Rosado-Montes v. United States

• Decision Date: 31 March 2014
• Docket Number: Civil No. 13–1158 SEC.
• Citation: 8 F.Supp.3d 55
• Parties: Leslie ROSADO–MONTES, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES of America, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

8 F.Supp.3d 55

Leslie ROSADO–MONTES, Plaintiff

v.UNITED STATES of America, et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 13–1158 SEC.

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

Signed March 31, 2014.

Filed April 11, 2014.

Juan Ramon Rodriguez–Lopez, Rodriguez Lopez Law Office, Ponce, PR, for Plaintiff.

Isabel Munoz–Acosta, United States Attorneys Office, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

SALVADOR E. CASELLAS, Senior District Judge.

Before the Court are the defendants' motion to dismiss (Docket # 6), the plaintiff's opposition thereto (Docket # 9), and the defendants' reply. Docket # 14. After reviewing the filings and the applicable law, the defendants' motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a case under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671 –2680, concerning the alleged unlawful disclosure of plaintiff Leslie Rosado–Montes' (Rosado) confidential medical information. Rosado also alleges violations under the Constitution, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub.L. No. 104–191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996), and the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a. The defendants are the United States of America; the Department of Veterans Affairs, the institution who oversees the Veteran's Hospital in San Juan, Puerto Rico (VH); Eric Holder, the Attorney General; Rosa Emilia Rodríguez, the United States Attorney for the District of Puerto Rico; and Eric Shinseki, the Secretary of the Department of Veterans Affairs. The well-pleaded facts in the complaint—extending every reasonable inference in Rosado's favor, see A.G. ex rel. Maddox v. Elsevier, Inc., 732 F.3d 77, 80 (1st Cir.2013) —are as follows.

The events giving rise to this suit occurred at the VH, during May and June, 2009. Docket # 1, ¶ 12. On May 23, Rosado, a veteran who had been working as a “resident nursing student” at the VH, “began feeling a strong pain in his lower back and groin,” id. He was promptly admitted to the VH's emergency room, where doctors treated him. Id. at ¶ 13. Eight days later, a doctor told him “that he was doing well and they had cured him of all his medical conditions.” Id. at ¶ 17. A confused Rosado “asked the doctor to explain to him what was happening.” Id. The doctor obliged, informing him that he had “Syphilis and Chlamydia” Id. HIV tests, the doctor further informed Rosado, were administered. Id. ¶ 19.

During his hospitalization, Rosado told Margieliz Quintero and Victor Sánchez—a “classmate” and his “best friend,” respectively—about his diagnosis. Id. ¶¶ 14, 26. “He was assured by both of them that it would be kept confidential.” Id. ¶ 26. According to the complaint, however, his other classmates “access[ed] his medical records.” Id. ¶ 30. “A couple of days later,” Rosado was released and resumed his “nursing training” at the VH. Id. ¶ 28. As it happened, Rosado tested negative for HIV, id. ¶ 27, though, shortly thereafter he “began to feel intense abdominal pain, and was admitted once again” to the VH. Id. ¶ 30. This time, he requested to be hospitalized in a different floor, “to avoid his classmates being able to access his medical record,” id. ¶ 30. The VH granted his request. And he was hospitalized for eight more days. Id.

According to the complaint, after he returned “to his training,” another nurse told him, “in a mocking manner if he had kissed a man in the mouth.” Id. ¶ 31. “As time went by,” the complaint avers, Rosado's classmates “continued to speak about “sexual[ly] transmitted diseases,” all while pointing at him in the hallways and “whisper[ing] in his presence.” Id. ¶ 35. In the same time frame, María Biascochea, “the lead nurse of the eight floor,” id. ¶ 33, met with Rosado and told him that “his classmates had complained about him.” Id. ¶ 37. Then, Biascochea allegedly “confessed she had access to [his] [medical] record because she needed to know who he really was.” Id. She also explained that she wanted to confirm comments regarding Rosado's “mental conditions” that, according to the complaint, were made by the director of the nursing internship program. Id.

Things escalated, and Rosado complained to Kiomara Bonilla, the VH's so-called “privacy official.” Id. ¶ 38. According to the complaint, Bonilla told Rosado that she would investigate the apparent breach of his medical information. Id. ¶ 38. “A week later,” Bonilla furnished Rosado with a list of the employees whom had accessed his records and instructed Rosado to “mark any person that did not have authorization to view his records.” Id. ¶ 38. He identified seven employees, including Biascochea, Heriberto Quintero (Margieliz Quintero's father), and several other nurses. Id. ¶ 39.

After Rosado returned to school, “the situation worsened,” id. ¶ 42, after a classmate said to him: “ ‘[M]argieliz told me you have Chlamydia, Syphilis, Hepatitis B, and that [you] were HIV positive’ and that she was telling everyone because it was [your] fault that her father was going to lose his job.” Id. ¶ 44. Rosado filed an administrative claim with the Department of Veterans Affairs and received a “Notice of Right to Sue” on September 1, 2012. Id. ¶ 47.

This suit ensued. Docket # 1. The complaint, alas, is an exemplar of how not to draft a complaint. It omits the “claim for relief” (or “statement of the claim”) section, see Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc. , ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 1377, 1391 n. 6, 188 L.Ed.2d 392, 2014 WL 1168967, *10 n. 6 (2014) (noting that an “element of a cause of action, ... must be adequately alleged at the pleading stage in order for the case to proceed”), thereby obfuscating (unnecessarily) the pleadings.¹ Indeed, the complaint is so poorly drafted that it is difficult to determine upon what theory the action is based. At bottom, however, Rosado appears to claim that the defendants violated the FTCA, the Privacy Act, HIPAA, Title VII, and the Constitution by allowing the VH's employees unlawful access to his confidential medical information. He alleges that such illegal disclosure has caused him “moral damages and mental anguish,” Docket # 1 ¶ 48; and that he was “humiliated, discriminated [against], [and] harassed....” Id. ¶ 50. He seeks six million dollars in damages.

The defendants move to dismiss for want of subject-matter jurisdiction, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), and for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Docket # 6.² Specifically, they claim that (1) “[t]here is no state tort analog cause of action under HIPAA,” id., p. 4; (2) HIPAA provides no private cause of action, id., p. 6; (3) the complaint “is outside the scope of the FTCA,” id., p. 7; and (4) the complaint fails to state a claim against the individual defendants, id., p. 10. Rosado opposed. Docket # 9.

Standard of Review

Rule 12(b)(1) is the appropriate vessel for challenging a court's subject-matter jurisdiction. Valentín v. Hospital Bella Vista, 254 F.3d 358, 362–63 (1st Cir.2001). In reviewing a motion to dismiss under this rule, the court construes the plaintiffs' allegations liberally and “may consider whatever evidence has been submitted, such as ... depositions and exhibits.” Carroll v. United States, 661 F.3d 87, 94 (1st Cir.2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Accordingly, courts are empowered to “[w]eigh the evidence and make factual determinations, if necessary, to determine whether it has jurisdiction to hear the case.” Massachusetts Delivery Ass'n v. Coakley, 671 F.3d 33, 40 n. 8 (1st Cir.2012) (citing Torres–Negrón v. J & N Records, LLC, 504 F.3d 151, 163 (1st Cir.2007) ). When faced with a jurisdictional challenge courts must credit the plaintiffs' well-pleaded factual averments and indulge every reasonable inference in the pleader's favor. Merlonghi v. United States, 620 F.3d 50, 54 (1st Cir.2010) (citing Valentin, 254 F.3d at 363 ). Nonetheless, a plaintiff faced with a subject-matter jurisdiction challenge has the burden to demonstrate its existence. Johansen v. United States, 506 F.3d 65, 68 (1st Cir.2007) (citations omitted).

For its part, Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes the dismissal of a complaint that fails to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. To avoid dismissal, a complaint must provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). At the pleading stage, the plaintiffs need not demonstrate likelihood of success, but their claims “ ‘must suggest more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.’ ”

García–Catalan v. United States, 734 F.3d 100, 102–03 (1st Cir.2013) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ). In other words, a plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). A claim has facial plausibility when a “complaint's non-conclusory factual content ... [permits] the court to draw the reasonable inference that [each] defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.' ” Gianfrancesco v. Town of Wrentham, 712 F.3d 634, 639 (1st Cir.2013) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ).

Applicable Law and Analysis

For cases, such as this one, where no diversity of citizenship exists between parties, “jurisdiction turns on whether the case falls within ‘federal question’ jurisdiction.” Ortiz–Bonilla v. Federación de Ajedrez de Puerto Rico, Inc., 734 F.3d 28, 34 (1st Cir.2013). Because the defendants' motion to dismiss is grounded on two different grounds—Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) —the Court would normally consider the Rule 12(b)(1) challenge first. See, e.g., Deniz v. Municipality of Guaynabo, 285 F.3d 142, 149 (1st Cir.2002) ( “When a court is confronted with motions to dismiss under both Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), it ordinarily ought to decide the former before broaching the latter.” (citations omitted)). But...