Rose v. Washington Times Co.
| Decision Date | 09 January 1928 |
| Docket Number | No. 4586.,4586. |
| Citation | 23 F.2d 993 |
| Parties | ROSE v. WASHINGTON TIMES CO. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
George R. Sherriff and W. C. Burton, both of Washington, D. C., for appellant.
W. J. Lambert and May T. Bigelow, both of Washington, D. C., for appellee.
Before MARTIN, Chief Justice, and ROBB and VAN ORSDEL, Associate Justices.
On October 25, 1926, appellant, as plaintiff, filed a declaration against appellee to recover damages because of an alleged libelous publication appearing on July 18, 1924, in a newspaper owned and published by appellee. Appellee filed a plea alleging that the cause of action sued upon had accrued more than one year before the commencement of the suit, and was therefore barred by the statute of limitations. Appellant filed a replication alleging that he was imprisoned, and therefore under a disability, from July 18, 1924, until the 1st day of December, 1925, by reason of the fact that he was placed under arrest by the police officials of the District of Columbia, under charges of violating the National Prohibition Act, and that he was then placed under bond and held to bail, and remained under bond continuously from July 18, 1924, until December 1, 1925, when a nolle prosequi of the charge was entered, and his bail and bond were discharged. Appellee filed a demurrer to the replication, which was sustained by the lower court. Appellant elected to stand on the demurrer, whereupon judgment dismissing the case was entered, and this appeal was taken.
Section 1265, D. C. Code, requires that actions for libel shall be brought within one year after the accrual of the right of action, but provides, nevertheless, that, if the complaining party be imprisoned at the time when the cause of action accrues, he may bring the action within one year after the removal of such disability. The sole question presented by this appeal is whether the arrest of the appellant by the police officials of the District of Columbia under charges of violating the National Prohibition Act (27 USCA), and his release under bond, and the fact that he remained continuously under bail from July 18, 1924, until December 1, 1925, constituted "imprisonment" within the sense of the statute.
Appellant contends that when an accused is admitted to bail he is in contemplation of law delivered into the custody of his bail, and remains so from the moment when a bond or recognizance is executed until he is discharged or recommitted; that the bail, whenever they choose to do so, may seize the accused and deliver him up for their discharge; that the accused, therefore, when admitted to bail, is not restored to complete liberty of action, but remains subject to a measure of involuntary restraint; and that in law the custody of the bail is but a continuance of the original imprisonment of the accused. Appellant cites numerous authorities in support of these views, none of them, however, having special reference to the use of the word "imprisoned" in the statute of limitations.
The principles involved in the present appeal were passed upon...
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