Rosenthal v. Scott, 30961

• Citation: 131 So.2d 480
• Decision Date: 21 June 1961
• Docket Number: No. 30961,30961
• Parties: Murray ROSENTHAL and Joseph Rosenthal, Petitioners, v. Paul Andrew SCOTT, Respondent.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Florida

Page 480

131 So.2d 480

Murray ROSENTHAL and Joseph Rosenthal, Petitioners, v. Paul Andrew SCOTT, Respondent.

No. 30961.

Supreme Court of Florida.

June 21, 1961.

Reece & Murray, Miami, for petitioners.

David Goldman, Miami, for respondent.

ROBERTS, Justice.

This cause is before the court on a petition for writ of certiorari filed by Murray and Joseph Rosenthal in which they seek review of a decision of the District Court of Appeal, Third District, appearing at 118 So.2d 555, contending that the above mentioned decision is in direct conflict with the decisions of this court in Mims v. Reid, Fla.1957, 98 So.2d 498 and Hough v. Menses, Fla.1957, 95 So.2d 410. Noting probable jurisdiction this court issued the writ and heard argument in the cause.

Although the decision of the District Court was in effect a per curiam reversal without opinion, the judgment was supported in part by the special concurring opinion of Judge Barns, and which special concurring opinion (though not adopted by a majority of the court) sets forth adequate factual background for the purpose of this order. At first appearance it would seem that the opinion of Judge Barns is the opinion of the District Court, but a more careful examination reveals that neither of the other judges agreed to the opinion, limiting their concurrence to the judgment of reversal only. Thus, we have a situation where the judgment of the Circuit Court was reversed without opinion by the District Court.

We come first to the question of whether or not this court has jurisdiction under Article V of the Constitution of Florida, F.S.A. to review the cause. We find the discharge of our constitutional duty in making this determination to be indeed difficult because we do not have before us an opinion agreed to by a majority of the District Court. This court has no absolute rule that requires an appellate court to write an opinion in deciding a cause brought before it; however, we have said in Florida Hotel and Restaurant Commission v. Dowler, Fla.1958, 99 So.2d 852, 853: 'It has long been the custom and practice in this court to write an opinion where the judgment being reviewed is reversed * * *.' This is indeed logical because, to reverse a lower court and remand the cause for further proceedings without some indication of the error committed or the manner in which the reviewing court expects the cause to proceed in the lower court, would leave the court under review in doubt and confusion as to what error had been committed and what corrections were expected in the future course of the case.

Further consideration of the record reveals that our final disposition of the jurisdictional question would be facilitated, and this court's duty to preserve harmony and uniformity among the decisions of the appellate courts of this state could be more readily performed, by an expression by the appellate court of the theory and reasoning upon which it based its judgment of reversal. In these circumstances we do not deem it unreasonable to request the appellate court to do so. Cf. State v. Bruno, Fla.1958, 104 So.2d 588.

A similar procedure is followed by the United States Supreme Court in determining whether a substantial federal question within the jurisdiction of that court was properly raised and necessarily determined by a state court of last resort. See Honeyman v. Hanan, 1936, 300 U.S. 14, 22, 57 S.Ct. 350, 81 L.Ed. 476; State of Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 1940, 309 U.S. 551, 60 S.Ct. 676, 84 L.Ed. 920; Blackburn v. State of Alabama, 1956, 354 U.S. 393, 77 S.Ct. 1098, 1 L.Ed.2d 1423. The language of the United States Supreme Court in State of Minnesota v. National Tea Co., supra, in its discussion of the necessity for such clarification, could well be paraphrased to fit the situation here. We do not do so, however, but quote verbatim from that court's opinion, as follows:

'It is fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered by us in interpreting their state constitutions. But it is equally important that ambiguous or obscure adjudications by state courts do not stand as barriers to a determination by this Court of the validity under the federal constitution of state action. Intelligent exercise of our appellate powers compels us to ask for the elimination of the obscurities and ambiguities from the opinions in such cases. Only then can we ascertain whether or not our jurisdiction to review should be invoked. Only by that procedure can the responsibility for striking down or upholding state legislation be fairly placed. For no other course assures that important federal issues, such as have been argued here, will reach this Court for adjudication; that state...