Willie v. Board of Trustees

• Decision Date: 13 November 2002
• Docket Number: No. 27384.,27384.
• Citation: 59 P.3d 302,138 Idaho 131
• Parties: Tim WILLIE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES, Oneida School District No. 351; Lynn Schow, in his official capacity as Superintendent of Oneida School District No. 351, Defendants-Respondents.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

59 P.3d 302

138 Idaho 131

Tim WILLIE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES, Oneida School District No. 351; Lynn Schow, in his official capacity as Superintendent of Oneida School District No. 351, Defendants-Respondents.

No. 27384.

Supreme Court of Idaho, Pocatello, September 2002 Term.

November 13, 2002.

John E. Rumel, Boise, for appellant.

Anderson, Julian & Hull, Boise, for respondents. Brian K. Julian argued.

KIDWELL, Justice.

Appeal by Tim Willie, a high school teacher, from a grant of summary judgment in favor of Oneida School District on his claims for breach of employment contract, violation of public policy, and violation of constitutional rights including freedom of speech and association. The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Oneida School District (District) hired Tim Willie (Willie) as a teacher for the 1996-97 school year. Willie was certified to teach Business Education 6/12, Vocational Business Education, Marketing Ed 6/12, Vocational Marketing 6/12, Social Studies 6/12, and to serve as a Work Based Learning Coordinator. Willie's duties included supervising a newly created Alternative School Program and coaching the high school football team.

The District renewed Willie's contract for the 1997-98 and 1998-99 school years. The contract stated:

It is understood and agreed between the parties that this contract is subject to the applicable laws of the State of Idaho, the duly adopted rules of the State Board of Education and the policies of the District which are, by reference, incorporated herein and made a part of this agreement the same as if fully set forth herein.

Willie's contract incorporated a Reduction In Force (RIF) policy the Board adopted in the early 1980's. The policy provided a procedure in the event that the District needed to reduce its work force. The RIF policy stated, in relevant part: "When, in the judgement [sic] of the Board of Trustees, a decline in enrollment, a reduction of program, a loss of revenue, or any other reason requires a reduction in staff, the administration shall attempt to accomplish the same by attrition ...." The policy then explains in detail that a reduction in force will proceed on a seniority basis if not accomplished by attrition.

During its February 24, 1999 meeting, the Board, at the recommendation of District administrators, eliminated the Alternative School Program in favor of hiring an additional science teacher. District administrators were seeking a new science teacher in response to parent complaints that the high school did not offer a sufficient curriculum to prepare students for college. Willie was not certified, and therefore not qualified, to teach science. The Board unanimously decided not to renew Willie's teaching contract for a fourth year at the same meeting. The Board made no decision regarding Willie's status as football coach at that time.

In a letter dated March 1, 1999, the District's superintendent, Lynn Schow (Schow), informed Willie of the Board's decision to close the Alternative School Program and not to renew his contract. In the same letter, Schow notified Willie of his right to request an informal review. The letter stated the decision not to renew Willie's contract resulted from the change in curriculum and was not related to unsatisfactory performance. Willie requested an informal review in a letter dated March 16, 1999. The Board affirmed its previous decision at the informal review. In a letter dated June 23, 1999, the Board informed Willie that its decision not to renew his teaching contract also included non-renewal of his contract as head football coach.

On June 21, 1999, Willie filed a complaint in which he sought a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and damages. Willie amended his complaint on August 4, 1999, and again on June 1, 2000. The District and Schow moved for summary judgment on October 30, 2000. On January 2, 2001, the district court heard the motion and on January 22, 2001, it issued an order granting summary judgment in favor of the District and Schow. Willie now appeals from the district court's order granting summary judgment.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court has formulated the standard of review for summary judgment as:

Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. When reviewing an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, this Court employs the same standard used by the district court originally ruling on the motion ... ascertain[ing] whether any genuine issues of material fact exist, and whether the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law..., this Court should liberally construe all facts in favor of the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences from the facts in favor of the nonmoving party. Summary judgment must be denied if reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the evidence presented. If the moving party challenges an element of the nonmoving party's case on the basis that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to present evidence that is sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact ... [t]he nonmoving party must submit more than just conclusory assertions that an issue of material fact exists to establish a genuine issue.

Northwest Bec Corp v. Home Living Servs., 136 Idaho 835, 838-39, 41 P.3d 263, 266-67 (2002) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

Regarding constitutional issues, this Court decides whether the facts in the record demonstrate a violation of the claimant's constitutional rights independently of the district court. Bradbury v. Idaho Judicial Council, 136 Idaho 63, 67-68, 28 P.3d 1006, 1010-11 (2001).

III. ANALYSIS

A. The District Court Did Not Err In Granting Summary Judgment.

1. There Is No Genuine Issue Of Material Fact Regarding Willie's Breach Of Contract Claim.

Willie argues the District's RIF policy is ambiguous and the District breached Willie's contract by failing to apply the RIF policy when deciding not to renew his contract. The District argues the RIF policy does not apply to Willie because it is unambiguous and applies only when there is a "reduction in force" and there was no reduction in force, i.e., the District did not reduce the total number of teachers it employs.

The RIF policy became part of Willie's contract and, if triggered, would apply to actions affecting him. The RIF policy states in relevant part: "[w]hen, in the judgement [sic] of the Board of Trustees, a decline in enrollment, a reduction of program, a loss of revenue, or any other reason requires a reduction in staff, the administration shall attempt to accomplish the same by attrition." The policy also explains that in the event attrition is not sufficient to accomplish a reduction in force, then layoffs will occur on a seniority basis. The plain and unambiguous language of the RIF policy makes it clear that it applies only when there is a "reduction in force," i.e., when the District reduces the total number of staff (teachers in this case) it employs.

Willie's argument that the term "reduction in staff" is ambiguous because reasonable minds could differ over whether it refers to an overall reduction of staff or, as in his case, the loss of one staff member due to elimination of a program, is strained. The RIF policy clearly refers to an overall or aggregate reduction in staff, not to a single occasion of non-renewal and replacement.

The facts show there was no reduction in force; rather, one teacher replaced another. Therefore, this Court finds that the RIF policy is unambiguous and did not apply to the District's decision not to renew Willie's contract. As a consequence, the District did not breach its contract with Willie.

2. There Is No Genuine Issue Of Material Fact Regarding Willie's Claims Based On Violation Of Public Policy, The Idaho Constitution, or 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Willie claims his participation in the union, which is protected association and speech activity, is the reason the District decided not to renew his contract. Willie also asserts that the District's actions violate Idaho public policy, the Idaho Constitution, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The District counters that Willie's union participation played no role in its decision not to renew his contract and that the decision was based solely on a change in curriculum.

Willie must produce some evidence that the District's decision not to renew his teaching contract was based on his union participation in order to withstand summary judgment on his claims for violation of public policy,¹ the Idaho Constitution, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Crea v. FMC Corp., 135 Idaho 175, 178, 16 P.3d 272, 275 (2000)

(discussing public policy and employment at will); Plumeau v. School District # 40 County of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir.1997); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994); Aberdeen Springfield Canal Co. v. Peiper, 133 Idaho 82, 92, 982 P.2d 917, 927 (1999); DeMoss v. City of Coeur d' Alene, 118 Idaho 176, 179-80, 795 P.2d 875, 878-79 (1990) (discussing requirements necessary to prove a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

Willie argues that the following points create a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of whether the District's decision to not renew his contract was based on his union activity: (1) the District and Schow knew they would be forced to negotiate with him as a newly elected union officer; (2) after deciding not to renew his contract, the District informed the union Willie could not serve as a negotiator because he was no longer an employee; (3) the District informed him his contract to coach the football team would not be renewed the day after it was served with his...