Rose v. Village of Peninsula
| Decision Date | 01 December 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 5:93CV1.,5:93CV1. |
| Citation | 839 F. Supp. 517 |
| Parties | James H. ROSE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. The VILLAGE OF PENINSULA, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
Augustin F. O'Neil, Melissa Graham-Hurd, Akron, OH, for plaintiffs.
Mark H. Ludwig, Leland D. Cole, Cole Co., Akron, OH, Alan E. Johnson, Leo R. Ward, Ward & Associates, Cleveland, OH, for defendants.
Now pending before the court are three motions to dismiss. The first was filed on behalf of all defendants (docket # 11). The second was filed on behalf of defendant Redmon based on qualified immunity (docket # 12). The last motion to dismiss was filed on behalf of defendant Ruoff based on theories of judicial and qualified immunity.
The complaint is divided between factual allegations by plaintiff Rose and factual allegations by plaintiff Becker.
Rose alleges that Mayor Ruoff, Officer Redmon and the Village replaced signs on State Route 303 with signs that were 15 m.p.h. lower than the speed authorized by state law. Allegedly this was done sometime before July 9, 1991 for the purpose of increasing Village revenues. Rose also alleges a variety of Village actions indicating that Peninsula was having financial problems and further states that Ruoff advised the police to charge people with violations of Village ordinances rather than state violations so that the municipality could collect any fees or fines.
On July 9, 1991, at 6:25 a.m., Rose was stopped by Redmon and cited for going 52 m.p.h. in a section posted 35 m.p.h. Rose claims first, that the road signs were unauthorized because the state has no record of a request to reduce the speed and had not granted such a request. Second, Rose claims that Redmon's radar gun was 20% inaccurate. Third, Rose claims that the intersection of Dogwood Lane and Rt. 303 () is not within the boundaries of Peninsula.
Based on Redmon's seizure of Rose pursuant to the moving violation, Redmon also came to believe that Rose had an expired driver's license. Therefore, Rose was given two citations and summons which required Rose to appear in Peninsula Mayor's Court.
Rose first obtained a continuance and then appeared pro se on August 14, 1991. Following his plea of not guilty, Rose was tried before Mayor Ruoff who found him guilty and imposed an unspecified sanction. Ruoff is the Mayor and Chief Executive Officer of the Village and is responsible for the financial condition of the village and is the chief conservator of the peace. He is also the person responsible for hiring Officer Redmon.
On August 20, 1991, Rose filed for a trial de novo in Cuyahoga Falls Municipal Court. On September 12, his retained counsel filed a motion to dismiss. On September 23, 1991, the Village dismissed the charges against Rose, thereby terminating the case.
Becker alleges that he was ticketed for speeding February 9, 1992 and appeared before the Mayor's Court on February 12. Becker entered a plea of not guilty and his case was continued to April 1, 1992. At the trial before Ruoff, Becker claimed that the officer mistook Becker's car for a similar car which passed his at high speed. Ruoff purportedly said, Ruoff found Becker guilty and imposed an unspecified sentence.
On April 8, Becker appealed to the Municipal Court and on April 23, filed a motion to dismiss. On May 13, the Municipal Court dismissed the case against Becker without ruling on the merits of the motion to dismiss.
In Count I, Rose and Becker claim that they were deprived of a substantive due process right to have their cases heard before a court of competent jurisdiction, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs request a preliminary and permanent injunction and $20,000 jointly and severally from Ruoff and the Village as compensatory damages. In addition, plaintiffs pray for the sum of $250,000 in punitive damages from Ruoff. Plaintiffs' complaint includes a discussion of certain cases upon which this civil rights claim is based.
In form, Count II is substantially similar to Count I. The underlying facts, the remedy sought and the underlying legal theory are identical. The only difference is that Count II alleges a deprivation of the substantive due process right to have a case heard by a disinterested and impartial judge.
Count III applies only to Rose. This count alleges that Ruoff, Redmon and the Village conspired against Rose by "1) enforcing Village ordinances that are in conflict with and pre-empted by Ohio law, by posting of Speed Limit signs that are fifteen (15) miles per hour lower than authorized by State Law, and 2) by using such pre-empted and void signs and ordinances to seize, prosecute, and convict Plaintiff Rose of Municipal Ordinance violations in the Village of Peninsula Mayor's Court was outrageous, abhorrent, and an arbitrary abuse of power violative of Due Process of Law." (¶ 128.)
Count IV is also limited to Rose. Rose claims that the Village and Redmon violated his fourth amendment rights by seizing him "in the absence of probable cause or reasonable suspicion". (¶ 133.)
In Count V, Rose and Becker ask that Ohio Rev.Code § 2945.72(F) be declared unconstitutional. This section relates to extending time for trial when removal or change of venue is necessitated by judicial bias.
Finally, in Count VI, Rose claims that his rights to due process and equal protection are violated by a law which prohibits him from representing people in Mayor's Court because he is not a lawyer while Ruoff, the judge, is also not a lawyer.
For purposes of clarity, the court will first examine the general objections to each count made on behalf of all defendants. The court will then examine the individual immunity arguments raised in the motions filed by defendants Ruoff and Redmon as they relate to counts not dismissed based on general infirmities.
In Count I plaintiffs claim to have been deprived by defendant Ruoff and the Village of Peninsula of a fundamental liberty right of due process: the right to have their contested traffic cases heard in a court of proper jurisdiction. Similarly, in the allegations of Count II, plaintiffs claim a denial of due process, again by Ruoff and the Village of Peninsula, viz. the right to have a disinterested and impartial judge hear and decide their contested traffic cases. These counts shall be considered together because they are substantially similar. This court's analysis which follows suggests that Count I is only valid if Count II is also valid.
The Ohio Revised Code provides, in relevant part:
the mayor of the municipal corporation has jurisdiction ... to hear and determine all criminal causes involving any moving traffic violation occurring on a state highway located within the boundaries of the municipal corporation, subject to the limitations of sections 2937.08 and 2938.04 of the Revised Code.
Section 2937.08 provides that "if the nature of the offense is such that right to jury trial exists, such matter shall not be tried before the mayor unless the accused, by writing subscribed by him, waives a jury and consents to be tried by the mayor." See Brunswick v. Giglio, 39 Ohio Misc.2d 5, 530 N.E.2d 37 (* * * * * 1988) Section 2938.04 likewise provides for a jury trial before a court of record in compliance with Ohio Rev. Code § 2945.17 which authorizes jury trials in all causes involving penalties which exceed $100. A mayor's court is not a court of record.
In sum, by statute, the Peninsula Mayor's Court appears authorized to conduct trials in cases involving traffic violations occurring within the Village when the fine for such violation is $100 or less.
Recitations of the statutory provisions mentioned aside, however, plaintiff's contentions raise once again issues surrounding the legal propriety of the Ohio Mayor's Court system. This system has been the subject of judicial scrutiny for more than six decades.
The Supreme Court took up the question of whether convictions by Ohio's mayor's courts satisfied the Fourteenth Amendment requirement of due process in Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 47 S.Ct. 437, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927) (Taft, C.J.). Tumey involved fines levied pursuant to the Ohio Prohibition Act which act extended the jurisdiction of the mayor's court county-wide to allow zealous communities to root out local alcohol dens harbored in more permissive surrounding communities. Id. at 520-21, 47 S.Ct. at 440. In addition to providing the legal authority to enforce prohibition, the Ohio Prohibition Act also provided financial incentives to stimulate enforcement of the law — fines collected from convictions were evenly split between the state and the convicting village. Id. at 521, 47 S.Ct. at 440.
But as ultimately discovered in Tumey, not only did the prosecuting municipality have a general interest in the monies to be collected, the mayor himself had a direct and personal stake. From May 11, 1923 to December 31, 1923, the mayor/judge received $696.35 above his regular salary collected from the monies collected from violators of the prohibition law. Id. In the particular case of defendant Tumey, the mayor received an additional $12.00 which he would not have received had Tumey been acquitted. Id. at 522, 47 S.Ct. at 440.
Responding to Tumey's claim that he was deprived of due process, the Court held:
No matter what the evidence was against him, he had the right to have an impartial judge. He seasonably raised the objection and was entitled to halt the trial because of the disqualification of the judge which existed both...
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