La Rosa v. Nichols
| Decision Date | 18 November 1918 |
| Docket Number | No. 70.,70. |
| Parties | LA ROSA v. NICHOLS. |
| Court | New Jersey Supreme Court |
(Syllabus by the Court.)
Appeal from Supreme Court.
Action by Anthony La Rosa, by his next friend, Stefano La Rosa, against Armand T Nichols. Judgment for plaintiff, and from an affirance of the judgment on appeal (103 Atl. 390), defendant appeals. Reversed.
Louis E. Stern, of Atlantic City, for appellant.
Ewart & Siracusa, of Atlantic City, for appellee.
WALKER, Ch. The defendant-appellant, a garage keeper in Atlantic City, stored the automobile of the plaintiff, furnished supplies for, and did work upon it, at the special instance and request of the plaintiff, who owned the machine. The bill thus contracted amounted to $74.49, and, default being made in its payment, defendant retained possession of the automobile, asserting a lien under the act for the protection of garage keepers and automobile repair men. P. L. 1915, p. 556. Plaintiff brought replevin in the Atlantic circuit court, setting up that he was an infant 20 years of age; that he repudiated his contract to pay for gasoline and storage, supplies, accessories, and for repairs to his automobile, and demanded possession of it free from any lien claimed by the defendant. The defendant answered, and set up that the plaintiff represented himself to be of full age when he engaged the defendant to store his automobile, etc.; that the plaintiff received the benefit of the storage, work and labor, and materials furnished; that the same were necessary to the plaintiff in order to operate his machine in and about his business of a jitney driver; and that the prices charged were reasonable.
The case was submitted to the court without a jury. The judge found in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, and judgment was thereupon entered, with costs. Appeal was taken to the Supreme Court, and the judgment was there affirmed. 103 Atl. 390. From the judgment entered upon that affirmance appeal has been taken to this court.
The case was tried in the court of first instance upon an agreed state of facts, as follows: That the amount claimed by defendant is due and owing to him from plaintiff; that at the time of storing the car and purchasing the supplies, etc., plaintiff was an infant and would not be of age until October, 1917 (the items running over a period from September 16, 1916, to January 17, 1917); that at the time mentioned plaintiff had the appearance of being of full age, and then, and prior thereto, represented himself to defendant as being of full age, and before that time executed a chattel mortgage to defendant on the automobile, and in the acknowledgment of the execution of the mortgage recited the fact that he was of full age; that plaintiff held a state license to drive an automobile in Atlantic City for hire, to operate a car commonly called a "jitney"; that the plaintiff's father, who is acting as his next friend in this suit, knew that the plaintiff was engaged in the business of operating an automobile for hire, and that the car was stored in the defendant's garage, and that plaintiff was purchasing gasoline, etc., from defendant, and consented thereto; that plaintiff lived with his father, and irregularly contributed money to his household.
If this suit were in the Court of Chancery the plea of infancy in the circumstances of this case would not be tolerated. Parker v. Hayes, 39 N.J.Eq. 469; Pemberton B. & L. A. v. Adams, 53 N.J.Eq. 258, 31 Atl. 280. In the former case it was held by Vice Chancellor Van Fleet that if an infant, entitled to a sum of money on attaining 21 years of age, induces his trustee to pay it to him in advance of that time by fraudulently representing himself to be of full age, he will, in equity, be bound by the payment, although he would not be at law. See pages 478, 479. And in the latter case Vice Chancellor Bird held that infancy is no defense to a suit on a contract, the consideration of which was money advanced to the infant upon his falsely representing himself to be of age when the representation is relied upon by the lender, and that a court of equity will not permit the plea of infancy to prevent the enforcement of a contract for a loan of money without a return of the loan, and this irrespective of fraud. I understand the vice chancellor's assertion (53 N.J.Eq. at page 259, 31 Atl. 280) that the law will not in such circumstances allow a fraud-doer to protect himself under the plea of infancy, to refer to the law administered in courts of equity. The authorities he cites show this. Parker v. Hayes went to the Court of Errors and Appeals, and there Mr. Justice Reed, writing the opinion for that court, said the equitable rule was fully and correctly stated in the opinion of the learned vice chancellor. Hayes v. Parker, 41 N.J.Eq. 630, 632, 7 Atl. 511.
Counsel for plaintiff urges that neither in Parker v. Hayes nor Pemberton B. & L. A. v. Adams did the Court of Chancery say that infants were bound by their contracts, but that enforcement of the contracts was denied on the ground of estoppel, equitable estoppel. But this doctrine is not now one of exclusively equitable cognizance; for, as this court in Central R, R. Co. v. MacCartney, 68 N.J.Law 165, at page 175, 52 Atl. 575, speaking by Mr. Justice Pitney, said, the doctrine of equitable estoppel, although the creature of equity and depending upon equitable principles, is recognized and enforced alike by courts of law and equity.
Two cases decided by our Supreme Court were cited as authority for that court's decision in the case at bar, namely, Woolston v. King, 3 N.J.Law 1049, and Hall v. Acken, 47 N.J.Law 341. In the former the suit was on a promissory note, and the defense set up was that the defendant was an infant when the note was given. The court held that it is the real or supposed incapacity of mind in an infant to make judicious contracts that the law renders invalid his bargains. And the latter case was on a mechanic's lien claim against the builder, who contracted the debt, and against the owner, who was an infant, to charge his...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Hollander v. Abrams
...law and the weight of this decision is now questioned by counsel for complainant, in view of the later case of La Rosa v. Nichols, 92 N. J. Law, 375, 105 A. 201, 6 A. L. R. 412. In the Shumard Case, Justice Swayze "The case of a married woman is like the case of an infant, exeept so far as ......
-
Bancredit, Inc. v. Bethea
...see La Rose v. Nichols, 91 N.J.L. 355, 357, 103 A. 309 (Sup.Ct.1918), reversed on other grounds sub nom. La Rosa v. Nichols, 92 N.J.L. 375, 105 A. 201, 6 A.L.R. 412 (E. & A. 1918); Annotation 78 A.L.R. 392 (1932), recent decisions have espoused the more realistic view that an occupational a......
-
Ebert v. Balter
...of equity, and governed by equitable principles, it is a doctrine enforceable in courts of common law jurisdiction. LaRosa v. Nichols, 92 N.J.L. 375, 105 A. 201, 6 A.L.R. 412; Central R. Co., (of New Jersey) v. MacCartney, 68 N.J.L. 165, 52 A. 575. It is of the essence of equitable estoppel......
-
Matullo v. Sky Zone Trampoline Park
...its genesis in the concept that minors do not have the capacity to bind themselves to contractual obligations. See La Rosa v. Nichols, 92 N.J.L. 375, 379, 105 A. 201 (1918) ; Bancredit, Inc. v. Bethea, 65 N.J. Super. 538, 547, 168 A.2d 250 (App. Div. 1961). Exceptions to the general rule in......
-
The Infancy Defense in the Modern Contract Age: a Useful Vestige
...torts, and yet not be liable on their contracts when apparently of sufficient capacity to make them . . . ." (citing La Rosa v. Nichols, 105 A. 201, 203 (N.J. 1918)). 74. Daniel, supra note 12, at 257 ("More than anything, the current doctrine appears to provide conniving adolescents with a......