Ross v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co.

• Decision Date: 02 July 1906
• Citation: 119 Mo. App. 290,95 S.W. 977
• Parties: ROSS v. CHICAGO, R. I. & P. R. CO.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

95 S.W. 977

119 Mo. App. 290

ROSS v. CHICAGO, R. I. & P. R. CO.

Kansas City Court of Appeals. Missouri.

July 2, 1906.

1. CARRIERS — CARRIAGE OF GOODS—ACTION— PARTIES.

A suit on a transportation contract is properly brought in the name of the consignor, irrespective of whether he is the owner of the goods.

2. SAME — EVIDENCE—ADMISSIBILITY—VALUE OF GOODS.

In an action against a carrier for the loss of furniture having no market value in transportation, it was proper to admit evidence as to the value of the furniture at the place of shipment.

3. SAME—DELIVERY—NOTICE TO CONSIGNEE.

In the absence of a custom at the place of destination for carriers to give notice to consignees of the arrival of goods, no notice is required.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jackson County; John G. Park, Judge.

Action by Mrs. John A. Ross against the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

M. A. Low, Frank P. Sebree, and John D. Wendorff, for appellant. Meredith & Harwood, for respondent.

BROADDUS, P. J.

This suit originated in a justice's court, from which it was appealed to the circuit court, where it was again tried; the judgment being for the plaintiff. Defendant appealed.

On May 14, 1903, plaintiff delivered to the defendant a certain piece of furniture, called a "davenport," for transportation to East Cambridge, Mass., "consignee Mrs. Jas. P. Campbell, care of C. J. Anderson, Met. St. Warehouse, 134 Mass. Ave." Mrs. Campbell after a time notified plaintiff that she had not received the furniture, whereupon she began writing letters to defendant about its nondelivery. In October, 1905, defendant's agent wrote her that upon investigation he had ascertained that the shortage occurred on Eastern lines; the article having been billed over the defendant's route and that of the Boston & Albany Railroad. The furniture belonged to Mrs. Campbell, who broke up housekeeping in Kansas City in the year 1897, at which time she left it with the plaintiff, upon the understanding that, if plaintiff should care for it, the furniture would be a benefit to both of them, as the latter could use it. It was a part of the understanding that whenever plaintiff should break up housekeeping she would send it to Mrs. Campbell. Plaintiff testified that she paid the charges and billed the davenport as expressly directed by Mrs. Campbell. There was no evidence of the value of the property at the point of its destination. As it was secondhand furniture, evidence was introduced of its value to the person owning it.

The principal ground relied on by defendant for reversal is that the plaintiff had no ownership in the property. The authorities cited to sustain this view go to the extent of establishing the theory that Mrs. Campbell, the actual owner, was the proper party to bring the action. In Redfield on Carriers. § 322, the rule is stated that, "where the general property in the goods vests in the consignee, upon delivery to the carrier, the consignor has ordinarily no property remaining, even where he pays the freight." In Hale on Bailments and Carriers, pp. 546, 547, it is said that, "in the absence of an express contract it is presumed that the carrier is employed by the person at whose risk the goods are carried; that is, the person whose goods they are and who would suffer if they were lost. Prima facie, this is the consignee, and the consignor is presumed to contract for the transportation as his agent. Both these presumptions may be rebutted. * * * Whether the consignor contracted on his own behalf or as agent of the consignee depends, primarily, of course, upon the intention of the parties, and this will often be determined with a view to which party has the title to the goods." And such is the law as stated by Edwards on Bailments, § 665; Hutchinson on Carriers, § 720. The argument of defendant is that plaintiff's bailment ceased when she shipped the goods according to the express direction of the owner and at the latter's risk; that thereafter she had no such interest in the property as would authorize her to maintain an action for a breach of the contract of shipment. But there are other respectable authorities that hold to the view that a person having no interest in the property shipped, if he be the consignor and pay the charges, may maintain an...