Rosenberger v. KOOTENAI COUNTY SHERIFF'S, No. 29777

• Decision Date: 17 December 2004
• Docket Number: No. 29778., No. 29777
• Citation: 103 P.3d 466,140 Idaho 853
• Parties: Michael D. ROSENBERGER and Jeanne Rosenberger, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. KOOTENAI COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT; and Kevin Mumford, Defendants-Appellants, and Idaho State Police, a division of the Department of Law Enforcement; and Gerald Stemm, Defendants. Michael D. Rosenberger and Jeanne Rosenberger, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Gerald Stemm, Defendant-Appellant, and Kootenai County Sheriff's Department; Idaho State Police, a division of the Department of Law Enforcement; and Kevin Mumford, Defendants.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

103 P.3d 466

140 Idaho 853

Michael D. ROSENBERGER and Jeanne Rosenberger, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. KOOTENAI COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT; and Kevin Mumford, Defendants-Appellants, and Idaho State Police, a division of the Department of Law Enforcement; and Gerald Stemm, Defendants.

Michael D. Rosenberger and Jeanne Rosenberger, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Gerald Stemm, Defendant-Appellant, and Kootenai County Sheriff's Department; Idaho State Police, a division of the Department of Law Enforcement; and Kevin Mumford, Defendants.

Nos. 29777, 29778.

Supreme Court of Idaho, Coeur d'Alene, October 2004 Term.

December 17, 2004.

Paine, Hamblen, Coffin, Brooke & Miller, Coeur d'Alene, for appellants, Kootenai County Sheriff's Department and Mumford. Darrin L. Murphey argued.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for appellant Stemm. Michael G. McPeek, Deputy Attorney General argued.

Kenneth B. Howard, Jr., Coeur d'Alene, argued for respondents Rosenbergers.

KIDWELL, Justice.

Michael Rosenberger filed this action in district court alleging that Trooper Stemm and Deputy Mumford used excessive force in arresting him. The district court held that Stemm and Mumford were not entitled to qualified immunity and the officers appealed. This Court reverses the judgment of the district court.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A civil disturbance broke out in the downtown area in Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, during the annual Car d'Alene Cruise, on June 18, 1999. Police forces gathered to establish control over the unruly crowd, resulting in the arrest of several people. Trooper Stemm, of the Idaho State Police, and Deputy Mumford, of the Kootenai County Sheriff's Department, were dressed in riot gear and positioned on the corner of 4th Street and Sherman Avenue, with instructions to keep people from entering Sherman Avenue. Stemm and Mumford arrested Rosenberger, though the facts leading up to his arrest are in dispute.

Rosenberger asserts that the intersection was free of pedestrians and that he approached the police officers and said he needed to get his car and "see about his wife." He claims that he heard an officer say, "You have to leave" but did not realize the officer was talking to him; however, he testified in district court that he responded to the officer by saying, "Well, let me leave. My car's right there. Let me go." In addition to not being warned, he further alleges he was not told he was under arrest. He asserts he did not swear, yell or touch any of the officers. Rosenberger claims the police immediately resorted to violence and, as a result of the double arm-bar takedown method employed by the officers, his head and shoulder hit the ground causing a large abrasion. Rosenberger's injuries required hospitalization and surgery.

The police claim Rosenberger appeared to be under the influence of alcohol and agitated, yelling at the police demanding to know where his wife was. The police allege they told him that his wife had been arrested and taken to jail and told him to "go or go to jail" approximately seven times. They further assert that his yelling and refusal to leave were inciting the already hostile crowd. The police claim they advised Rosenberger he was under arrest, and he replied, "No, I'm not." The police allege that they reached for his arms, he pulled them away in a defensive manner and started to back into the crowd. Eventually, the police used a double arm-bar takedown placing him on the ground face first and placed hinge-cuffs on him.

An individual videotaping the civil disturbance caught this incident on tape. The video, which was admitted into evidence, shows the crowd behind the police and several people directly in front of the police yelling profanities at them. It shows Rosenberger stepping in front of the hostile group of people and approaching the police in an aggressive manner, repeatedly shouting, "I want to know where my wife is!" The video confirms that Stemm repeatedly said, "Go or go to jail." After Rosenberger refused to leave, Stemm stepped towards Rosenberger. The video shows Rosenberger pulling his arms back in a defensive manner and stepping back into the crowd, in addition to the takedown and arrest of Rosenberger by the officers.

As a result of the incident, Rosenberger was convicted by a jury in a criminal action for resisting or obstructing officers in violation of Idaho Code § 18-705. Rosenberger filed suit in district court alleging he suffered personal injuries caused by defendants' use of excessive force in arresting him. Rosenberger brought the action against the Kootenai County Sheriff's Office, Idaho State Police, Trooper Stemm and Deputy Mumford, alleging state law tort claims and federal 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims.

All defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment as to the state law claims against all defendants and the § 1983 claims against Kootenai County Sheriff's Office and the Idaho State Police. The district court denied Stemm and Mumford's motions for summary judgment on the § 1983 claims based on a determination that they were not entitled to qualified immunity. Stemm and Mumford each requested reconsideration of this determination and permissive appeal if the finding was affirmed. The denial of qualified immunity was affirmed and the district court issued an order granting permissive appeal, as did this Court. We hold Stemm and Mumford are entitled to qualified immunity.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Regarding constitutional issues, whether the facts in the record demonstrate a violation of the claimant's constitutional rights is decided independently of the district court's conclusions. Willie v. Bd. of Trustees, 138 Idaho 131, 133, 59 P.3d 302, 304 (2002).

III. ANALYSIS

A. The District Court Erred In Denying Appellants' Motion For Summary Judgment Based On The Defense Of Qualified Immunity.

The only claims on appeal to this Court are the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against Appellants Stemm and Mumford since the other claims were disposed of by the district court when it granted partial summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Section 1983 provides "a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271, 114 S.Ct. 807, 811, 127 L.Ed.2d 114, 122 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144, n. 3, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 2694, n. 3, 61 L.Ed.2d 433, 442, n. 3 (1979)). The relevant portion reads:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, ...

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Rosenberger alleges that Stemm and Mumford violated his Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force in arresting him. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989), established the general proposition that excessive use of force is contrary to the Fourth Amendment. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-01, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 2155-56, 150 L.Ed.2d 272, 280-81 (2001). However, "[n]ot every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge's chambers, violates the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 209, 121 S.Ct. at 2160, 150 L.Ed.2d at 286 (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. at 1872, 104 L.Ed.2d at 455). In Graham, the Supreme Court noted that "[o]ur Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has long recognized that the right to make an arrest ... necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it." Id. at 208, 121 S.Ct. at 2160, 150 L.Ed.2d at 286 (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. at 1871-72, 104 L.Ed.2d at 455).

Excessive use of force claims are evaluated for objective reasonableness based upon the information the officers had when the conduct occurred. Id. at 207, 121 S.Ct. at 2159,150 L.Ed.2d at 285. There may be a gray area when determining what degree of physical force or coercion is excessive. Qualified immunity protects officers from the "hazy border between excessive and acceptable force," and ensures that before they are subjected to suit, officers are on notice their conduct is unlawful. Id. at 200-01, 121 S.Ct. at 2155-56, 150 L.Ed.2d at 280-81 (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 225, 13 L.Ed.2d 142, 145 (1964)). Qualified immunity is "an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial." Id. (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2815, 86 L.Ed.2d 411, 425 (1985)). If qualified immunity is requested in a suit against an officer for an alleged violation of a constitutional right, a ruling on the issue of qualified immunity should be made early in the proceedings so that costs and expenses of trial are avoided where the defense is dispositive. Id. at 200, 121 S.Ct. at 2155, 150 L.Ed.2d at 280.

In determining whether qualified immunity is appropriate, it is imperative to note that the decision is not based on whether a material issue exists regarding the excessive use of force claim. The United States Supreme Court rejected this approach in Saucier v. Katz. In that case, the Supreme Court overruled a decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, stating, "The approach the Court of Appeals adopted—to deny summary judgment any time a material issue of fact remains on the excessive force claim—could undermine the goal of qualified immunity to `avoid excessive disruption of government and permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment.'" Id. at 202, 121 S.Ct. at 2156, 150 L.Ed.2d at 282 (...