Del Rosario v. Labor Ready Se., Inc.

• Decision Date: 25 August 2015
• Docket Number: CASE NO. 14–21496–CIV–LENARD/GOODMAN
• Citation: 124 F.Supp.3d 1300
• Parties: Leoncio Del Rosario, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Labor Ready Southeast, Inc., and MDT Personnel, LLC, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

124 F.Supp.3d 1300

Leoncio Del Rosario, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.Labor Ready Southeast, Inc., and MDT Personnel, LLC, Defendants.

CASE NO. 14–21496–CIV–LENARD/GOODMAN

United States District Court, S.D. Florida.

Signed August 25, 2015

Max Aaron Goldfarb, Miami, FL, Edilberto O. Marban, Coral Gables, FL, for Plaintiffs.

Gregory Ronald Schmitz, Baker Hostetler, LLP, Kevin William Shaughnessy, Baker & Hostetler, Orlando, FL, M. Kristen Allman, Robert Bleakley, Susan Elaine Lee, Ronald Gray McCormick, Jr., The Bleakley Bavol Law Firm, Tampa, FL, Dori Katrine Stibolt, Susanne Mary Calabrese, Fox Rothschild LLP, West Palm Beach, FL, for Defendants.

OMNIBUS ORDER ON CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(D.E. 78, 80, 84)

JOAN A. LENARD, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Defendant MDT Personnel, LLC's ("MDT") Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on January 5, 2015. (D.E. 78.) Plaintiffs filed their Response on January 29, 2015, (D.E. 95), to which MDT filed a Reply on February 9, 2015, (D.E. 101). The Parties' Statements of Undisputed Facts are incorporated into their respective pleadings.

Also before the Court is Defendant Labor Ready Southeast, Inc.'s ("Labor Ready") Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on January 5, 2015. (D.E. 80.) Plaintiffs filed their Response on January 29, 2015, (D.E. 96), to which Labor Ready filed a Reply on February 9, 2015, (D.E. 98). The Parties' Statements of Undisputed Facts are incorporated into their respective pleadings.

Also before the Court is Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on January 9, 2015. (D.E. 84.) MDT and Labor Ready each filed a Response on January 29, 2015, (D.E. 97, 98), to which Plaintiffs filed Replies on February 10, 2015, (D.E. 105, 106). Plaintiff filed a Statement of Undisputed Facts (D.E. 85); Defendants incorporated their statements of facts into their Responses.

Upon review of the Motions, Responses, Replies, and the record, the Court finds as follows.

I. Background¹

MDT employed Plaintiffs to move and clean rental cars on behalf of Alamo Rent A Car at Miami International Airport ("Alamo MIA"). (Id. ¶ 5.) Labor Ready acquired MDT's assets in February or March, 2013. (Id. ¶ 6.)² Plaintiffs are suing Defendants pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 -219, and Florida's Minimum Wage Act, Florida Statute § 448.110. (MDT Mot. (D.E. 78) ¶ 1.) They allege minimum wage and unpaid overtime violations, for which they seek actual and liquidated damages. (Id. ¶¶ 2-4.)

Plaintiffs were hourly-paid employees of MDT and Labor Ready. (Pls. Facts (D.E. 85) ¶ 12.) Alexander Grullon was the branch manager and the person in charge of employee payroll for MDT and Labor Ready at the Alamo MIA location until April 2014. (Id. ¶¶ 13, 16.) In April 2014, Ami Pavon became the branch manager at Alamo MIA. (Labor Ready Resp. ¶ 14.) She was also in charge of paying Plaintiffs' wages. (Pls. Facts ¶ 14.)

Frank Maresca was MDT and Labor Ready's regional manager at the Alamo MIA location. (Id. ¶ 18.) Mr. Maresca delegated to Mr. Grullon the responsibility of monitoring the hours employees worked. (Id. ) Because MDT/Labor Ready did not have an overtime bill rate for Alamo, they were required to bill Alamo for "straight time" even when employees were working overtime. (Id. ¶ 19.) Because Defendants could lose money this way, Mr. Maresca spoke with Mr. Grullon about reducing and limiting employee overtime. (Id. ) Mr. Maresca limited Mr. Grullon to offering twenty hours of overtime per week, and told him that the ultimate goal is zero overtime. (Id. ¶ 20.)

Plaintiffs state that Mr. Grullon deleted hours from Plaintiffs' time records and that Plaintiffs were not paid for those deleted hours. (Id. ¶¶ 21, 23.) Labor Ready contends that the hours Mr. Grullon deleted were fraudulently-entered, non-worked hours. (D.E. 98 ¶¶ 21, 23.)

Plaintiffs allege that each workday, Defendants required Plaintiffs to report to a remote employee parking facility at MIA and wait for a shuttle to transport them to Alamo MIA. (D.E. 85 ¶ 24.) The parking facility did not have a time clock, and Plaintiffs were not paid for the time spent waiting for the shuttle and travelling to the work site, which amounted to approximately 25 to 40 minutes of uncompensated time each day. (Id. ) Defendants also required Plaintiffs to clock out before shuttling back to the employee parking lot at the end of each workday, which amounted to an additional 25 to 40 minutes of uncompensated work time. (Id. ) Defendants state that Plaintiffs were not required to park in the employee parking lot and that, regardless, time commuting to and from the employee lot is not compensable under the FLSA. (See MDT Resp., D.E. 97 ¶ 24; Labor Ready Resp., D.E. 98 ¶ 24.)

It is undisputed that in March 2014, Mr. Maresca became aware that employees were not being paid "right away." (Labor Ready's Resp., D.E. 98 ¶ 27; Pls. Facts ¶ 27.) Mr. Maresca reprimanded Mr. Grullon for this and instructed Mr. Grullon that "from now on we need to pay everybody on Mondays." (Pls. Facts ¶ 27.) However, the late payments continued and Mr. Grullon was ultimately terminated in part because he was not paying employees on a timely basis. (Id. )

Labor Ready states that its policy and practice was to pay workers based on a Saturday to Friday work week and to pay workers within seven to eight days following the Friday of the preceding pay period. (Labor Ready Mot. ¶ 6.) Plaintiffs dispute that the payroll records support Labor Ready's assertion, but stop short of disputing that they were, in fact, paid within eight days of the end of the pay period. (See Pl. Resp., D.E. 96 ¶ 6.)

MDT states that during the relevant time period, it had no corporate policy to hold two weeks of pay from its employees, (MDT Mot. ¶ 10), but Plaintiffs argue that Defendant did have such a policy and withheld wages in abeyance, (D.E. 95 ¶ 10).

On September 4, 2014, Plaintiffs filed the operative Second Amended Complaint (D.E. 33) alleging claims for: unpaid overtime against Labor Ready and MDT, respectively (Counts I and II); minimum wage violations for failure to promptly pay wages against Labor Ready and MDT, respectively (Count III and IV); unpaid minimum wages against Labor Ready and MDT, respectively (Counts V and VI).

Additional facts will be developed where relevant to the Court's discussion.

II. Legal Standards

On a motion for summary judgment, the Court is to construe the evidence and factual inferences arising therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co. , 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). Summary judgment can be entered on a claim only if it is shown "that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In addition, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f)(1), the Court may grant summary judgment for the non-moving party "[a]fter giving notice and a reasonable time to respond." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f)(1) ; see also Gentry v. Harborage Cottages – Stuart, LLLP , 654 F.3d 1247, 1261 (11th Cir.2011). The Supreme Court has explained the summary judgment standard as follows:

[T]he plain language of [Rule 56 ] mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be no genuine issue as to any material fact, since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (internal quotation omitted). The trial court's function at this juncture is not "to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial."

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 249–50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact-finder could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ; see also Barfield v. Brierton , 883 F.2d 923, 933 (11th Cir.1989).

The party moving for summary judgment "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex , 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Once the movant makes this initial demonstration, the burden of production, not persuasion, shifts to the nonmoving party. The nonmoving party must "go beyond the pleadings and by [its] own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ " Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 ; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In meeting this burden the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is a metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). That party must demonstrate that there is a "genuine issue for trial." Id. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348. An action is void of a material issue for trial "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party." Id.

III. Discussion

In their cross-motions for summary judgment, the Parties argue their respective positions concerning: (1) Plaintiffs' unpaid overtime wage claims; (2) Plaintiffs' unpaid minimum wage claims; and (3) whether Defendants failed to promptly pay Plaintiffs' wages.³ The Court will...