ROSE V. HODGES
| Decision Date | 11 November 1975 |
| Citation | 423 U. S. 19 |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Respondents were convicted of murder and sentenced to death. The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions, but reversed and remanded to the trial court on the punishment issue. Shortly thereafter, the Governor commuted the death sentences to 99 years' imprisonment, and the State immediately petitioned for a rehearing in the Court of Criminal Appeals, which sustained the commutations and held its remand "for naught," thus affirming the convictions and sentences, as modified. After the State Supreme Court denied certiorari, respondents sought habeas corpus in the Federal District Court, claiming, inter alia, that their Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated by the illegal commutations, but the District Court dismissed on this issue for failure to exhaust state remedies. On respondents' appeal, the Court of Appeals held that, since the death sentences had been vacated at the time of the Governor's order, there were no death sentences to commute, and hence the commutations were invalid.
Held:
1. Whether or not respondents' sentences were subject to commutation, and the extent of the Governor's authority under the circumstances, are questions of Tennessee law which the State Criminal Appeals Court resolved in favor of the Governor's action, and it was not a federal habeas court's province to reexamine these questions.
2. Respondents' Fourteenth and Sixth Amendment rights to jury trial were not infringed by the state proceedings. After such commutations of sentences, defendants are not entitled to have their sentences redetermined by a jury, the Federal Constitution affording no impediment to a State's choice to allow the Governor to reduce a death penalty to a term of years without resort to further judicial proceedings.
Certiorari granted; 519 F.2d 1402, reversed.
Respondents Hodges and Lewis were convicted of committing murder in the perpetration of a rape in Memphis,
Tenn. and sentenced to death by electrocution. On July 31, 1972, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the judgments of conviction but reversed and remanded the record to the trial court on the issue of punishment, declaring that "[t]he Supreme Court of the United States has decreed that the death sentence is contrary to the Eighth Amendment. . . ." Hodges v. State, 491 S.W.2d 624, 628 (1972).
On August 7, 1972, the Governor of Tennessee commuted respondents' death sentences to 99 years' imprisonment. On August 8, 1972, the State (represented by petitioner here) filed a timely petition for rehearing in the Court of Criminal Appeals pursuant to Tenn.Code Ann. § 16-451 (Supp. 1974), which provides that such a petition must be filed within 15 days of the entry of the judgment.
The Court of Criminal Appeals then found the commutations by the Governor to be "valid and a proper exercise of executive authority," citing Bowen v. State, 488 S.W.2d 373 (Tenn.1972), and held its remand "for naught," thus affirming the convictions and the sentences, as modified, in full, 491 S.W.2d at 629. On March 5, 1973, the Supreme Court of Tennessee denied certiorari.
Respondents Hodges and Lewis then petitioned for habeas corpus in the Federal District Court asserting, inter alia, that their Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated by the illegal commutation of their sentences. The case was transferred to the Federal District Court for the Western District of Tennessee, which dismissed as to this issue for failure to exhaust state remedies. Respondents appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
In a brief order, that court held that, since the death sentences had been vacated at the time of the Governor's
commutation order, "there were . . . no viable death sentences to commute," and therefore declared the commutations invalid. [Footnote 1]
Upon reconsideration, the court noted that the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals vacating the death penalties had been timely modified by that court to comply with the commutation order. However, it did not alter its earlier decision, except to note that respondents had exhausted their state remedies as to this point. [Footnote 2]
A necessary predicate for the granting of federal habeas relief to respondents is a determination by the federal court that their custody violates the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, 28 U.S.C. § 2241; Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293, 312 (1963). The one sentence in the opinion of the Court of Appeals dealing with the invalidity of the Governor's commutations contains no reference to any provision of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States or to any decision of this Court or any other court. [Footnote 3] Whether or not the sentences imposed upon respondents were subject
to commutation by the Governor, and the extent of his authority under the circumstances of this case, are questions of Tennessee law which were resolved in favor of sustaining the action of the Governor by the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals in Hodges v. State, supra. It was not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine these questions.
Respondents urge, in support of the result reached by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, that their Fourteenth and Sixth Amendment rights to jury trial have been infringed by the Tennessee proceedings. We reject these contentions. A jury had already determined their guilt and sentenced them to death. The Governor commuted these sentences to a term of 99 years after this Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238 (1972). Neither Furman nor any other holding of this Court requires that, following such a commutation, the defendant shall be entitled to have his sentence determined anew by a jury. If Tennessee chooses to allow the Governor to reduce a death penalty to a term of years without resort to further judicial proceedings, the United States Constitution affords no impediment to that choice. Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U. S. 71 (1902). Cf. Schick v. Reed, 419 U. S. 256 (1974).
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS would deny certiorari.
I dissent on two grounds: first, because the Court errs in reading the record to include a final holding of the Court of Appeals declaring the commutations to be invalid,
and, second, because, if there were such a final holding, summary disposition of the question of the validity of the commutations -- certainly one of first impression in this Court -- is particularly inappropriate. [Footnote 2/1]
That the "commutations" have not been finally declared invalid clearly emerges from the record of the proceedings in the District Court and in the Court of Appeals. The petition for habeas corpus alleged five errors by the state courts. Three (coerced confessions, prejudicial comments during voir dire, Hodge's claim under Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123 (1968)), attacked respondents' convictions, the other two the sentences (invalid jury sentence and unconstitutional commutations). The District Court held that respondents had failed to exhaust state remedies on all of these issues except the alleged invalidity of the jury sentence; accordingly, the District Court issued a show cause order "solely on the issue that the jury allegedly failed to specify the degree of murder in the verdicts." Hodges v. Rose, No. C-73442 (WD Tenn. Nov. 15, 1973). The State accordingly filed an answer dealing only with this issue, and the District Court decided only that issue, rejecting respondents' claim on the merits. This question was therefore the only claim that was ripe for appeal; specifically, there was no decision of the District Court on the constitutionality of the commutations that was or could have, been the subject of respondents' appeal to the Court of Appeals. [Footnote 2/2]
Nevertheless, it is of course true that the initial opinion of the Sixth Circuit contains the following language:
"[The] commutation followed by some eight days an order of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals vacating the order imposing the death penalty and remanding the case to the trial court for punishment determination in the light of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238 [(1972)], and for the reason that there were therefore no viable death sentences to commute, we hold the purported commutation and the concomitant imposition of committed [sic] sentences for terms of 99 years invalid."
Hodges v. Rose, No. 71461 (CA6, Feb. 25, 1975). (Emphasis added.) The same opinion goes on to affirm the decision on the merits of the only question decided by the District Court, namely, the jury sentence issue, and then observes that the State had confessed error on the exhaustion point. Accordingly, the judgment was "for further proceedings consistent herewith." This necessarily must have meant that the three constitutional attacks on the convictions
should be addressed on the merits by the District Court. The sua sponte comments on the commutations thus made no sense, since that issue would never arise if the convictions were set aside on any of the three grounds.
Not surprisingly, therefore, the State sought rehearing. The State dispositively argued, first, that the Sixth Circuit was precluded from addressing the commutation issue, since the District Court had carefully confined its decision on the merits to the validity of the jury sentence. The State argued, second, that there had been no opportunity to argue the commutation question in the District Court, and that no record had been made on the issue, and, third,...
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