:15-CV-1364 (VAB), 2017 WL 855795, at *6 (D. Conn. Mar. 3, 2017) ().
In considering a motion to dismiss, the court typically may consider only the complaint, or, here, the petition. The petition, however, “is deemed to include any written instrument attached to it as an exhibit or any statements or documents incorporated in it by reference,” as well as any documents deemed “integral” to it. Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152-53 (2d Cir. 2002) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). See also Subaru Distribs. Corp. v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 425 F.3d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 2005) (). Accordingly, here, the Court will consider documents submitted by the parties and available in the public record relevant to the various state court proceedings underlying the procedural history of this case.
As a preliminary matter, the Court observes that, although Petitioner cites § 2241...
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