Rose v. Parsons
| Decision Date | 12 January 2017 |
| Docket Number | SUPERIOR COURT Civil Action Docket No. RE-2011-056 |
| Parties | HELEN RIVAS ROSE and NATHANIEL P. MERRILL, Plaintiffs, v. WILLIAM PARSONS, JR., et als., Defendants, and LLEWELLYN P. H. ALDEN, et als., Parties-in-Interest. |
| Court | Maine Superior Court |
STATE OF MAINE
YORK, SS.
(TITLE TO REAL ESATE INVOLVED)
This case involves a dispute over private rights of access to and use of two beaches—the western end of Parsons Beach and Crescent Surf Beach—both in Kennebunk, Maine. The parties are descendants of a man named Charles Parsons, who owned land along the Atlantic Ocean that included these beaches. After his death in 1904, an elaborate plan to subdivide the property among his heirs was established in accordance with his will. His descendants have owned and enjoyed use of the property since that time.
Two of his descendants, Helen Rivas Rose and her brother, Nathaniel P. Merrill, jointly own a parcel of land in the subdivision. The parcel is known as the Farm Lot and does not have ocean frontage. They claim the Farm Lot benefits from deeded easements over the properties of other family members in the subdivision. They further claim the easements provide an ongoing right to use certain private roads to access and use the beaches. The dispute was brought to a head when Nathaniel P. Merrill attempted to sell part of the Farm Lot and represented to prospective buyers that the land for sale included a right of access to the beaches. Other family members and property owners oppose the claims.
This action was commenced in March 2011 when Plaintiffs filed a three-count complaint. Count I sought a declaratory judgment to confirm that, as owners of the Farm Lot, they have full rights to utilize the roadways depicted in the subdivision plan, including for access to and use of the beaches. Count II sought similar relief under a theory of adverse possession or prescription. Count III alleged slander of title.
The original complaint named a smaller subset of defendants.1 However, in response to a motion to dismiss, the court ordered joinder of any additional parties owning properties that this decision could affect. Plaintiffs then filed two amended complaints adding additional parties.2 In March 2012, another amended complaint added a new party-in-interest.3 Defendants filed a counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment that Plaintiffs, as owners of the farm lot, have no rights to two of the roads depicted in the plan or any right to use the beaches. Party-in-Interest Mary ElizabethFluke filed a cross-claim seeking a declaration that she and owners of other property depicted in the plan have rights to utilize the roadways, and in particular a road known as "Road H" to access and use the beach.
After mediation proved unsuccessful, Plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment on Count I of their complaint. Defendants along with Party-in-Interest Horace P. Liversidge II filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on all counts. In September 2012 the court denied Plaintiffs' motion and granted the cross-motion for summary judgment, concluding that Roads A and H were terminated by merger except for the easement across Lot 12 and "[n]o later deeds revived the easements for the plaintiffs."4 Rose v. Parsons, No. RE-2011-056, 2012 Me. Super. LEXIS 139, at *11 (Sept. 27, 2012). Plaintiffs appealed.
In August 2013 the Law Court vacated summary judgment in part and remanded the case to the trial court. Rose v. Parsons, 2013 ME 77, ¶¶ 1, 6, 76 A.3d 343. The Law Court held that even if the doctrine of merger had operated to extinguish the easements, a subsequent conveyance through a codicil to the will of one of Plaintiffs' predecessors in title revived the easements in the roads appurtenant to the Farm Lot. Id. ¶ 6. On remand, the trial court was instructed to determine whether the easements were thereafter abandoned or continue to exist. Id. ¶ 11. Summary judgment for Defendants was upheld with respect to the adverse possession and slander of title claims. Id. ¶¶ 12-13.
In the wake of the Law Court's remand, the parties filed another round ofmotions and cross-motions for summary judgment. In May 2014, the trial court granted Plaintiffs' renewed motion for summary judgment, denied Defendants' cross-motion, and dismissed as moot Party-in-Interest Fluke's motion. Defendants' motion to alter or amend the judgment was denied. Another appeal followed. The Law Court vacated the second summary judgment and remanded the matter for trial. Rose v. Parsons, 2015 ME 73, 118 A.3d 220.
The court conducted a view of the property with counsel on September 27, 2016. A bench trial was held on September 27, 28, and 29, 2016. Final argument was held on October 27, 2016.
Around the turn of the twentieth century, Charles Parsons owned a significant amount of land along the Atlantic Ocean in Kennebunk, Maine. He and his family built and used seasonal homes and other buildings on the land. The property, which is the subject of the present dispute, includes two beaches separated by a rock outcropping—Parsons Beach to the east of the rocks and Crescent Surf Beach to the west—as well as substantial acreage inland.
Charles Parsons died in October 1904. Pursuant to his will, the property was initially placed in trust with instructions to the trustees, Edwin Parsons and Jefferson Hogan, that it was to be divided among his heirs after the death of his wife, Sarah J. Parsons. (Joint Ex. 21.) The trustees, with the assistance of Roland W. Libby an Engineer based in Saco, Maine, created a detailed plan to divide the lots in accordance with the will of Charles Parsons. The final plan is entitled, dated August 10, 1915 ("1915 Plan" or "Plan"). (Joint Ex. 47.) The Plan was recorded in the York County Registry ofDeeds along with its implementing deeds in May 1916. (Joint Exs. 2-8, 47.)
The 1915 Plan divides the property into approximately 46 lots, 27 of which have direct ocean frontage on one of the two beaches. (Joint Ex. 47.) The Plan states the square footage, ascribes the length in feet and directional courses of boundaries, depicts the footprint of any structure(s) then extant on a lot, and provides other details relevant to the division of the property for each lot. (Joint Ex. 47.) The Plan depicts eight "roads," labeled "Road A" through "Road H," passing over and through the lots. (Joint Ex. 47.) According to the Plan's scale—1 inch equals 200 feet—the roads were generally drawn to be between 12 ½ to 25 feet wide. Below is an enlarged subsection of the Plan5 highlighting the two roads in dispute in this case, Road A and Road H. It also shows part of the Farm Lot, the dominant estate, and the relevant servient estates.
Image materials not available for display.
Despite the meticulous detail of the 1915 Plan and its implementing deeds, there remain several ambiguities that go to the heart of the dispute in this case, specifically, the purpose and scope of the easements in Road A and Road H and the intended location of Road A.
The record contains a copy of a letter dated March 27, 1915 addressed to Walter L. Dane, Esq. ("Dane Letter" or "Letter") regarding "Charles Parsons' Estate." (Joint Ex. 25.) The Letter addresses issues that needed to be considered in order to finalize the plan for dividing the Parsons' property. (Id.) The author of the Letter does not identify himself but represents that he was asked by the trustees under the will of Charles Parsons "to take up with you [Walter L. Dane, Esq.]6 the matter of making a division of land owned by the estate in Kennebunk." (Id.) The author also quotes George C. Parsons, a son of Charles Parsons and one of the subsequently named co-executors of the will, with respect to some of the issues that needed to be addressed in dividing the property. (Id. at 10-12.) The Letter further authorizes Mr. Dane to "prepare descriptions of the several parcels of land to be conveyed to the different members of the family, . . . make whatever investigations of the titles is necessary, and have Mr. Libby make such surveys and maps as are necessary." (Id. at 2.)
Enclosed with the Letter was a map or draft of a division plan for the property that Mr. Libby previously prepared showing "the proposed division in a rough way." (Id. at 3.) The enclosure is not in the record, but it is apparent from the Letter'sdescriptions and references that the draft depicted the same configuration of many lots shown in the final 1915 Plan. (Id.) The Letter requests a new map be drawn up depicting the land in Kennebunk as well as the proposed division of the land into lots with "sufficient particularity to enable us to prepare proper deeds." (Id. at 3.) Further, it states, "The map should also show all existing roads and other rights of way," (Id.), and "[s]pecial attention should be paid to the question of public and private roads and other rights of way, as there seems to be a great deal of confusion in regard to this matter." (Id. at 9.)
The roads in issue in this case—Road H and Road A—are specifically referenced in the Letter, though not by name. For example, in referring to access to Crescent Surf Beach, the Letter quotes George C. Parsons as follows:
In 1887 father built the house on lot A and turned the road about where the present circle on lot A is (on your map) westerly to the extreme easterly point of lot B, thence along lot B to the road leading to the beach between lot B and lot one. As far as I know from the circle on lot A to the beach was the way the road always ran.7
(Id. at 11.) (emphasis added). The italicized language is a reference to what became Road H on the Plan. The Letter also references the third segment of Road A shown in the 1915 Plan, again quoting George C. Parsons: "The road to the beach between lot 12 and lot F.N....
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