Ross v. Brotherhood

• Citation: 95 N.W. 207,120 Iowa 692
• Parties: WILLIAM N. ROSS, Appellant, v. MODERN BROTHERHOOD OF AMERICA
• Decision Date: 26 May 1903
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Iowa

95 N.W. 207

120 Iowa 692

WILLIAM N. ROSS, Appellant, v. MODERN BROTHERHOOD OF AMERICA

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

May 26, 1903

Appeal from Buchanan District Court.--HON. F. O. PLATT, Judge.

THE defendant is a mutual benefit association, and on the 4th day of May, 1897, issued to the plaintiff its certificate of membership and insurance, which provided for the payment of $ 200 "for each broken arm or leg resulting from accident." The certificate also contained the following agreement: "This benefit certificate is issued and accepted upon the following express warranties, conditions and agreements: First. This certificate, the articles of incorporation, fundamental laws, by-laws, rules and regulations of this fraternity, now in force or which may be hereafter adopted, and the application for membership including the physician's report, a copy of which is hereto attached, shall together, constitute the exclusive contract between this fraternity, the member and the beneficiary." In October, 1900, the supreme lodge of the defendant regularly adopted a by-law defining what should constitute a broken leg within the meaning of its certificate, as follows: "The breaking of a leg is specifically defined to be the breaking of the shaft of the thigh bone between the hip and the knee joints, or the breaking of the shaft of both bones between the knee and ankle joints, and no payment will be made for a broken * * * leg unless the same comes under the definition of a broken * * * leg as above set out." In February, 1901, the plaintiff had one bone of the right leg broken between the knee and ankle joint, and brings this action to recover therefor under his certificate. The defendant alleges no liability under the by-laws in force at the time of the accident. The case was tried in equity upon an agreed statement of facts, and a judgment rendered for the defendant. The plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

E. E Hasner for appellant.

Grimm Trewin & Moffit and Barry Gilbert for appellee.

OPINION

SHERWIN, J.

Before the adoption of the by-laws of October, 1900, defining specifically what should constitute a broken leg, there was no definition or regulation governing this matter, as we understand the record; and it is conceded tat, if the plaintiff is not bound by this enactment, he is entitled to recover. The plaintiff's action is based upon the certificate issued to him by the defendant, and it is the contract upon which his rights against the defendant must rest, and by which the liability of the defendant must be measured. The certificate which the plaintiff accepted as his contract with the defendant provides that "the articles of incorporation, fundamental laws, by-laws, rules, and regulations * * * now in force, or which may be hereafter adopted, shall together constitute the exclusive contract" between the parties. It is, of course, elementary that parties competent to contract may make such contracts as they see fit, so long as the public is not injured thereby, and that courts will do no more than to construe them as they find them, regardless of the consequences to either of the contracting parties. It is argued that the by-law under consideration is unreasonable and therefore does not bind the plaintiff. But the language of the contract is broad, and clearly and expressly provides that future by-laws and rules and regulations shall constitute a part thereof. We know of no reason...