Ross v. City of Dallas
| Decision Date | 31 March 2023 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 3:20-cv-1690-E,3:20-cv-2095-E |
| Parties | ETHELYN ROSS, Individually and as Mother and Independent Administrator of DIAMOND ROSS, deceased Plaintiff, v. CITY OF DALLAS, et al. Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
Before the Court is Defendant City of Dallas' Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings, (Doc. 41), seeking the dismissal of: (1) Plaintiff Ethelyn Ross's state-law claims against Defendants Larry Moody and William Ortega; (2) Plaintiff Ethelyn Ross's state-law claim against the City of Dallas; (3) Plaintiff Ethelyn Ross's claim for municipal liability under 42 U.S.C § 1983 against the City of Dallas; and (4) Plaintiff Clarence McNickles's claim for municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Dallas. For the reasons discussed below, the Motion is hereby GRANTED, and the claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
The Court previously outlined a detailed factual and procedural history related to this case in a previous order and memorandum opinion. See Ross v. City of Dallas, No 3:20-CV-1690-E, 2022 WL 992593 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2022). For the purposes of this memorandum opinion and order, the Court incorporates that background and will recite only additional background information relevant for the purposes of deciding this Motion.
This case arises from the death of Diamond Ross (“Ms Ross”), who was arrested in the early morning hours of August 18, 2018. While in police custody, Ross was transported to the hospital and died the next day from the toxic effects of phencyclidine (PCP). On June 25, 2020, Ms. Ross's mother Evelyn Ross (“Plaintiff Ross”) filed this suit against Defendants City of Dallas (“the City”) and Dallas Police Department Officers Larry Moody and William Ortega (“the Officers”). (Doc. 1). On August 6, 2020, Ms. Ross's father, Clarence McNickles (“Plaintiff McNickles”), also filed a lawsuit arising from Ms. Ross's death styled McNickles v. City of Dallas, et al., Civil Action No. 3:20-cv-02095-E. (McNickles, Doc. 1). On January 20, 2021, this Court issued an Order, (Doc. 17), granting Defendants' unopposed motion to consolidate McNickles's case with this proceeding. Plaintiffs did not amend their complaints following consolidation. Thus, Plaintiff Ross's operative complaint is her Second Amended Complaint (“the Ross Complaint”), (Doc. 15), and Plaintiff McNickles's operative complaint is his Original Complaint (“the McNickles Complaint”), (McNickles, Doc. 1).
The Ross Complaint asserts the following claims against the Officers: (1) a claim for the alleged violation of Ms. Ross's constitutional right to medical care under 42 U.S.C § 1983; (2) a willful-and-wanton survival claim under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 71.021; (2) a willful-and-wanton wrongful death claim under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 71.002004; and (3) a negligence claim under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code §§ 71.002-004, 71.021. . Plaintiff Ross also asserts the following claims against the City of Dallas: (1) a negligence claim under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code §§ 71.002-004; (2) a claim for municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the alleged violation of Ms. Ross's constitutional right to medical care; and (3) claims under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12134, 12131(2), and 12182, and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794. .
The McNickles Complaint asserts the following claims: (1) a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Officers for the alleged violation of Ms. Ross's constitutional right to medical care; (2) a claim against the City for municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against for the alleged violation of Ms. Ross's constitutional right to medical care; and (3) claims against the City under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2), and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794. .
On March 12, 2021, the Officers filed a Motion for Summary Judgment Based on Qualified Immunity, (Doc. 23), seeking the dismissal of both Plaintiff Ross and Plaintiff McNickles's § 1983 claims against them. On March 31, 2022, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Officers, concluding that they did not violate Ms. Ross's constitution right to medical attention and dismissing the § 1983 claims against them. (Doc. 39).
On August 4, 2022, Defendant City of Dallas filed the instant Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings, seeking the dismissal of: (1) Plaintiff Ross's state-law claims against the Officers under the “Election of Remedies” provision of the Texas Tort Claims Act[1]; (2) Plaintiff Ross's state-law negligence claim against the City under the doctrine of governmental immunity; (3) Plaintiff Ross's § 1983 claim against the City; and (4) Plaintiff McNickles's § 1983 claim against the City. (Doc. 41). For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants the City's Motion and dismisses each of these claims with prejudice.
Rule 12(c) permits a party to move for judgment on the pleadings after the pleadings are closed but early enough so as not to delay trial. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c). A motion brought pursuant to Rule 12(c) is “designed to dispose of cases where the material facts are not in dispute and a judgment on the merits can be rendered by looking to the substance of the pleadings and any judicially noticed facts.” Great Plains Tr. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2002) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A Rule 12(c) motion is decided under the same standard as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Guidry v. Am. Pub. Life Ins. Co., 512 F.3d 177, 180 (5th Cir. 2007). Under that standard, the Court “accepts all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 206 (5th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 12(c) motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. A complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations,” but the “allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The allegations pleaded must show “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
The Court concludes that Plaintiff Ross's state-law claims against the Officers must be dismissed because they are barred as a matter of law by the Texas Tort Claims Act (the “TTCA”). Plaintiff Ross asserts three state-law causes of action against the Officers: (1) a willful-and-wonton survival claim; (2) a willful-and-wrongful death claim; and (3) a negligence claim. Plaintiff Ross also asserts a negligence claim against t the City of Dallas. Because Plaintiff Ross brings claims under the TTCA against both a governmental unit-the City of Dallas-and its employees-the Officers-the claims against the Officers must be dismissed under Texas law.
Under Texas law, the Texas Tort Claims Act “essentially prevents an employee from being sued at all for work-related torts and instead provides for a suit against the governmental employer.” Garza v. Harrison, 574 S.W.3d 389, 400 (Tex. 2019). Section 101.106(e) of the TTCA states: “[i]f a suit is filed under this chapter against both a governmental unit and any of its employees, the employees shall immediately be dismissed on the filing of a motion by the governmental unit.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.106(e) (emphasis added). The Texas Supreme Court has held that “all tort theories of recovery alleged against a governmental unit are presumed to be under the [TTCA].” Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 253 S.W.3d 653, 659 (Tex. 2008) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Because it is a tort claim against a governmental unit, Plaintiff Ross's negligence claim is presumed to be under the TTCA. Moreover, this claim against the City is based on a theory of vicarious liability for the actions of the Officers. (Doc. 15, pg. 18, ¶ 84) (“[T]he City, by and through its agents and/or employees, Defendant Moody, Defendant Ortega, and others, acted contrary to law, and negligently, intentionally, and unreasonably deprived Ross of her rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the Fourteenth Amendment in a willful and wonton fashion.”). Thus, Plaintiff Ross brings a cause of action under the TTCA against the City that is rooted in the same alleged violations as her claims against the Officers. As such, § 101.106 precludes her from suing both the City and the Officers. See Bustos v. Martini Club Inc., 599 F.3d 458, 464 (5th Cir. 2010) ().
In response to the City's argument that the Officers must be dismissed under § 101.106(e), Plaintiff Ross argues that the City's decision to wait two years to file a ...
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