Rosania v. Taco Bell of America, Inc.

• Decision Date: 23 February 2004
• Docket Number: No. 3:03 CV 7525.,3:03 CV 7525.
• Citation: 303 F.Supp.2d 878
• Parties: Michael ROSANIA, Plaintiff, v. TACO BELL OF AMERICA, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio

303 F.Supp.2d 878

Michael ROSANIA, Plaintiff, v. TACO BELL OF AMERICA, INC., Defendant.

No. 3:03 CV 7525.

United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Western Division.

February 23, 2004.

John D. Franklin, Tracy Anne Lipinski, Law Office of John D. Franklin, Toledo, OH, for Plaintiff.

James R. Neumeister, Mark S. Floyd, Thompson Hine, Cleveland, OH, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

KATZ, District Judge.

Pending before the Court is Defendant's partial motion to dismiss Plaintiff's negligence and certain damages claims (Doc. No. 10); and Plaintiffs motion for leave to file amended complaint (Doc. No. 21) as to which Defendant has filed an opposition (Doc. No. 22) and Plaintiff has filed a reply (Doc. No. 23).

The Court has jurisdiction to decide this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(2). For the reasons stated below, Defendant's partial motion to dismiss Plaintiffs negligence and certain damages claims will be granted. Plaintiffs motion for leave to file amended complaint will also be granted.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Michael Rosania ("Rosania") began his employment with Defendant Taco Bell of America ("Taco Bell") in May 1989.¹ In May 2001, Rosania alleges that his mother was diagnosed with terminal colon cancer. Plaintiff contends that while caring for his mother, he was diagnosed with and treated for depression. Plaintiffs mother was admitted to the hospital on November 29, 2002. Rosania maintains that he informed his supervisor Sueyoung Georgas ("Georgas") and requested leave to care for his mother and to receive treatment for his depression.

Plaintiff was to return to work on December 4, 2002, but alleges that he contacted Georgas indicating that he was not yet ready. Two days later Rosania purportedly contacted Georgas to inform her that his mother had passed away, and remained on leave to attend the viewing and funeral. Rosania contends that on December 14 he received a letter from Georgas regarding potential termination due to "job abandonment." Plaintiff asserts that he contacted Georgas the next day and informed her that he could not return to work on December 16 due to a doctor's appointment to treat his depression, but would return on December 17. Rosania was apparently terminated on December 17.

Plaintiff then filed the instant action alleging Defendant violated the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") by interfering with, restraining or denying Rosania his rights under the FMLA and/or by discharging him for asserting/exercising those rights. Plaintiff also alleged a claim against Taco Bell for negligent supervision and retention. Defendant filed a partial motion to dismiss the negligent supervision and retention claim as well as Rosania's claims for compensatory and consequential, emotional distress and punitive damages.

Taco Bell also filed its Answer, affirmative defenses and asserted two counterclaims alleging conversion and unjust enrichment due to Plaintiffs purportedly having received and retained excess mileage reimbursements to which he was not entitled. The Court dismissed Rosania's claim of negligent supervision and retention under Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(1)(ii) following the parties' joint stipulation of dismissal, rendering that portion of Taco Bell's partial motion to dismiss moot. (Doc. Nos. 17 & 18). Plaintiff then filed a motion for leave to file an amended complaint to add a new count, alleging that Defendant's counterclaims represent unlawful retaliation under the FMLA.

DISCUSSION

A. DEFENDANT'S PARTIAL. MOTION TO DIMISS

Taco Bell moves the Court to dismiss Rosania's claims to compensatory and consequential, emotional distress and punitive damages. Specifically, Defendant seeks to dismiss paragraphs B and E in Plaintiffs prayer for relief, respectively:

That this Court award Plaintiff an amount to be determined at trial as compensation for his adverse health effects, for loss of the opportunity to engage in gainful employment, and future earnings for humiliation, embarrassment, loss of reputation and loss of self-esteem.

(Doc. No. 1, p. 6).

That this Court award Plaintiff punitive damages.²

Id. at 7.

The enforcement provision of the FMLA, 29 U.S.C. § 2617, provides in relevant part:

(a) Civil action by employees

(1) Liability

An employer who violates section 2615 of this title shall be liable to any eligible employee affected —

(A) for damages equal to —

(i) the amount of —

(I) any wages, salary, employment benefits, or other compensation denied or lost to such employee by reason of the violation; or

(II) in a case in which wages, salary, employment benefits, or other compensation have not been denied or lost to the employee, any actual monetary losses sustained by the employee as a direct result of the violation, such as the cost of providing care, up to a sum equal to twelve weeks of wages or salary for the employee.

(ii) the interest on the amount described in clause (i) calculated at the prevailing rate; and

(iii) an additional amount as liquidated damages equal to the sum of the amount described in clause (i) and the interest described in clause (ii), except that if an employer who has violated section 2615 of this title proves to the satisfaction of the court that the act or omission which violated section 2615 of this title was in good faith and that the employer had reasonable grounds for believing that the act or omission was not a violation of section 2615 of this title, such court may, in the discretion of the court, reduce the amount of the liability to the amount and interest determined under clauses (i) and (ii), respectively; and

(B) for such equitable relief as may be appropriate, including employment, reinstatement, and promotion.

Defendant contends that the § 2617 sets forth a comprehensive enforcement scheme, and that § 2617(a) provides the exclusive damages that an employee may recover under the FMLA. See O'Hara v. Mt. Vernon Bd. of Educ., 16 F.Supp.2d 868, 894 (S.D.Ohio 1998); Kilvitis v. County of Luzerne, 52 F.Supp.2d 403, 418-19 (M.D.Pa.1999); Desrochers v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 28 F.Supp.2d 693, 695 (D.Mass. 1998); Jolliffe v. Mitchell, 971 F.Supp. 1039, 1045 (W.D.Va.1997). Other courts have held to the contrary. See Knussman v. Maryland, 16 F.Supp.2d 601, 609-10 (D.Md.1998); Peterson v. Slidell Mem'l. Hosp. & Med. Ctr., No. 96-2487, 1996 WL 732840, "2-3, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18944, at *7 (E.D.La. Dec. 16, 1996). After a careful review of the aforementioned cases, and the reasoning contained therein, this Court joins those that hold that § 2617 provides the exclusive remedies for an employer's violation of the FMLA.

A number of courts have previously held that a Plaintiff cannot recover damages for emotional distress under the FMLA. See Graham v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 193 F.3d 1274, 1284 (11th Cir.1999); Montgomery v. Maryland, 72 Fed. Appx. 17, 19 (4th Cir.2003); Johnson v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 221 F.Supp.2d 853, 858 (S.D.Ohio 2002); Rogers v. AC Humko Corp., 56 F.Supp.2d 972, 979 (W.D.Tenn. 1999); Schmauch v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., No. C2-02-751, 2003 U.S. Dist. 24013, at *8 (S.D.Ohio Sept. 16, 2003); Johnson v. United States Postal Serv., No. 1:97-C794, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7981, at *26 (W.D.Mich. May 26, 1999).

The Court recognizes that the Sixth Circuit "has previously turned to the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), which contains similar remedial provisions, for guidance in interpreting the FMLA." Arban v. West Publ'g Corp., 345 F.3d 390, 407 (6th Cir.2003). See also Chandler v Specialty Tires of Am., 283 F.3d 818, 827 (6th Cir.2002); Frizzell v. Southwest Motor Freight, 154 F.3d 641, 644 (6th Cir. 1998). Moreover, in Moore v. .Freeman, 355 F.3d 558, 561, 2004 FED App. 0014P (6th Cir.), at "8-9 (6th Cir.2004), the Sixth Circuit recently joined other circuits in holding that emotional distress damages may be recovered under the FLSA. even though the FLSA's remedial provisions do not explicitly so provide.³ However, without more definite direction, and due to the lack of express language in the FMLA, the Court will follow existing jurisprudence, and as a result, holds that Rosania is not entitled to recover emotional distress damages. See Rogers, 56 F.Supp.2d at 979 (rejecting this same premise due in part to the lack of express language in the FMLA).

Also, Rosania may not recover punitive damages under the FMLA. See Johnson, 221 F.Supp.2d at 858; Schmauch, No. C2-02-751, 2003 U.S. Dist. 24013, at *8; Johnson, No. 1:97 — CV-794, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7981, at *26. Likewise, Plaintiff is not entitled to recover compensatory and/or consequential damages. See Walker v. United Parcel Serv., 240 F.3d 1268, 1278 (10th Cir.2001); Montgomery, 72 Fed.Appx. at 19; Nero v. Indus. Molding Corp., 167 F.3d 921, 930 (5th Cir.1999). Accordingly, Defendant's partial motion addressing Plaintiff's negligence and certain damages claims is granted to the extent it seeks to preclude Rosania's claims for compensatory and consequential damages, emotional distress and punitive damages.

B. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff moves the Court to allow him to amend his complaint to add a claim for retaliation under the FMLA based on Taco Bell's filing counterclaims for conversion and unjust enrichment. Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a), the trial court is vested with discretion in granting or denying an amendment. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962). A trial court may consider a number of factors in making this determination. Those factors may include undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, undue prejudice, futility of the amendment, or the repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed. Id. Additional factors may also include the need for additional discovery, strain on the court's docket, or the lack of prejudice as the issue is already known. See Budd Co. v. Travelers Indent. Co., 820 F.2d 787, 792 (6th Cir.1987...